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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF JAPANESE IDENTITY AND ITS 
HAUNTING OTHERS 
by 
Yoshiko Yamada 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor François Debrix, Major Professor 
This dissertation examined the formation of Japanese identity politics after World 
War II. Since World War II, Japan has had to deal with a contradictory image of its 
national self. On the one hand, as a nation responsible for colonizing fellow Asian 
countries in the 1930s and 1940s, Japan has struggled with an image/identity as a 
regional aggressor. On the other hand, having faced the harsh realities of defeat after the 
war, Japan has seen itself depicted as a victim. By employing the technique of discourse 
analysis as a way to study identity formation through official foreign policy documents 
and news media narratives, this study reconceptualized Japanese foreign policy as a set of 
discursive practices that attempt to produce renewed images of Japan’s national self.  
The dissertation employed case studies to analyze two key sites of Japanese 
postwar identity formation: (1) the case of Okinawa, an island/territory integral to 
postwar relations between Japan and the United States and marked by a series of US 
military rapes of native Okinawan girls; and (2) the case of comfort women in Japan and 
East Asia, which has led to Japan being blamed for its wartime sexual enslavement of 
Asian women. These case studies found that it was through coping with the haunting 
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ghost of its wartime past that Japan sought to produce “postwar Japan” as an identity 
distinct from “wartime imperial Japan” or from “defeated, emasculated Japan” and, thus, 
hoped to emerge as a “reborn” moral and pacifist nation. The research showed that Japan 
struggled to invent a new self in a way that mobilized gendered dichotomies and, 
furthermore, created “others” who were not just spatially located (the United States, 
Asian neighboring nations) but also temporally marked (“old Japan”). The dissertation 
concluded that Japanese foreign policy is an ongoing struggle to define the Japanese 
national self vis-à-vis both spatial and historical “others,” and that, consequently, postwar 
Japan has always been haunted by its past self, no matter how much Japan’s foreign 
policy discourses were trying to make this past self into a distant or forgotten other. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The relationship between identity and foreign policy has been well studied by 
many International Relations (IR) scholars. For many of these scholars, identity is greatly 
relevant to foreign policy and to the political/policy behavior of states, providing 
meaningful explanations of how certain policy options are considered natural, normal, or 
legitimate as a response to given international political situations.   
Japan is a sovereign state where foreign policy has been examined in terms of its 
profound implications for identity politics. While Japan’s distinctiveness can be traced to 
its unique culture, its geographical location, and its history, many have suggested that the 
end of World War II is a critical point in Japanese identity formation in relation to its 
foreign policy. Indeed, the defeat in the war posed such unexpected challenges to the 
sense of Japanese national pride and honor that the Japanese self had to be reconstructed 
from the ground up after the war. The Japanese self that had been produced by, and had 
provided the foundation for, Japanese imperial projects prior to WWII was completely 
challenged by the total destruction of imperial Japan and the subsequent occupation by 
the Allies. In this context, the questions of “who we were” and “who we are now” for 
Japan were repeatedly asked in the postwar era, with the result that competing discourses 
about the self and others were inevitably produced. 
What postwar Japan had to face were two different realities. The first reality was 
that Japan was now a defeated nation. Most major cities were destroyed by air raids; the 
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki disappeared as a result of the dropping of the atomic 
bombs; and the country was for the first time occupied and controlled by a foreign power. 
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The overwhelming presence of the victorious United States in Japan had a significant 
impact on the Japanese redefinition of the national self, often leading to Japan identifying 
itself as a “war victim” now faced with a victorious occupier.  
Since Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952, it has been striving to transform its 
relationship with the United States and to put an end to this “victor-loser relationship.” 
Although claiming to have become a US ally, Japan to this day is still haunted by a sense 
of victimhood reproduced and reinforced through war memorials and the presence of US 
military bases built during the period of US occupation. In particular, American military 
bases, although essential for Japan’s national defense, tend to destabilize Japan’s 
projected identity as an independent and sovereign state. Therefore, military bases 
become crucial sites of Japanese identity formation vis-à-vis the United States. In a way, 
the issue of the alliance with the United States is not only about Japan’s defense and 
foreign policy. It is also, and primarily, a question of identity. 
While a sense of victimhood still lies at the core of the Japanese collective self 
today, postwar Japan has also been confronted with another reality: that of being a former 
barbaric aggressor state. Japan’s brutal acts during WWII were tried in the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, resulting in mass executions and punishments of 
Japanese war criminals. After normalizing diplomatic relations with neighboring Asian 
states after the war, Japan still had to face issues of war reparation and compensation. 
Overcoming the legacy of World War II and Asia’s mistrust has thus been an important 
agenda in postwar Japanese foreign policy. Wartime reparation issues are, indeed, 
repeatedly raised throughout Asia, thus contributing to the continued image of Japan as 
an international aggressor. Asian nations keep reminding Japan of its haunting wartime 
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legacy allegedly left behind by its past self. Lingering anti-Japanese sentiments in Asia 
overshadow diplomatic relations. And history still creates serious foreign policy issues 
that can easily ruin Japanese efforts to build renewed relations with the nations of Asia. 
These conflicting identities as victim and aggressor have long shaped Japan’s 
national self. Japan’s fragmented identity is continuously reproduced vis-à-vis these 
significant others through a variety of foreign policy issues. Japan, therefore, continues to 
struggle to distance itself from its past, both as a former victim and a former aggressor. 
Although identity can be considered to constitute the foundation of foreign policy and 
thus have certain political “effects,” this dissertation seeks to conceptualize Japanese 
foreign policy as a continual process through which the Japanese self is produced 
performatively in relation to foreign and external others. The approach I take in this 
research is derived from poststructuralist theory of International Relations. This specific 
analytical perspective allows me to examine the dynamic processes of state identity-
making in Japan. In the following section, I briefly introduce poststructuralism and 
another competing theory of identity construction prevalent in IR circles known as 
constructivism (I describe these two theories in more details in Chapter II).    
 
Identity and Foreign Policy 
In recent years, the question of identity has become one of the core issues within 
the discipline of International Relations. Although many mainstream and traditional 
approaches to IR have neglected the social dimension of international relations, treating 
states’ interests and identities as pre-given, more scholars of late have focused on identity 
as an important variable to explore the social construction of states and the states system 
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(Bar-Tal 2000; Katzenstein 1996a; 1996b; Telhami and Barnett 2002). In the 
constructivist IR tradition, Alexander Wendt, for example, has argued that states are 
inherently social constructions whose identities and interests are shaped and reshaped 
through processes of their own interaction. As states define “who we are” and “what we 
want” in relation to others, Wendt argues, state interactions are not only key to the social 
construction of states but also provide the foundation for the international social 
structures within which states give meaning to their action (Wendt 1992; 1999). Indeed, 
state practices determine the nature of the international structure, while changes in state 
behavior can develop different institutions under a condition of international anarchy. 
International structure is, in this sense, a social construction that has no intrinsic or 
essential logic of its own. Rather, state practices constitute the basis for international 
institutions, while these institutions, in turn, reshape state identities and interests. That is, 
state actors and international institutions are mutually constitutive.  
Constructivist studies, therefore, suggest the importance of identity and other 
ideational/cultural factors as variables to explain state behavior. “There is a shared 
presumption among the identity scholars in IR that identity is a source of an actor’s 
behavior and is therefore fundamental,” Kuniko Ashizawa writes (2008, 577). State 
behavior/foreign policy is shaped, if not determined, by the state’s understanding of “who 
we are” and “who they (others) are,” an understanding that helps the state define its 
interests and/or preferences. Describing foreign policy as a state’s action “made in order 
to fulfill a given preference, which is defined in terms of value (pro-attitude) perceived 
by agents of the state or decision makers,” Ashizawa thus argues that “a conception of 
state identity provides policymakers with a particular value, which sometimes becomes 
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the dominant value, and hence, defines the preference of state foreign policy” (2008, 580, 
581). Constructivists, in this sense, assert that there is a constitutive relationship between 
identity and foreign policy that should explain how particular practices are preferred 
while others are omitted from policy options.   
While this approach is widely accepted in the discipline today, other scholars 
have pointed to the limitations of this perspective and have drawn attention to the 
question of identity from a different perspective. In contrast to constructivists, 
poststructuralists have focused on the discursive production of identity by treating 
identity as an effect of discourse that is generated and sustained through a repeated 
practice of signification. In other words, poststructuralist scholars consider identity to 
result from representational practices, that is to say, the very representations and 
expressions of “what we/others are” give meanings and endow “us” or “them” with 
particular identity traits or features.  
The idea that identity is primarily a discursive construction fundamentally goes 
against the constructivist understanding of identity as something that can be possessed by 
a (preexisting) subject and acquired through social processes or interactions. Indeed, 
constructivist studies of foreign policy presuppose a political subject who perceives 
“what it is” and “what it wants” and acts accordingly. Thus, for constructivists, a 
subject’s identity can be regarded as a variable and as ontologically separable or distinct 
from foreign policy. By contrast, in drawing attention to discursive practices of foreign 
policy, poststructuralists look into the very processes through which the state self is 
articulated as “an initiator of action, a formulator of policy, an assessor of situations, and 
a definer of problems,” that is to say, a political subject in whose name foreign policy 
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operates (Doty 1993, 313). In this respect, poststructuralists observe that foreign policy is 
precisely a site or domain where the state is constituted “as it is” by performance, and 
that the state “has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its 
reality” (Butler 1990, 173). In other words, identity is not causally separable from foreign 
policy. There is, rather, a “co-constitutive” relationship between foreign policy and 
identity. And “identities are articulated as the reason why policies should be enacted, but 
they are also (re)produced through these very policy discourses: they are simultaneously 
(discursive) foundation and product” (Hansen 2006, 19). 
Accordingly, the poststructuralist conceptualization of identity makes it possible 
to critically question the notions of subject, agent, and identity, and thus to “shift analysis 
from assumptions about pre-given subjects to the problematic of subjectivity and its 
political enactment” (Campbell 2007, 219). Such a shift enables one to explore more 
carefully the dynamic nature of identity formation because identity exists “only insofar as 
it is continuously rearticulated and uncontested by competing discourses” (Hansen 2006, 
5). Therefore, as what poststructuralists call a discursive construction, “the subject is 
always in the process of being constituted,” that is to say, it is always “incomplete,” 
“unfinished,” and “unsettled” (Edkins and Pin-Fat 1999, 1).  
In this sense, central to a poststructuralist analysis of foreign policy is the 
discursive construction of subjects and its political and ethical outcomes, or what is often 
called “how-possible” questions. More precisely, unlike conventional “why-questions” 
asked by IR scholars in which analysis is “concerned with explaining why particular 
decisions resulting in specific courses of action were made,” “how-possible” questions 
ask “how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects/objects, thus 
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constituting particular interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities and 
preclude others” (Doty 1993, 298, emphasis in original). That is, by examining foreign 
policy discourse, this type of analysis calls into question what is presupposed by the more 
conventional “why-questions,” or “a particular subjectivity (i.e., a mode of being), a 
background of social/discursive practices and meanings which make possible the 
practices as well as the social actors themselves” (Doty 1993, 298). By doing so, this 
poststructuralist approach de-naturalizes what is taken-for-granted and thereby reveals 
how certain policies, beliefs, and behaviors become meaningful and legitimate as a result 
of the way “reality” is discursively articulated.    
 
Discourse Analysis 
As suggested above, the key to a poststructuralist analysis of identity is paying 
close attention to the role of discourse. Discourse “refers to a specific series of 
representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities 
constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or 
less possible” (Campbell 2007, 216). The term “discourse” would suggest that language 
plays an important role in producing discursive effects. Many poststructuralist studies of 
identity are based on particular understandings of language. Thus, concepts such as 
“intertextuality,” “performativity,” and “iterability” lie at the core of these analyses 
(Debrix 2003a; Doty 1993; Hansen 2006). Poststructuralists accordinglys engage in an 
analysis of various texts, including official documents, speeches, statements, newspapers, 
and academic literature. As Campbell’s definition implies, however, discourse also refers 
to broad representational practices. As such, discursive practices are not restricted to 
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linguistic representations. For example, Lene Hansen (2006) suggests that, in addition to 
the texts mentioned above, we could also include other textual sources in the analysis, 
such as film, television, computer games, photography, comics, music, painting, and 
architecture. Diverse modes of representation or signification are increasingly studied by 
many scholars today (Butler 2009; Campbell 2003; 2007; Dittmer 2005; Hansen 2006; 
Sharp 1996; Shapiro 2009; Weber 2006). Each of these representational forms provides a 
rich source of discourse, creating social realities, and thus producing political outcomes. 
Indeed, any type of text—written, spoken, cinematic, or even visual—should be 
“situated inside a larger intertextual web that traces intertextual references to other texts, 
thereby bringing in sources that are constructed either as supporting influences or as texts 
in need of repudiation” (Hansen 2006, 53). The key to this conception is the notion of 
intertextuality (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989). In other words, Hansen (2006, 49) 
explains: “all texts make references, explicitly or implicitly, to previous ones, and in 
doing so, they both establish their own reading and become mediations on the meaning 
and status of others. The meaning of a text is thus never fully given by the text itself but 
is always a product of other readings and interpretations.” Put differently, every text is 
interlinked with other texts in that it refers to prior texts and/or is based on conceptions, 
analogies, and categories developed by, and shared with, other texts. In this sense, as 
direct or indirect references to other texts construct a complex and boundlessly expanding 
intertextual link that “produces mutual legitimacy and creates an exchange at the level of 
meaning,” any text is “always located within a shared textual space” (Hansen 2006, 51, 
49).  
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The notion of intertextuality, accordingly, indicates that even official statements 
should not be seen as “entities standing separately from wider societal discourses but as 
entities located beyond other policy texts, into journalism, academic writing, popular 
non-fiction, and, potentially, even fiction” (Hansen 2006, 49). For instance, a magazine 
constitutes a site where popular imaginings of the international landscape are 
performatively constructed, while cultural/political norms (“common sense”) are also 
produced and reproduced (Sharp 1996). The popular magazines can be, thus, seen as “the 
very nexus of power/knowledge central to the workings of geopolitics,” providing wider 
societal and cultural resources with which foreign policy converges (Sharp 1996, 568).   
 To note, discourse analysis is a form of analysis that involves “the detailed 
explication of the discourse itself. This consists of examining various textual mechanisms 
at work in the discourse that construct identities for subjects and position these subjects 
vis-à-vis one another” (Doty 1993, 304). This also means that poststructuralists do not 
see various ways of representation as mere “tools” of signification or communication. As 
Hansen (2006, 16) notes: 
To poststructuralism, language is ontologically significant, it is only 
through the construction in language that “things”—objects, subjects, 
states, living beings, and material structures—are given meaning and 
endowed with a particular identity. Language is not a transparent tool 
functioning as a medium for the registration of data as (implicitly) 
assumed by positivist, empiricist science, but a field of social and political 
practice, and hence there is no objective or “true meaning” beyond the 
linguistic representation to which one can refer.  
 
That language is not a practical “tool” or “instrument” to represent things, but is both 
productive and constitutive of meaning, implies that the very acts of representation 
10 
“constitute the objects of which they speak”—that is, language is “performative” 
(Campbell 2007, 216). Roxanne Lynne Doty (1993, 302) also writes: 
A discursive practice is not traceable to a fixed and stable center, e.g., 
individual consciousness or a social collective. Discursive practices that 
constitute subjects and modes of subjectivity are dispersed, scattered 
throughout various locales. This is why the notion of intertextuality is 
important. Texts always refer back to other texts which themselves refer to 
still other texts. The power that is inherent in language is thus not 
something that is centralized, emanating from a pre-given subject. Rather, 
like the discursive practices in which it inheres, power is dispersed and, 
most important, is productive of subjects and their worlds. 
 
In the poststructuralist analysis of discourse, thus, the object of analysis is what language 
“does” (Debrix 2003a). Individuals using language are not seen as “the loci of meaning” 
(Doty 1993, 302). Subjectivity is rather a discursive construct.  
 To conduct discourse analysis, poststructuralists have developed various 
approaches (Milliken 1999). As Jennifer Milliken (1999, 231) writes, “there is no single 
method for analysis and abstraction along these lines, but rather a number of ways that 
scholars can identify key aspects of significative practices and, based on their study, 
establish a discourse.” Yet, it is common among poststructuralists to study predicates 
such as verbs, adverbs, and adjectives attached to nouns or “things” being constructed. 
These predicates give “things” attributes and establish relations between them 
(opposition, similarity, and complementarity, for example) whereby social realities are 
performatively constructed (Doty 1993; Milliken 1999). Further, poststructuralists 
analyze political and ethical effects created by discourses. That is, discourses authorize, 
legitimize, and naturalize certain possibilities (such as foreign policy options) while 
silencing/excluding others. 
11 
 It is important to keep in mind that the subjects constructed by discourse are 
always uncertain, unstable, and unfinished. As the notion of intertextuality suggests, 
discourse operates within “a complex and infinitely expanding web of possible 
meanings” (Doty 1993, 203). As such, intertextual links at times reinforce but at other 
times challenge meanings. The idea of intertextuality, however, does not deny the 
formation of dominant discourses, as an intertextual web often produces mutual 
legitimization, thereby making some discourses more powerful than others. However, 
there also exist competing discourses that would revise, contradict, or challenge dominant 
discourses. In this respect, discursive spaces always encompass competing meanings, and 
the competition between these various meanings can never be definitively settled (Weber 
2006). As Cynthia Weber (2006, 165) puts it, identity is, therefore, “a place to which we 
may aspire but at which we will never arrive.” There is no stable, finished identity as 
such; that is, it is impossible to “be an identity.” 
 
Cases of Identity Construction     
Following the poststructuralist conception of identity as a discursive construct, 
which can thus be studied by discourse analysis, my dissertation seeks to explain how 
Japan discursively or performatively constructs itself as a reborn nation by creating and 
externalizing otherness through a continual process of foreign policy. In order to explore 
this process, two major foreign policy issues critical to the construction of postwar Japan 
will be analyzed. As mentioned above, postwar Japan’s identity is split and confused. The 
United States and neighboring Asian nations, in particular, constitute important others for 
Japan. Thus, in my dissertation, I focus on specific issues of Japanese foreign policy that 
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have arisen with these key others. Here, I look in turn at these issues and give a brief 
overview of my case studies.   
The first case study will focus on the so-called Okinawa problem. Okinawa is the 
southernmost Japanese prefecture consisting of many small tropical islands. Okinawa 
provides a pertinent study in my dissertation for two reasons. First, Okinawa has been 
key in defining Japan’s relations with the United States since the end of World War Two. 
During the war, Okinawa became one of the few places where Japan and the United 
States fought a ground war within the present-day boundaries of Japan. Remembered as 
one of the most brutal and bloodiest battles between the two nations, the Battle of 
Okinawa resulted in the sacrifice of one quarter of the local population and reduced much 
of the islands to rubble. Indeed, the Battle of Okinawa is also called the “Typhoon of 
Steel.” The US military indiscriminately destroyed houses, cities, towns, cultural 
heritage, forests, and even farmland by air raids, flamethrowers, and, most notably, 
massive bombardment by warship cannons firing hundreds of thousands of tons of 
artillery. Most importantly, as a result of the Battle, Okinawa was detached from the rest 
of Japan and fell under the direct military control of the United States. Considering the 
islands to be a strategically important location, US forces constructed military facilities 
all around Okinawa and practically transformed the territory into “base islands” that 
played a crucial part as America’s military stronghold in the Pacific.  
Okinawa was finally returned to Japan in 1972. That year marked the formal end 
of US postwar occupation of the Japanese territory. Nevertheless, upon Okinawa’s 
reversion to Japan, American military bases that had long symbolized the foreign 
occupation of Okinawa were given a new role as the “cornerstone” of Japan-US security 
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arrangements, which, since the independence of postwar Japan, have largely determined 
the path of the relationship between Japan and the United States. Although still a symbol 
of US domination and a reminder of the victimhood of Japan, these US military bases 
today also serve as the foundation of the current Japan-US partnership, thus epitomizing 
the new phase in the bilateral relationship. 
Okinawa accordingly lies at the heart of Japanese collective memory and of 
Japan’s national imagination about “who we are.” Indeed, how to remember the history 
of Okinawa goes straight to the question of Japan’s identity since Okinawa is a symbol of 
Japan’s wartime victimhood vis-à-vis the United States and its postwar (and ongoing) 
subjugation to the victor country. And yet, Okinawa also offers the symbol of a renewed 
relationship between Japan and the United States as strategic security partners or even 
close friends. Japan, thus, can be represented as a state that has transformed itself from a 
subjugated state to become a respectable “partner” of the United States, even though the 
uninterrupted presence of the US military in Okinawa also suggests that Japan is in a 
continuous state of subjugation vis-à-vis a foreign power. Although, in the first 
perspective, Okinawa makes possible the image of a “new” Japan that has overcome the 
past, in the second perspective, Okinawa indeed represents what Japan “was”: a 
miserable occupied and subjugated nation, the haunting ghost of Japan’s new self.    
The unique history of Okinawa giving it two conflicting identities leads to the 
second reason why we should see the Okinawa problem as a critical site for the 
performative construction of Japan. Okinawa offers an interesting case because it is key 
to the demarcation of Japanese national space. Okinawa’s unique history shows that 
Okinawa has been situated “inside” and “outside” of Japan many times. In fact, until the 
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19th century, Okinawa was known as the Ryukyu Kingdom, an independent state that 
maintained close relationships with both China and Japan. After the Ryukyu Kingdom 
was annexed to Japan in the 1870s, the Japanese government gave it a prefectural status 
and renamed it Okinawa. And yet, the US invasion of 1945 resulted in the separation of 
Okinawa from Japan’s main islands, and Okinawa was once again placed outside of 
Japan. Although Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, and the Japanization of 
Okinawans has since been promoted, there remains a deep cleavage between Okinawa 
and mainland Japan. Not only the legacy of the occupation such as the high concentration 
of US military bases in Okinawa, but also its weak economy provide the lingering image 
of Okinawa as backward, underdeveloped, dependent, occupied, and subjugated. In this 
way, it is an “internal other” in relation to Japan. Okinawa is therefore also where the 
“foreign” or the “outside” is constituted, a place where the spatial boundaries of Japan are 
constantly made and remade. But Okinawa is a site where the temporal boundaries of 
Japan are created too in the sense that Okinawa is an ever present reminder of Japan’s 
past self, something that Japan struggles to forget and wants to remove from within.     
 Given that Campbell (1992, 75) defines foreign policy as “one of the boundary-
producing practices central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose 
name it operates,” the issues concerning Okinawa lie at the heart of Japanese foreign 
policy. Indeed, Japanese foreign policy can be redefined as a set of practices that 
establish the boundaries of the Japanese self while excluding the “difference” that 
constitutes the “foreign” and/or the (spatial/temporal) other for Japan.     
Methodologically speaking, the discourse of Okinawa can be traced back to a 
variety of texts, including governmental statements, newspaper articles, films, and 
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photography. In this dissertation, to examine how different identities about Japan are 
created, I carefully read Japan’s defense white papers as constitutive of official 
discourses and newspaper editorials as representative of media discourses on the 
Okinawa problem. In examining media discourse, I place a particular focus on US 
military rapes of Okinawan girls as manifestations of the Okinawa problem. Although 
constituting less than 2% of the entire crimes committed by the US military personnel in 
Okinawa,1 rapes tend to become highly political issues as they evoke strong hostile 
sentiments toward the US military throughout Japan and in Okinawa in particular. 
Indeed, as my research will suggest, rape victims are presented as sexualized/gendered 
symbols of Okinawa’s historical victimhood in the media narratives of the rapes. They 
are symbols of the US violation and domination of Japan’s “internal” space. In the 
discussion of these “incidents,” therefore, Okinawa’s victimhood—and thus, its 
feminized identity—is continually reproduced. The Okinawa problem represents Japan’s 
continued weakness and emasculation vis-à-vis the United States, and it is shown to be 
the haunting shadow in the Japan-US alliance.  
While discursive representations of Okinawa position Japan as the victim in 
contrast with the victorious and hyper-masculine United States, Asian nations such as 
China and South Korea challenge such representations about Japanese victimhood. In 
relation to its Asian neighbors, Japan is confronted with its history as a former aggressor. 
This dissertation, therefore, takes up the relationship between Japan and other Asian 
                                                          
1 Oga, Kazuo, “Kisha no me: Okinawa joji boko jiken: Chii kyotei dake ni torawarezu kichi no sonzai koso 
saiko wo” [Journalist’s Eyes: The Rape of a Female Child in Okinawa: Reconsider Not Only the SOFA But 
Also the Military Presence], Mainichi Shinbun, 26 September, 1995. 
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states as a second key case study. More specifically, I focus on the “comfort women” 
issue that evidences Japan’s brutality during World War II.   
It is well known that a substantial number of women served the Japanese Imperial 
Military as “comfort women”—women who provided sexual comfort for Japanese 
soldiers. For decades, the comfort women issue has been an object of international 
criticism as it is widely believed that these women were forcibly recruited from among 
women in Japanese controlled territories, and that the comfort women system was 
nothing less than a form of sexual exploitation or enslavement of Asian women by 
imperial Japan. Since the early 1990s, a number of resolutions against the comfort 
women system have been adopted in foreign parliaments, while the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission has published reports on the issue that have described 
comfort women as “sex slaves” and acknowledged that the enslavement and rape of these 
women constitute “crimes against humanity” (Coomaraswamy 1996; McDougall 1998). 
  Although the number of comfort women is still unknown, it has been officially 
disclosed by the Japanese government that the so-called comfort stations existed in Japan 
and in many of the then Japanese-occupied territories, including China, Korea, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, Hong Kong, Macao, French Indo-
China, and New Guinea (Naikaku kanbo gaisei shingi shitsu 1993). Most of the comfort 
women were from Korea, but there were also women from Japan, China, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and the Netherlands. While it is still being debated whether the 
comfort women were recruited forcefully or voluntarily (Soh 1996; 2003), it is widely 
agreed that the comfort women were forced to live under harsh conditions and that many 
of them became ill or even died as a result of their service.   
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The wartime comfort women system was accordingly politicized and has been 
construed as a diplomatic issue between Japan and the former victim states. In response 
to criticisms from governments and various international forums, the Japanese 
government formally apologized to the victims and established the Asian Women’s Fund 
as a vehicle to launch national atonement projects. The issue of the comfort women has 
thus become a major war responsibility for Japan vis-à-vis former victim states. It has 
thus tested postwar Japan’s resolve to become a “responsible” state that can overcome the 
difficult legacies from its past and to transform the old victim-aggressor relationship. 
The comfort women issue can be seen as a crucial aspect of Japanese foreign 
policy since official statements on this question constitute a textual/discursive domain 
where Japan’s spatial, temporal, and ethical identities are performatively created. Indeed, 
from a poststructuralist perspective, to talk about the “past” is nothing less than to 
construct the “past” self, which is typically positioned vis-à-vis the “present” self. In 
other words, by making statements and sending apologies, Japan can performatively try 
to turn postwar Japan into a “new” self while externalizing the “evil” elements within and 
attributing them to “wartime Japan.” Official statements are thus the site where postwar 
Japan can be constructed as a new identity—pacifist, responsible, respectable, and 
sympathetic to victims of the former war. In this sense, war responsibility issues are 
opportunities for postwar Japan, while they are also what Japan must overcome to be 
demarcated from its old wartime self. 
  Today, the comfort women issue is considered to have been completely settled 
by the Japanese government. Thus, the government currently does not take any action 
toward the survivors or is not willing to talk about the issue with other Asian 
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governments. Instead, a series of competing discourses are continuously created in 
society, and official accounts of the comfort women issue are now being seriously 
challenged. In fact, despite the repeated official statements acknowledging remorse for 
the comfort women system and wartime aggression, these statements have never 
amounted to a powerful political discourse. On the one hand, many Japanese still 
question the existence of the comfort women during the war and/or the forceful 
recruitment of these women by the military (Jeans 2005; Soh 2003). The conservatives 
accordingly deny the responsibility of Japan toward these Asian women, inviting strong 
renewed international criticisms of Japan. On the other hand, the progressive camp 
problematizes the qualitative difference between wartime and postwar governments, 
maintaining that the government has not fully fulfilled its responsibility as a former 
aggressor.   
Thus, in this second case study, I analyze how postwar Japan is discursively 
constructed in official discourses and how such discourses have been reinforced and/or 
challenged by wider societal discourses, particularly newspaper editorials discussing this 
issue. Just like Okinawan rape victims, comfort women as symbols of “Asian” victims 
allow Japan to inscribe the discursive boundaries of the national space, or the “inside,” in 
relation to Asia as the “outside.” Further, the issue enables a discursive space where the 
“temporal” and “ethical” boundaries between aggressive wartime Japan and moral 
postwar Japan are made and remade. Therefore, the analysis of the comfort women issue 
makes it possible to explore the performative formation of postwar Japan faced with 
another postwar reality as a former assailant.  
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Together, these two case studies will not only show the delicate dilemmas that 
underpin Japan’s conflicted postwar identity, but will also reveal that Japanese 
subjectivity is always incomplete and unfinished. Japan is always haunted by various 
forms of otherness that it struggles to exclude from within. And yet, when confronted by 
different foreign policy issues that destabilize its spatial, temporal, and ethical 
boundaries, Japan can performatively recreate “what it is.” In this sense, these haunting 
legacies of the war actually provide the possibility for Japan to continuously reproduce its 
identity. It is in this continuous process to constitute the reality of “Japan” that Japanese 
subjectivity comes into being and is thereby made possible.    
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
The dissertation consists of four chapters. Chapter II will explore different 
theories of and approaches to identity (particularly, state and national identity) in the 
discipline of International Relations. In particular, Chapter II will analyze two theoretical 
traditions that examine the relations between identity and foreign policy: constructivism 
and poststructuralism. In Chapter II, I will demonstrate that constructivist arguments, 
including systemic and unit-level constructivist theories, make sense only if there is a 
pre-social/pre-discursive state actor that has a sense of self and shapes its social identity 
through interactions with other states. By showing how poststructuralism denaturalizes 
this pre-existing self and offers a way to study identity without essentializing political 
subjects, Chapter II will establish the theoretical grounds for the research conducted in 
the following chapters. Moreover, in Chapter II, I will explain the importance of 
examining women’s issues not only as foreign policy issues, but also as national identity 
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questions. I will argue that, although these issues tend to be seen as marginal or irrelevant 
in mainstream International Relations/Foreign Policy Analysis, women’s issues can 
constitute the space where the state performatively produces its reality and creates the 
boundaries between the inside and the outside. The cases of international rapes are 
particularly meaningful as crucial sites that reproduce—but also can disrupt—the national 
boundaries that make the feminine body a battleground for identity construction.  
Chapter III will focus on various current literatures on Japanese foreign policy. It 
will show how non-poststructuralist studies provide differing explanations of Japanese 
policy while naturalizing Japan as an international actor. Further, the chapter conducts an 
analysis of Japanese junior high school textbooks to show how history is narrated and 
how historical narratives can construct various Japanese selves. Although some 
constructivists believe that Japanese statehood has a “reality” independent of the social 
context and that its history provides an important source of national identity, through the 
analysis of history textbooks, I will show that various discourses on Japanese national 
history are not simply discussions of historical facts but are rather actively productive of 
“who we were” and “who we are.” I suggest in Chapter III that we need to shift the focus 
from the historical formation of Japan’s identity to the question of the discursive 
enactment of “Japan.”  
In Chapters IV and V, I will conduct case studies of two key sites of national/state 
identity formation identified above to demonstrate the performative construction of 
Japan’s identity: (1) the Okinawa problem, as integral to the postwar relations between 
Japan and the United States and as symbolized in US military rapes of Okinawan girls; 
and (2) the comfort women issue, whereby Japan has been blamed for its wartime sexual 
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enslavement of Asian women. By focusing on women’s issues, these two case studies 
aim to characterize the conflicted images of postwar Japan as both a “victim” of crushing 
attacks by the United States and a former “aggressor” in Asia.  
These two case studies are based on detailed textual/discursive analyses of 
government statements, policy papers, and newspaper editorials. Employing discourse 
analysis as a way of studying official foreign policy discourse and wider political debates 
allows me to explain that, while Japan is still haunted by the ghosts of its own past (as 
represented by Okinawa and the former comfort women), it is by dealing with the legacy 
of its past that Japan performatively produces and reproduces its renewed identity, 
namely, its image as a “reborn” pacifist Japan. And yet, these studies will also 
demonstrate that, despite such attempts, Japan has been left with a sense of self that is 
both confused and confusing. It is in this context that I suggest the need to interpret 
Japanese foreign policy as a continual process whereby Japan seeks and struggles to 
create a new Japanese self rather than as a reaction to established structural elements, 
situations, and behaviors in international relations and foreign policy.  
Looked at from this point of view, Japan’s attitude vis-à-vis the United Nations or 
other international organizations can also be explained as the performative construction 
of a national self now desirous to pass for a pacifist agent who is eager to leave behind its 
20th century image inherited from a less than glorious past. Therefore, in the conclusion, I 
examine how Japan has been trying to overcome its fragmented and split identity by 
briefly examining recent Japanese policies toward the United Nations. More recently, the 
United Nations has been a place/institution where Japan has sought to offer a 
contribution, not only as a defeated nation that genuinely looks for a better world, but 
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also as a former aggressor nation that is determined to recreate itself as a “reborn” moral 
and globally responsible nation. Thus, by briefly analyzing the discursive construction of 
the meaning of more recent Japanese contributions to the UN and its organizations, I 
hope to conclude that Japanese foreign policy is constantly trying to overcome its 
contradictory senses of self through a larger investment in global peace and security, 
something that I believe is likely to provide a foreign policy direction for Japan over the 
next decades. 
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II. IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
 
The so-called “reflectivist turn” (Keohane 1988) has brought identity to the fore 
of the discipline of International Relations. The reflectivist turn has not only been a 
challenge to rationalist theory in which identities and interests are pre-given, but it has 
also been a challenge for IR scholars to develop new approaches to international relations, 
using different ontological, epistemological, and methodological bases. In other words, 
the turn to identity has allowed researchers to problematize taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the nature of the state, the international system, and world politics and 
to question how their reality is constituted socially, linguistically, and/or performatively.  
The present chapter examines two different but important approaches to identity 
in International Relations: constructivism and poststructuralism. The turn to identity in 
International Relations is largely owed to these two theoretical traditions. Constructivism 
today enjoys the status of one of the mainstream approaches to international relations. 
Stephen M. Walt (1998), in his reflections upon IR theory after the end of Cold War, 
describes constructivism as one of the three major paradigms in International Relations, 
alongside realism and liberalism. Although “realism remains the most compelling general 
framework for understanding international relations,” Walt (1998, 43, 44) notes, 
“constructivist theories are best suited to the analysis of how identities and interests can 
change over time, thereby producing subtle shifts in the behavior of states and 
occasionally triggering far-reaching but unexpected shifts in international affairs.” In this 
sense, Walt (1998, 44) advises that “the ‘complete diplomat’ of the future should remain 
cognizant of realism’s emphasis on the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism’s 
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awareness of domestic forces in mind, and occasionally reflect on constructivism’s vision 
of change.” Similarly, in their account of the evolution of the study of international 
political economy and, more generally, of world politics, Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. 
Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner (1998) consider constructivism to be one of the two 
prevailing theories of International Relations. They represent IR scholarship as shaped by 
a theoretical contestation between rationalism and constructivism, a debate promoting 
knowledge and understanding about international relations by complementing each other. 
It is important to note that the boundaries of constructivism remain fuzzy, and the 
label is assigned to many different studies of IR. As Steve Smith (2001a, 40) rightly 
writes, “even to talk of ‘a’ social constructivism is problematic.” For example, there are 
major differences between those constructivists who are primarily concerned about 
speech acts and the linguistic construction of the world, on the one hand, and those who 
pay little attention to the role of language, on the other (Debrix 2003b; Fierke 1996; 
Kubalkova 2001; Kubalkova, Onuf, and Kowert 1998; Onuf 1989; 1998). In the above-
mentioned article, Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner (1998, 675-78) argue that 
constructivism includes three broad clusters: “conventional,” “critical,” and “postmodern.” 
Likewise, defining constructivists as those “who believe that international structure 
consists fundamentally in shared knowledge, and that this affects not only state behavior, 
but state identities and interests as well,” a notable constructivist scholar Alexander 
Wendt (1999, 31, 32) places the English School approach, the World Society School, 
postmodernism, and feminism into constructivism. Smith (2001a, 40) argues against 
these broad classifications, noting that those approaches categorized as “constructivism” 
rest on “fundamentally opposed epistemological positions.” In fact, as I will discuss 
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below, there are essential differences between constructivist and postmodernist 
(poststructuralist) modes of analysis, which in turn give rise to competing approaches to 
identity. 
In my research, therefore, I treat constructivism and poststructuralism as two 
different theories of International Relations. The current chapter first looks into the 
constructivist theory of identity. In my analysis of constructivism, I particularly focus on 
arguments developed by Alexander Wendt. Wendt is one of the most cited constructivists. 
Both his 1992 article, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” and his 1999 book, Social 
Theory of International Politics, are well known. Most importantly, Wendt offers a 
detailed analysis of the nature and evolution of state identity, which provides a relevant 
starting point for the critical study of identity. In addition, I briefly look at works by Peter 
J. Katzenstein and some other constructivists to examine different constructivist studies 
of identity. While Wendt is known as a systemic theorist, Katzenstein draws attention to 
domestic processes of identity formation. By comparing systemic and unit-level analyses 
of identity, I intend to make clear the characteristics as well as limitations of 
constructivism. 
In contrast to constructivism that is generally accepted among the mainstream IR 
scholarship, poststructuralism is often regarded as a series of more radical approaches to 
International Relations. The criticism is partly because of a distinction made between 
positivism and post-positivism, a distinction allowing positivists to define the boundary 
of “an inner circle in IR” (Fierke 2003). The distinction not only divides IR scholars who 
disagree over epistemological, ontological, and methodological viewpoints into mutually 
exclusive camps, but it also creates a disciplinary hierarchy between these camps as a 
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result of a widely shared belief in “social science” (S. Smith 1996; Wæver 1996a). 
According to Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner (1998, 678), postmodernism, located in 
the post-positivist camp, denies “the use of evidence to adjudicate between truth claims,” 
“risks becoming self-referential and disengaged from the world,” and “falls clearly 
outside of the social science enterprise.” As Keohane once indicated, a particular form of 
research program is clearly privileged in the discipline: the one involving the formulation 
and testing of hypotheses, without which scholars “will remain on the margins of the 
field” (Keohane 1988, 392). The division, accordingly, “purposefully place[s] someone 
outside the boundaries of the debate” by labeling one who questions the possibility of 
social science as a “post-positivist” (Fierke 2003, 70). For positivists, post-positivists 
have developed a new “language” of International Relations, which, without a translator, 
cannot be understood by mainstream scholars (Fierke 2003, 72). 
While some mainstream scholars criticize poststructuralism for having nothing to 
contribute to the discipline other than critiques of existing theories (Kubalkova, Onuf, 
and Kowert 1998, 20; Mearsheimer 1994/95, 38; Walt 1991, 223), poststructuralists have 
developed unique theoretical and research frameworks to study identity, discourse, and 
international politics. In particular, David Campbell (1992) and Lene Hansen (2006) 
provide fresh insights into identity formation that will provide an alternative approach to 
constructivism for the present study. In their respective works, Campbell and Hansen 
examine the construction of state identity through discursive practices of foreign policy. 
Interestingly, they define identity as an effect of discourse. In other words, they argue 
that identity exists “only insofar as it is continuously rearticulated and uncontested by 
competing discourses” (Hansen 2006, 5). This imply that identity is no more than a 
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discursively constructed “idea,” and that there are no objective identities that exist 
outside discourse. Poststructuralists, thus, bring into the discipline discourse analysis as a 
new way of analyzing identity, whereby the performativity of discourses, or the 
discursive construction of identities and its political and ethical outcomes, become central 
to the analysis. That is to say, contrary to the constructivist conception, poststructuralists 
assert that a discursive construction of identity cannot be “possessed” by a preexisting 
subject who will go on to take action based on a given definition of the self. Rather, the 
discursive construction of “reality” must be problematized, and poststructuralism “moves 
us away from a reliance on the idea of (social) construction towards materialization” of 
subjects and objects (Campbell 2007, 216-17, emphasis in original).    
  Through analyzing two different theories of identity, I seek to establish the 
theoretical foundations for the present research. Further, I turn to feminist studies that 
will give us an insightful additional point of view as to what constitutes a site of foreign 
policy. Generally, women’s issues are not considered central to foreign policy analysis. 
However, feminist studies reveal that women’s experiences are constitutive of 
international relations and that, without women, international politics cannot operate as it 
does. Women’s integral roles in world politics suggest the importance of reevaluating the 
relevance of women’s issues to international problems and seeing these issues as issues 
of international politics and foreign policy. Feminist perspectives, thus, make it possible 
to shed new light on marginal issues of foreign policy and to reconceptualize them as 
central to state practices or discourses of foreign policy. Lastly, in the last section of the 
chapter, I try to form a research design for the present study. I primarily follow Hansen’s 
research design for poststructuralist discourse analysis (Hansen 2006). The chapter will 
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accordingly provide a theoretical and methodological framework for the following 
chapters.      
 
Wendt and Identity 
Wendt (1992; 1999) posits that states are inherently social actors that acquire 
identities and define interests through processes of interaction among themselves. 
Wendt’s argument constitutes a powerful challenge to a rationalist account of 
international relations in which the identities and interests of states are exogenously given. 
Rationalism, by taking a behavioralist approach to international relations, makes 
foundational assumptions about the nature of states. That is, it assumes that states are 
atomistic, self-interested, and rational. These assumptions, in turn, provide grounds for 
theories that emphasize the presence of “atomistic rational beings that form social 
relations to maximize their interests” in a purely “strategic” arena of international 
relations (Reus-Smit 2005, 192; see also Keohane 1988). Wendt’s challenge, in this sense, 
lies in its focus on the “social construction” of states and their international environment. 
In other words, Wendt stresses that “these self-interested actors indeed had a self; that 
this self coloured their interactions with other states; and that these interactions between 
the selves of states in turn shaped some of the structures within which ulterior 
interactions take place” (Epstein 2010, 329).   
According to Wendt, contrary to the rationalist argument, identities and interests 
are endogenous to social interaction. State actors engage in social acts—signaling, 
interpreting, and responding—the reciprocal processes of which “create relatively stable 
concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in the interaction” (Wendt 1992, 
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405). More precisely, social interaction allows states to develop expectations with regard 
to their future behavior vis-à-vis each other, and thereby to generate ideas about who 
“they” are and who “we” are, ideas through which states acquire identities or “relatively 
stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt 1992, 397). 
National interests presuppose these socially constructed identities “because an actor 
cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is” (Wendt 1999, 231). In fact, interests 
depend on how the state “define[s] certain situations as calling for certain actions” or how 
it “view[s] the meaning and requirements” of those perceived situations based on the 
particular definition given to the self (Wendt 1992, 398, 402).   
Identities and interests are, in this sense, socially constructed on the basis of 
intersubjective understandings and expectations arising out of state interaction. Both 
identities and interests are “relationship-specific” and are, thus, particular to social 
contexts (Wendt 1992, 408). This means that coexistence with other actors is 
fundamental to defining identities and interests. As Wendt (1992, 402) puts it, “actors do 
not have a self prior to interaction with an other.” More importantly, this further implies 
that, as identities and interests depend on changing relationships between the self and 
others, they are always in the making. As such, changes in state practices can develop 
different structures of identities and interests under international anarchy, whose 
character can be competitive (Hobbesian), individualistic (Lockean), or cooperative 
(Kantian) (Wendt 1992; 1999). These social institutions, in turn, reshape state identities 
and interests; that is, they are mutually constitutive. 
Wendtian constructivism, accordingly, offers a perspective that destabilizes 
rationalist theories as well as fundamental assumptions about International Relations on 
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which these theories are based. “Sovereignty,” for example, “seems to be prior to the 
kinds of calculations on which rationalistic theory focuses: governments’ strategies 
assume the principle of sovereignty, and the practice of sovereign statehood, as givens” 
(Keohane 1988, 391, emphasis in original). However, Wendt (1992, 413) argues that “the 
sovereign state is an ongoing accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for-all creation 
of norms that somehow exist apart from practice.” The principle of sovereignty and 
sovereign statehood are, in other words, among such institutions that “exis[t] only in 
virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations; there is no sovereignty 
without an other” (Wendt 1992, 412). While the principle of sovereignty shapes the 
behavior of states by defining what it means to be sovereign, it is only out of the practice 
of sovereign statehood that a certain set of rules develop to govern international relations 
(Keohane 1988, 385).   
Wendt, thus, makes a significant contribution to the discipline of International 
Relations by problematizing rationalist “reifications” of the world, that is, “treating it as 
something separate from the practices by which it is produced and sustained” (Wendt 
1992, 410). However, Wendt does not essentially challenge the prevailing idea of “states,” 
whereby states unproblematically exist as the international political agents in Wendt’s 
constructivist world. Rather, as Cynthia Weber (2009, 62) points out, by explaining that 
state practices determine the character of anarchy, Wendtian constructivism constitutes 
the state as “the key decision-maker about the ‘nature’ of international anarchy.” His 
constructivism, in this respect, allows the state to change its interests and practices, but it 
“produces the identity of the state as decision-maker, and this identity cannot be changed” 
(Weber 2009, 62, emphasis in original). After all, as Weber (2009, 80) rightly notes, 
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“Wendt only manages to escape the reification of international anarchy by reifying the 
state as decision-maker” (emphasis in original). 
Weber’s point raises the issue of reifying states as political subjects prior to social 
interaction. Wendt ignores the processes of constructing states as such, and accordingly, 
states are “already there,” independent of the social context (Weber 2009, 80). As Jenny 
Edkins and Veronique Pin-Fat (1999, 1) put it:  
Although “identity” is often seen as intersubjectively produced or, 
in other words, formed through social interaction, what is meant by 
this is sometimes no more than that a preexisting (but “uncultured” 
or prelinguistic) subject is socialized into particular cultural 
settings. In this view, identity then becomes something the subject 
acquires—and a subject may have many different identities, 
shifting from one to another either in the course of time or in 
relation to the different social groups or positions among which the 
subject may move.  
 
In Wendt’s world, the state (e.g., “Ego”) is already there as a preexisting subject that has 
an identifiable, pre-social identity and is ready to acquire social identities through 
interaction with other preexisting subjects (e.g., “Alter”). And “this starting point is 
presented as innocent, as relatively free of prior assumption” (Zehfuss 2001, 336). Hence, 
Wendt brackets the very process of “how actors are constituted into self and other in the 
first place” (S. Smith 2000b, 160). Wendt simply presupposes that the state inherently has 
such a thing as a state identity, a sense of self, whose definition is changeable. 
In fact, Wendt himself makes a distinction between two kinds of identities that 
states possess: social identities and corporate identities (Reus-Smit 2005, 199-200; Wendt 
1999, 224-33). Social identities refer to what Wendt calls “type,” “role,” and “collective” 
identities that international society ascribes to states. These identities are social to the 
extent that their construction involves “otherness,” only in relation to which their social 
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types, roles, and collectivity can be defined. On the other hand, corporate identities refer 
to a sense of collective self that makes states corporate agents or “real actors to which we 
can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and 
intentionality” (Wendt 1999, 197). Corporate identities are constituted by self-organizing 
internal structures/processes of states, which are exogenous to the states system. As the 
“constitutive process is self-organizing,” Wendt (1999, 225) contends, the construction of 
corporate identities requires “no particular Other to which the Self is related.” Therefore, 
“autogenetic” corporate identities create “(usually) stable platforms for processes of 
social construction at the international level,” where states acquire social identities 
(Wendt 2000, 175).   
In this context, Wendt (1999, 198) posits that “states are ontologically prior to the 
states system.” As a matter of fact, Wendt is interested in developing a systemic theory of 
international relations rather than a theory of state identity formation, and systemic 
theorists “can theorize about processes of social construction at the level of the states 
system only if such processes have exogenously given, relatively stable platforms” 
(Wendt 1999, 198, emphasis in original). After all, Wendt (1999, 244) argues, “we 
cannot study everything at once.” “The contradiction,” Charlotte Epstein (2010, 331) 
elegantly clarifies, “lies in his attempt to reconcile a structural, systemic focus that 
requires positing given units and appraising them from the outside, while emphasizing 
effects that call into question this given-ness and require opening up these units—which 
in turn risk undermining his starting point.” “Put differently,” she continues, Wendt 
“wants to look at a system that has certain pre-givens, but he wants to look at it in such a 
way as to draw out how these are made by that system, such that they can no longer be 
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treated as ‘givens.’” In this sense, Roxanne Lynne Doty (2000, 139) critically argues that 
“the truth of the matter is that unitariness must be attributed to ‘the state’ in order for 
causality, prediction, and positive social science to work. What [Wendt’s] Social Theory 
demonstrates most forcefully, albeit unintentionally, is that ‘the state’ rather than being 
an essential entity that has desires, is itself a desire, a desire on the part of international 
relations scholars to secure our discipline.”  
Somewhat ironically, and as an inevitable consequence of his systemic theory in 
which states are like “people” and exogenously given, Wendt’s constructivism not only 
makes the domestic political process irrelevant to analyze identity formation and state 
behavior. But it also makes it impossible to analyze the foreign policy making process 
within the state. In Wendt’s theory, as Steve Smith (2001a, 50-1) states, “there is no room 
for decision theory, or groupthink, or bureaucratic politics, or operational codes, or 
implementation theory. The actors are not the officials who make decisions, or the 
interest groups or companies, or political parties or military juntas. Rather, the actors are 
the states-as-persons, and there is no need to look into the black box of the foreign policy 
process. It is in this sense that foreign policy is what states make it” (emphasis added). 
Foreign policy in Wendt’s world is merely a state’s response to social interaction with 
other states, and it is a consequence of the formation of a state’s social identity. State’s 
subjectivity is, thus, already there, and it must be there in the first place.    
 
Unit-level Constructivism: Overcoming Wendtian Constructivism? 
While systemic constructivists focus on the processes of identity construction at 
the international level, unit-level constructivists draw attention to the domestic processes 
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of identity formation by looking into cultural institutional contexts—norms, in 
particular—within the state. State actors are socially constructed at different levels, and 
thus, as Wendt (1999, 21) notes, “a complete theory of state identity needs to have a large 
domestic component.” The unit-level analysis is, in this respect, expected to fill the gap 
that Wendtian constructivism leaves, namely domestic self-organizing processes 
exogenous to the states system (Reus-Smit 2005, 200). The unit-level constructivists, 
however, seem to share the basic belief with systemic constructivists about identity. In 
other words, they also presuppose that there is such a thing as a state identity, whose 
meaning the domestic processes define.   
For example, Peter J. Katzenstein (1996a) analyzes Japan’s security policies by 
examining both regulative and constitutive effects of institutionalized norms and the 
consequent formation of Japanese collective identity shaping the foreign policy. Here, 
norms are understood to have two kinds of effects: regulative and constitutive. On the 
one hand, norms are regulative in the sense that norms serve to regulate the behavior of 
actors. On the other hand, norms are also constitutive in that they “constitute the identity 
of actors and shape the standards of appropriate behavior which inform interests and 
policy” (Katzenstein 1996a, 4). This point suggests that, “as fundamentally social beings, 
individuals or states cannot be separated from a context of normative meaning which 
shapes who they are and the possibilities available to them” (Fierke 2007, 170). Based on 
this understanding of the effects of norms, Katzenstein argues that institutionalized norms 
have not only directly defined standards of conduct for Japan, but also shaped Japanese 
collective identity and interests informing Japan’s security policies. 
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This way, Katzenstein attends to the domestic processes of norm and identity 
formation. Yet, a closer examination of his definition of identity reveals that he stands in 
the same place as Wendt. In other words, Katzenstein “explicitly define[s] norms in 
relation to ‘given’ identities” and thus considers norms as those that define the 
“characters” of identities that are pre-given (Epstein 2010, 333). For example, when he 
talks about the constitutive effect of norms, Katzenstein means “to shape” collective 
identities that are already there and not “to create” collective identities per se. Indeed, he 
describes identities as “contingent properties of actors” or “label[s] for the varying 
construction[s] of nationhood and statehood” (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 
41, 59; Katzenstein 1996c, 6, emphasis in original). Thus, what is at issue here is 
“characters” and “variations” of nationhood/statehood and not nationhood/statehood per 
se (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 60; Katzenstein 1996c, 6). That is to say, 
social identities rather than corporate identities are rendered problematic, and in order to 
talk about social identities, corporate identities must be there in the first place so that 
Katzenstein can theorize about the roles of norms in shaping properties/characters of the 
Japanese statehood and in formulating its external behavior. In this sense, Katzenstein 
can unquestionably state that “nations do construct and project collective identities, and 
states operate as actors” (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 59).  
Accordingly, for Katzenstein, Japan’s statehood exists prior to the production and 
reproduction of its characters, and Japan’s foreign policy is the consequence of the 
institutionalization of certain norms and the subsequent acquisition of a particular social 
identity or a character given to the preexisting Japanese state. Although he problematizes 
a state-as-actor model by examining different forces within the state and challenging the 
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state’s unitariness (Katzenstein 1996a, 4), Katzenstein essentially treats identity as 
something that Japan, preexisting statehood, acquires, maintains, and reproduces through 
domestic processes. 
Many unit-level constructivist analyses share this take on identity (Berger 1998; 
Katzenstein 1996b; Telhami and Barnett 2002). When they analyze the social 
construction of states at the domestic level, they actually look at how states are socialized 
into particular norms and cultural contexts developed within them, whereby the 
subjectivity of these actors is naturalized, treated as a social fact. Many constructivists, 
indeed, refer to psychology to explain the formation of identities and their effects on 
actors’ behavior (Greenhill 2008; Kowert 1998). But such arguments make sense only if 
these actors’ “Egos” or pre-social selves are presupposed.     
In sum, constructivist research is based on, and requires, the foundational 
assumption that “the body would hold some true essence of some pre-social self” 
(Epstein 2010, 332). Consequently, constructivism does not allow us to question this very 
body or to examine the political enactment of subjectivity per se. At this point, 
poststructuralism offers alternative approaches to identity, which will provide a useful 
analytical guideline for the present study. This theoretical tradition gives us a critical 
perspective on identity that does not essentialize a self. In the following sections, thus, I 
focus on poststructuralist analyses of identity and foreign policy.     
 
Alternative Ontology of Identity: Poststructuralism 
Poststructuralism offers different approaches to state identity by questioning the 
fundamental idea of state’s “I”—the idea that the state has a corporate identity that exists 
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prior to social interaction. Like constructivists, poststructuralists conceptualize identity as 
social and relational in that identity is constituted through a set of collectively articulated 
codes and in relation to otherness/an other. However, unlike constructivists, in 
poststructuralism, identity is also conceptualized as political and discursive. Identity is 
theorized as a discursive construction, or an effect of political discourse, as an adequate 
response to which political action or inaction by the self toward the other is called for and 
legitimated (Hansen 2006). More precisely, treating identity as discursive means that, 
“rather than understanding subjects as having natural identities, subjects and their various 
identities might instead be thought of as the effects of citational processes” (Weber 1998, 
79)—processes that, by the very representations and expressions of what they are, give 
things—objects and subjects—meanings and endow them with particular identities. This, 
however, implies that there is no identity outside discourse, and that identity is a 
discursive construction generated and sustained through a repeated practice of 
signification. That is to say, identity is a “fabrication” or an “illusion” that “has no 
ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality” (Butler 1990, 
173). 
A conceptualization of identity as discursive and performative makes 
poststructuralist discourse analysis unique and distinct from constructivist approaches to 
identity. Instead of assuming what Wendt (1999) calls “essential states” that are self-
organizing and capable of acting as corporate agents prior to the social context, 
poststructuralists examine the discursive construction of identities and its political and 
ethical outcomes, thereby rendering pre-discursive states problematic. This suggests that, 
in poststructuralism, de-essentialized selves can no longer “serve as the points of 
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epistemic departure from which theory emerges and politics itself is shaped” (Butler 1990, 
164). Insofar as pre-discursive subjects are impossible, the constructivist argument that 
pre-existing subjects acquire their identities vis-à-vis others and construct the 
international social structure cannot stand. For poststructuralists, there are no pre-given 
selves who then identify objects, differences, and others through social interaction or 
through language as a tool of naming others (Campbell 2007, 217; Doty 1993, 300-5). 
The idea that identity is a performative construction, therefore, requires a new 
way of thinking about selves and others. Because no pre-existing subjectivity is 
presupposed, the fundamental distinction between them becomes unnatural and 
problematic. For example, David Campbell (1998, 8) writes: 
Identity is an inescapable dimension of being. No body could be without it.  
Inescapable as it is, identity—whether personal or collective—is not fixed 
by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. Rather, 
identity is constituted in relation to difference. But neither is difference 
fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. 
Difference is constituted in relation to identity. The problematic of 
identity/difference contains, therefore, no foundations which are prior to, 
or outside of, its operation. Whether we are talking of “the body” or “the 
state,” or particular bodies and states, the identity of each is 
performatively constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity is 
achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate 
an “inside” from an “outside,” a “self” from an “other,” a “domestic” from 
a “foreign.”   
 
As Campbell notes above, difference is essential to the construction of a political identity 
because its construction is made possible by demarcating the identity from “what it is not.” 
Thus, as Campbell (2007, 215) puts it, “the outside is always central to the constitution of 
the inside; the insane is central to the constitution of what it is to be sane or rational; the 
criminal is central to the constitution of the law-abiding citizen and the foreign is pivotal 
in understanding the domestic.” Difference is, however, defined in relation to identity 
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since identity establishes “what it is not.” Identity and difference are, accordingly, 
simultaneously constituted vis-à-vis each other. Neither can identity nor difference be 
constituted without the other.  
State identity is, in this context, created as an effect of discourse that constructs 
the state’s self and foreign others by which to inscribe the boundaries between the 
“inside”/“domestic” and the “outside”/“international.” From this perspective, foreign 
policy discourse is of fundamental importance to constitute state identity. Integral to 
foreign policy are “the discursive practices mobilized in presenting and implementing 
foreign policy” (Hansen 2006, 1). Foreign policy discourses articulate a national self 
faced with diplomatic problems or security issues with a series of others, and thereby 
invoke the (ir)responsibility of the self to take appropriate action toward these others. 
That is to say, by articulating problems and policies to address them, foreign policy 
discourses construct the national self and the external others, each of whom is given a 
particular identity that legitimizes proposed policies. 
More importantly, this argument indicates that identity is “both constitutive of and 
a product of foreign policy” (Hansen 2006, 20). More precisely, Lene Hansen (2006, 19) 
writes:  
The conceptualization of foreign policy as a discursive practice implies 
that policy and identity are seen as ontologically interlinked: it is only 
through the discursive enactment of foreign policy, or in Judith Butler’s 
terms “performances,” that identity comes into being, but this identity is at 
the same time constructed as the legitimation for the policy proposed […] 
Identities are thus articulated as the reason why policies should be enacted, 
but they are also (re)produced through these very policy discourses: they 
are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and product. 
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Poststructuralists, thus, argue that identity is ontologically inseparable from foreign 
policy. As Hansen (2006, 23) notes, “identities are produced, and reproduced, through 
foreign policy discourse, and there is thus no identity existing prior to and independently 
of foreign policy.” Therefore, contrary to constructivist arguments, foreign policy is 
neither what identities shape, nor is it what “follows” identity formation. There are no 
pre-discursive or pre-social state identities that serve as the secure foundations for 
implementing foreign policy. For poststructuralism, foreign policy and identity are 
ontologically interlinked and mutually constitutive. They cannot be causally separated 
and treated as distinct variables. Foreign policy discourse rather becomes precisely the 
place where the boundaries between the self and the other are drawn and the identity of 
the self is secured. Given that identity is performatively constructed in relation to others, 
foreign policy can be redefined as “one of the boundary-producing practices central to the 
production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates” (Campbell 1992, 
75). It is by discursive practices of foreign policy that the formation, production and 
maintenance of state identity are made possible.   
 
Three Dimensions of Identity: Spatiality, Temporality, and Ethicality 
If state identities are constructed by the very representations of these identities, 
how are selves and others relationally produced by discourse? According to Hansen 
(2006), foreign policy discourse assigns various “signs” to a self and an other so that the 
identity of the self is rendered different from that of the other. More precisely, Hansen 
(2006, 37) explains: “meaning and identity are constructed through a series of signs that 
are linked to each other to constitute relations of sameness as well as through a 
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differentiation to another series of juxtaposed signs.” “For example,” she notes, “to 
construct ‘the Balkans’ as different from ‘Europe’ does not create much meaning unless 
this construction is situated within a discourse that links and differentiates these signs. 
One discursive possibility is to link ‘the Balkans’ to the violent, irrational, 
underdeveloped, barbarian, backward, tribal, primitive, and savage and differentiate it 
against a controlled, rational, developed, civilized, organized, national, orderly, and 
mature ‘European’ identity” (Hansen 2006, 37).  
By assigning a range of signs to construct the self and the other, then, identities 
acquire three dimensions: spatiality, temporality, and ethicality (Hansen 2006, 41-5). 
Identity is spatially constructed in the sense that the self is constituted in relation to a 
territorially localized other. The relational construction serves to create the boundaries 
between “us” and “them,” thus producing the “internal space” or the “core” of the self 
distinguished from the “external space” allegedly belonging to the other. It is in this sense 
that the boundaries delineating the self do not naturally hold themselves and are only 
“tenuously maintained” in relation to the other (Butler 1990, 170). Identity is also 
articulated in a temporal manner. The temporality of the self is constructed in relation to 
the temporality of the other by way of temporal meanings such as 
developed/underdeveloped, progressive/backward, modern/primitive, and 
transforming/repetitive. These temporal dualities are relationally assigned to both the self 
and the other. Furthermore, the conflation of spatial and temporal identities often invokes 
the responsibility of the self toward the other, thus constructing an ethical identity for the 
self too. The articulation of ethical identity has grave implications for foreign policy 
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because foreign policy discourse often involves a construction of morality that the self 
should uphold in carrying out a policy toward the other.  
For example, Doty’s analysis of US official statements shows how the 
construction of the United States and the Philippines as particular kinds of subjects made 
possible US interventionist policy in the Philippines during the Huk Rebellion of the 
early 1950s (Doty 1993). According to Doty, US foreign policy texts generally described 
the Philippines as a “child”—immature, guided by passion and emotion, inept, and 
disordered—needing the guiding influence of the United States (that was conversely 
identified as rational, ordered, moral, and powerful—like a parent). Presented as “an 
initiator of action, a formulator of policy, an assessor of situation, and a definer of 
problems,” it would, then, become imperative for the United States to take action in the 
face of the Filipino rebellion and, most probably, to adopt a counterinsurgency policy 
through which to give the Philippines proper guidance and control (Doty 1993, 313). 
Indeed, to do nothing would not be an option as it “would mean the U.S. would abrogate 
its ‘moral position’ in the world” (Doty 1993, 315). The direct use of force against the 
Philippines was not an alternative either because it “would call into question the 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘independence’ of the Philippines” and thereby problematize “the 
success of the American ‘experiment’ that was the Philippines” (Doty 1993, 315). The 
very representations of fact, thus, create and naturalize certain possibilities and preclude 
others. As Campbell (1998, ix) writes, “justice is the relationship to the other.”     
The articulation of these three dimensions of identity offers a convenient 
framework for the present study on Japan’s identity. Indeed, Japan’s identity is spatially 
constructed in relation to its external otherness (such as Asia or the United States), which 
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in turn (re)produces Japan’s solidarity and distinctness by defining differences or 
“foreignness.” But it is also temporally secured in a way that, further, enables or impedes 
certain ethical responses and attitudes. More precisely, Japan has long endeavored to 
reinvent “postwar Japan” as an identity distinct from past or old Japan, whether it is a 
reinvention away from a miserable and defeated Japan or from an immoral imperial 
Japan. As a country responsible for colonizing fellow Asian nations but that also had to 
face the harsh realities of defeat, Japan has struggled with the contradictory domestic 
image of its national self as a victim, on the one hand, and with the regional perception of 
the Japanese nation as an aggressor on the other. Postwar Japan has, thus, tried to produce 
renewed images of itself by creating discursive boundaries between an “old Japan” and a 
“new Japan” and, in this process, reinventing past selves as temporal others. That is to 
say, Japan is reproduced not only as a spatial identity, but also as a temporal construct 
that is indeed critical in the articulation of a “reborn” pacifist Japan. Therefore, it is 
important to analyze different dimensions of Japan’s self in order to adequately 
understand Japanese identity politics in the postwar era and to explain its foreign policy 
as both a foundation for, and a response to, the spatial/temporal/ethical self. In this way, 
it becomes possible to examine Japanese foreign policy as an ongoing struggle to define 
the Japanese national self vis-à-vis both spatial and historical others.  
 
Insecurity as an Ontological Necessity? 
As suggested above, poststructuralists argue that identities are constructed 
relationally by assigning opposing signs to a self and an other. While “it is a temptation 
[emphasis in original] rather than a necessity,” William E. Connolly (1991, 8) writes, 
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“the attempt to establish security of identity for any individual or group” is often made 
“by defining the other that exposes sore spots in one’s identity as evil or irrational.” More 
precisely, “a range of differences” are constituted as “intrinsically evil, irrational, 
abnormal, mad, sick, primitive, monstrous, dangerous, or anarchical,” whereby 
differences are converted into “threat” or “danger” (Connolly 1991, 8, 65, emphasis in 
original). According to Connolly (1991, 65), this allows the self to be identified, in turn, 
“as intrinsically good, coherent, complete or rational.” That is to say, the conversion of 
difference into opposition, danger, or threat is intrinsic to the construction of the state as a 
secure, ordered, and rational subject. 
In the context of foreign policy, this point indicates the critical importance of the 
security discourse in which a national self is represented as being confronted with 
threatening others. David Campbell’s work on the discursive formation of American 
political identity is of particular note in this respect. On the basis of the poststructuralist 
conception of states as “unavoidably paradoxical entities that do not possess 
prediscrusive, stable identities,” Campbell argues that “the state requires discourses of 
‘danger’ to provide a new theology of truth about who and what ‘we’ are by highlighting 
who or what ‘we’ are not, and what ‘we’ have to fear” (Campbell 1992, 11, 54). 
Campbell (1992; 1994) finds that, in US foreign policy discourses, foreign others, 
whether communist states or economically developing Japan, are often described as sick, 
dirty, incapable, irrational, and disordered, thus needing to be rationalized, normalized, 
moralized, corrected, punished, and disciplined by the United States that is in turn 
depicted as healthy, capable, rational, and morally superior to such radical others. By 
constructing dangerous or inferior others and differentiating them from the self, Campbell 
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suggests, the boundaries of the self are inscribed and its identity is produced. It is in this 
sense that Campbell sees US foreign policy as “a political practice central to the 
constitution, production, and maintenance of American political identity” (Campbell 
1992, 8). Foreign policy is indeed a practice that performatively produces the realm of the 
“foreign” by identifying and defining danger “outside,” which, in turn, makes possible 
the secure domestic space “inside” and the constitution of a national self as a political 
subject. The actual practice of security policy, then, “serves to reproduce the constitution 
of identity made possible by [discursive practices of] ‘foreign policy’ and to contain 
challenges to the identity that results” (Campbell 1992, 76, emphasis in original). 
More interestingly, Campbell’s argument suggests that there is an interdependent 
and complementary relationship between identity and danger articulated by foreign 
policy discourse. That is to say, “insecurities and the objects that suffer from insecurity 
are mutually constituted” since “insecurity is itself the product of process of identity 
construction in which the self and the other, or multiple others, are constituted” (Weldes 
et al. 1999, 10). This point indicates that radical otherness is both a source of insecurity 
and a condition of possibility for the existence of the state—that is, difference threatens 
identity and simultaneously constitutes it (Connolly 1991, 66, 67). The dangerous other, 
therefore, should be there haunting the self so that it can secure the appearance of a “true” 
identity. Identity is reproduced so long as it is haunted by danger, although this means 
that the self needs insecurity in order to be. Edkins and Pin-Fat (1991, 1) argue in this 
sense that identity never achieves self-reliance.  
There are no settled identities; the subject never achieves the completion 
or wholeness toward which it strives. It remains haunted by that which has 
to be excluded for subjectivity to be constituted in the first place […] In 
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this picture, the subject is always in the process of being constituted; there 
is no point at which, however briefly, the performance is finished. […] 
The subject only ever will have been.[emphasis in original] 
 
While Campbell posits that danger is an ontological necessity for state identity,2 
Hansen holds that difference is not necessarily translated as radical or threatening 
otherness. Rather, Hansen (2006, 6) writes: “constructions of identity can take on 
different degrees of ‘Otherness,’ ranging from fundamental difference between Self and 
Other to constructions of less than radical difference.” For example, an other can be 
constructed as exotic but attractive (Said 1979) or even superior to the self (Neumann 
1996). The other may have a potential for transformation and, thus, may eventually 
become like the self, usually by following the path that the self has taken and/or by 
getting guidance from the self (Doty 1993; 1996; Escobar 1995). Otherness can also be 
constructed by “othering” the past of the self. That is, as I will mention in detail in 
Chapters IV and V, the past self can be constituted as a temporal other (Wæver 1996b). 
Therefore, as Connolly (1991, 65) suggests, differences can be treated in many different 
ways—they can be equally translated into “complementary identities, contending 
identities, negative identities, or nonidentities.” 
These subtle but significant nuances in the construction of otherness are critical to 
foreign policy analysis. Indeed, as I mentioned above, particular representations of 
                                                          
2 To clarify, Campbell (1992, 78) notes “a simple contrast need not automatically result in the 
demonization of the other, and the differentiation or distantiation of one group from another does not 
require that their relationship be one of the violence.” However, he also argues: “in the context of Foreign 
Policy, the logic of identity more readily succumbs to the politics of negation and the temptation of 
otherness.” He continues: “Foreign Policy is concerned with the reproduction of an unstable identity at the 
level of the state, and the containment of challenges to that identity. In other words, Foreign Policy does not 
operate in a domain free of entrenched contingencies or resistances. Whichever Foreign Policy practices are 
implemented, they always have to overcome or neutralize other practices which might instantiate 
alternative possibilities for identity; and the intensive and extensive nature of the 'internal' and 'external' 
political contestation that this presupposes means the efficacy of one particular practice will more often 
than not be sharpened by the representation of danger” (Campbell 1992, 78).  
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otherness make certain policies taken by a self toward others natural, legitimate, and, thus, 
possible as reactions to the meanings assigned to these subjects. Different dispositions of 
meanings produce different political effects by calling for an action or inaction that the 
self should perform to comply with the produced identity. The action called for can be 
confrontational or defensive as in the case of otherness interpreted as a national security 
threat. But foreign policy is not only about a confrontation with radical others. It is also 
concerned with foreign aid, political integration, alliance, and so on, in which cases 
otherness does not need to be threatening. The point is that, if we dismiss the possibility 
of less radical otherness, we cannot adequately address the significance of realms of 
foreign policy other than security policy as sites that constitute the state. As Hansen 
(2006, 36-7) holds, “to define a priori that radical forms of identity construction would 
be the only form of identity construction within foreign policy discourse would result in 
an unnecessary theoretical and empirical limitation and prevent an engagement with 
important parts of contemporary foreign policy.” By not limiting the analysis to 
examinations of relations between the self and threatening others, we can not only look at 
diverse issues of foreign policy and the performative construction of the state therein, but 
also examine how different articulations of the self and the other give rise to various 
possibilities of conducts that the self can take toward the other.   
In the context of the present study, others critical in constituting contemporary 
Japan are not necessarily radical enemy others. Among significant others that construct 
postwar Japan are the United States, neighboring Asia, and Japan’s own past selves. On 
the one hand, the United States is the only ally that Japan has had since World War II, 
and the alliance with it allows Japan to identify itself as “America’s partner.” And yet, 
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Japan has developed ambivalent relations with the United States, which defeated Japan in 
WWII, occupied it in the immediate postwar years, and still maintains a military presence 
on Japanese territory (on Okinawa, in particular). Thus, Japan’s autonomy is significantly 
compromised vis-à-vis the United States—a “big brother” whom Japan cannot 
overcome—and Japan displays a victim identity in relation to this victorious and 
overwhelming other. On the other hand, Asian others represent an identity that imperial 
Japan once victimized. Their repeated claims that Japan must readily accept the 
responsibility toward war victims in Asia confront Japan with an unforgettable history of 
aggressive wars that imperial Japan initiated. In this way, Asian others represent 
“victimized others,” in relation to which Japan is identified as a former aggressor, an 
invader, and a victimizer. These victorious and victimized others, thus, give rise to 
competing identities for Japan. But both of these others, further, evoke Japan’s shameful 
identities of the past as a miserable loser of WWII and as an international aggressor in 
Asia. In other words, when dealing with the legacy of World War II, Japan actually faces 
its past selves that destabilize the contemporary pacifist and respectable identity of Japan.   
These others construct critical dimensions of postwar Japan, but they are not 
necessarily enemy others. Issues at stake between Japan and these others are not only 
about national security but also about various postwar matters. The analysis of Japan’s 
subjectivity, therefore, demands the examination of relations between the self and various 
constructions of otherness that can take more forms than radical difference. In order to 
address these aspects of Japan’s identity, we need to consider the possibility of less 
radical otherness making Japanese political subjectivity feasible.  
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Women and Foreign Policy 
If various degrees of otherness can be articulated to produce a national self 
through foreign policy discourse, which is now reconceptualized as one of the boundary-
producing practices central to the production and reproduction of state identity, it 
becomes possible to shed new light on diverse foreign policy issues, including those 
conventionally regarded as unimportant or irrelevant in mainstream foreign policy 
analysis and IR theory. Issues outside the scope of mainstream analysis can often provide 
important windows into the constitution, production, and maintenance of an identity. 
Indeed, poststructuralism shifts our understanding of foreign policy from “a concern of 
relations between states that take place across ahistorical, frozen, and pregiven 
boundaries to a concern with the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one 
and the same time, the ‘state’ and ‘the international system’” (Campbell 1992, 69, 
emphasis in original). This new perspective can bring added meaning to “marginal” 
issues of foreign policy/international relations too to the extent that they constitute sites 
for inscribing and re-inscribing the boundaries of a state identity and thus create its 
conditions of possibility. This redefinition of foreign policy, accordingly, allows us to 
expand the scope of foreign policy analysis and International Relations and to reexamine 
overlooked problems from a different point of view. 
A theoretical framework that questions boundary-making processes provides 
especially promising ground for feminist inquiries into foreign policy/International 
Relations. Generally, women’s issues are not considered one of the core subjects of 
foreign policy analysis and International Relations (Enloe 1990; Tickner 1997; Tickner 
and Sjoberg 2007). Many foreign policy issues do concern and affect women (for 
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example, humanitarian intervention conducted under the name of protecting women and 
children, issues of global poverty that affect women and men differently, etc.). But very 
rarely are these issues considered to be of high political importance in the field of IR. 
Indeed, women’s issues may not concern vital national interests like issues of peace and 
security. Further, foreign policy analysis is primarily about relations between states. As 
such, it supposedly has little to say about women, whose issues are more likely to be 
relegated to sociological problems or general human concerns (Enloe 1990, 3-4; Tickner 
1997, 615-16). Fred Halliday (1991, 159) further states: 
There is, however, a more fundamental reason for the gender blindness of 
most of the field of international relations, namely an assumption of 
separation between the two spheres of gender and international relations. 
On the one hand, it is presumed that international relations as such are 
little if at all affected by issues pertaining to women. To put it in simplistic 
terms, the assumption is that one can study the course of relations between 
states without reference to questions of gender. On the other hand, by 
neglecting the dimension of gender, international relations implicitly 
supports the thesis that international processes themselves are gender 
neutral; that is, that they have no effect on the position and role of women 
in society, and on the relative placement of women and men. 
 
These implicit assumptions (i.e., that international relations can be studied 
without reference to women and that international processes are gender-neutral) are 
disputed by feminist scholars who argue that women’s roles and experiences are integral 
to international relations. Feminists hold that international relations are constructed by 
gender, but in a way that devalues “femininity” and marginalizes women. For example, 
feminists observe that international politics is constructed as a man’s world not only 
because those who engage in international politics are mostly men, but also because 
“masculinity” serves as a norm for the international behavior of states (Beckman and 
D’Amico 1994; Cohn 1987; Elshtain 1997; Grant 1991; Tickner 1991; 1992; 2001). As J. 
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Ann Tickner (1992, 6) states, “masculinity and politics have a long and close association. 
Characteristics associated with ‘manliness,’ such as toughness, courage, power, 
independence, and even physical strength, have, throughout history, been those most 
valued in the conduct of politics, particularly international politics.” In order to defend 
and promote national interests, the state is expected to embody these masculine virtues 
and get rid of such traits as fear, vulnerability, dependence, and irrationality, traits widely 
associated with “femininity” in masculinist discourses. Men’s/manly behavior is, 
accordingly, considered to rightly shape world politics, while women’s/womanly roles in 
politics are rendered secondary and even made invisible in this masculine world.  
Contrary to these prevailing assumptions, feminists proclaim that International 
Relations cannot actually work without “women’s roles in creating and sustaining 
international politics” (Enloe 1990, 4). Most notably, Cynthia Enloe (1990) argues that 
International Relations are sustained by a particular power relationship between men and 
women that makes “the international” “personal.” She explains:  
governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships 
in order to conduct their foreign affairs. Governments need more than 
secrecy and intelligence agencies; they need wives who are willing to 
provide their diplomatic husbands with unpaid services so those men can 
develop trusting relationships with other diplomatic husbands. They need 
not only military hardware, but a steady supply of women’s sexual 
services to convince their soldiers that they are manly. To operate in the 
international arena, governments seek other governments’ recognition of 
their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculinized 
dignity and feminine sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous 
nationhood (Enloe 1990, 196-97). 
 
Enloe suggests that women’s issues are not simply “sociological problems” but also 
“problems of international relations.” And yet, she also notes that “the personal is 
international” in the sense that how governments conduct their affairs manifests itself in 
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personal power relationships between men and women (Enloe 1990, 196). Katharine H. S. 
Moon’s Sex Among Allies (1997) illustrates this point well. In this work, Moon 
demonstrates that the relative weakness of the South Korean government vis-à-vis the 
United States in the early 1970s, when the United States started to review its military 
strategy in Asia, led to the tighter statist control of prostitution camps around US military 
bases in South Korea to provide American troops with a better environment and thereby 
secure the US military commitment to South Korea. In this case, Korean prostitutes were 
an important instrument of national security policy. In other words, South Korea pursued 
national security by offering these prostitutes to the US military, thus building its 
“security” upon the “insecurity” of these women. Moon’s study, accordingly, indicates 
the strong relationship between the personal sexual relations of Korean prostitutes and 
US troops and the international relations of the entities we know as South Korea and the 
United States. That is to say, international politics was played at the interpersonal level as 
a reflection of relations between these states. 
These feminist perspectives suggest the importance of seeing women’s issues as 
issues of international politics and foreign policy by breaking down the barriers between 
“the personal” and “the international.” If women’s issues are redefined as political, it 
becomes possible to broaden the analysis of foreign policy to include women’s issues and 
to examine how these issues provide the state with opportunities to performatively 
constitute its reality. Feminist studies, therefore, suggest the possibility of studying the 
performative construction of the state by dealing with issues that arise between 
women/the feminine and men/the masculine. In fact, although foreign policy often 
demands a foreign other toward which a policy is adopted, otherness can be given rise to 
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not only by a “foreign” state but also by “foreigners,” “foreign” men or “foreign” women. 
These foreign entities allow the state to discursively construct its “outside” and thereby 
inscribe the national boundaries delineating the “domestic” and the “foreign” in gendered 
ways. 
Thus, given that the present research focuses on the boundary-producing practices 
of the state, a particular interest should be given to the roles women play in the 
construction of the boundaries of a collective self. Accordingly, to explore the 
relationship between women and boundaries, I would like to turn to feminist works on 
gender and nation. The feminist works discussed below find that women’s bodies 
constitute crucial sites for reproducing, as well as disturbing, the boundaries of the 
national body and identity. It is important to clarify how women’s bodies mark the 
national boundaries and what kinds of women’s issues are particularly implicated in 
constructing these boundaries. The following section, thus, introduces broad debates on 
gender, sexuality, and nation discussed in feminist literatures. 
 
Women and Boundaries   
A political community is often represented as a body—a political body or “body 
politic”—which serves as an instrument, a metaphor, and a symbol through which we 
make sense of the collectivity (Campbell 1992; Gatens 1996; Gould 2009). As feminists 
point out, this corporeal representation of the social group is not gender-neutral. Rather, it 
is a gendered imagination that relies heavily on images of either male or female bodies. 
For instance, the national body is often called up as a woman or a mother, whereby the 
motherland is feminized, calling her sons to defend her land, frontiers, and honor (Anand 
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2008; McClintock 1995; Peterson 1998; Pettman 1996). It is in this context that the 
invasion of the national land is at times symbolically represented as a “rape,” a metaphor 
used for the “rape of Belgium,” for example, during World War I, or the “rape of 
Kuwait” during the Gulf War. V. Spike Peterson (1998, 44) writes: 
a nation-as-woman expresses a spatial, embodied femaleness: the land’s 
fecundity, upon which the people depend, must be protected by defending 
the body/nation’s boundaries against invasion and violation. But nation-
as-woman is also a temporal metaphor: the rape of the body/nation not 
only violates frontiers but disrupts—by planting alien seed or destroying 
reproductive viability—the maintenance of the community through time. 
Also implicit in the patriarchal metaphor is a tacit agreement that men who 
cannot defend their woman/nation against rape have lost their “claim” to 
that body, that land.  
 
The other side of this metaphor is that women themselves are the symbolic bearers of the 
nation, its honor, and its purity (Charles and Hintjens 1998; Kofman 1998; McClintock 
1995; Nikolic-Ristanovic 1998; Pettman 1996; True 1993; Yuval-Davis 1997; Yuval-
Davis and Anthias 1989). Indeed, women fulfill essential roles in the nation, which Nira 
Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (1989, 7) define in the following terms:  
(a) as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities;  
(b) as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups;  
(c) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the 
collectivity and as transmitters of its culture;  
(d) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences—as a focus and symbol in 
ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and 
transformation of ethnic/national categories;  
(e) as participants in national, ethnic, economic, political and military 
struggles. 
  
As suggested by Yuval-Davis and Anthias above, women’s reproductive role is of 
foremost importance for the nation—women reproduce the nation by giving birth to the 
future generations and, thus, serve as “nationalist wombs” (Enloe 1990, 54). Women also 
transmit to children a national culture, thereby preserving the continuity of a national 
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tradition and values. Women are, in this sense, occasionally “represented as the atavistic 
and authentic body of national tradition […], embodying nationalism’s conservative 
principle of continuity” (McClintock 1995, 359). Women are, as it were, the “guardians” 
of national cultural identity.   
Considering such important roles women carry in nationalist processes, a rape by 
a foreign male has grave implications for the nation. Ruth Seifert (1994, 55) defines rape 
as “the violent invasion into the interior of one’s body [that] represents the most severe 
attack imaginable upon the intimate self and the dignity of a human being.” Given 
women’s symbolic status within the national community, the rape of “our” woman by a 
“foreign” man is not only a violent invasion into the woman’s body and a humiliation of 
her own dignity, but it also represents “the symbolic rape of the body of this community,” 
thus constituting an assault on national identity and honor (Seifert 1994, 64). In fact, rape 
in wartime is widespread, and it is used not just as a way to humiliate the male opponent 
as protector of women, but also as a way to destroy the opponent’s culture and the 
integrity of the group (Niarchos 2006; Mostov 2000, 96; Salzman 2006; Seifert 1994; 
Sjoberg and Peet 2011). Even in peacetime, international rape occasionally develops into 
a diplomatic issue, as we will see in Chapter IV. Rape is, in this sense, not so much “an 
aggressive manifestation of sexuality” as “a sexual manifestation of aggression,” 
aggression directed toward both women and their group (Seifert 1994, 50).    
Yet, obsession with women and the conduct of women’s bodies is not limited to 
issues of rape but also extends to sexual contact with “foreign bodies” and the by-
products of these acts. As Sarah Benton (1998, 34) writes, it is often argued in nationalist 
ideology that “only pure fluids—blood and semen and rivers—transmit moral purity and 
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racial belonging.” This suggests that great importance is attached to the control of the 
sexuality of women, whose morality, chasteness, and modesty must be retained for the 
reproduction of the “pure” nation (Charles and Hintjens 1998; Mayer 2000; Peterson 
1998; Pettman 1996; Yuval-Davis 1997). In other words, in nationalist processes, it is 
“not only that women’s sexual behaviour is circumscribed but also that ‘other’ men must 
not be allowed sexual access to them; such access not only impugns the honour of the 
family and community but also sullies the purity of the nation” (Charles and Hintjens 
1998, 10). In Bosnia in the 1990s, for example, both the women who became pregnant as 
a result of rape by Serb males and the children born after the rape were considered to 
belong to the enemy’s ethnic group (Kaufman and Williams 2007, 17; Nikolic-Ristanovic 
1998, 236). Nazi Germany similarly regarded those of mixed Aryan and non-Aryan blood 
as “contaminated” (Yuval-Davis 1997, 27).  
Women, in this sense, present “an entry point for invasion”—that is, they are 
“vulnerable to seduction, open to physical invasion and contamination, and symbols of 
territorial vulnerability and national defilement” (Mostov 2000, 92, 98). Yet more 
importantly, these nationalist discourses suggest that the female body becomes the very 
site where the national boundaries are reproduced and, at times, disrupted. Women 
serve as markers of the national boundaries. As such, various struggles to define the 
national boundaries are played out over the feminine body. Thus, if “our” women are 
raped or otherwise attacked or defiled, such an act of aggression constitutes an invasion 
of the self’s national boundaries, the occupation of its symbolic space, and a violation of 
its autonomy (Mostov 2000, 96). In this sense, “our” women must be protected at all 
costs by fathers, husbands, sons, as well as by the national state as a whole. And yet, 
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alienating certain women as “foreigners” also serves to reproduce and maintain “our” 
purity, virtues, and boundaries. It is in this context that women defined as “insiders” or 
“outsiders” have great implications for the construction of a national self. 
This point is of special significance to the present study. If a woman’s body is a 
symbolic marker of national boundaries, diplomatic issues concerning the body of 
“our”/“their” women constitute critical sites of foreign policy, wherein the boundaries of 
a national self are performatively constructed vis-à-vis foreign others. Indeed, 
international rape is outside the scope of conventional foreign policy analysis and is 
usually rendered unimportant among foreign policy issues. But, as discussed above, such 
a “trivial incident” becomes exactly where foreign policy takes place. In this dissertation, 
to examine the construction of the Japanese national self vis-à-vis the US, Asian others, 
or Japan’s past self through foreign policy practice, the issues of US military rape in 
Okinawa and of the comfort women “problem” will be closely analyzed. On the one 
hand, the comfort women issue is concerned with the Japanese wartime institution of 
sexual exploitation of numerous women, mostly women from the Japanese-occupied 
territories, an issue that was raised as a diplomatic matter by South Korea and other Asian 
states in the early 1990s. On the other hand, rape cases in Okinawa are believed to 
symbolize the American invasion and humiliation of Okinawa and Japan that are 
conducted through the bodies of rape victims, thus repeatedly developing into a serious 
diplomatic problem between Japan and the United States. Each case represents an issue 
between “our” women and “foreign” men or between “their” women and “our” men, 
thereby giving rise to discursive boundaries between “us” and “them.” Therefore, this 
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research will show that, by narrating these issues in foreign policy discourses, Japan 
performatively re-creates its gendered identity in relation to foreign others.  
 
Research Design 
To conduct the present research effectively, it is important to have a clear research 
design. Hansen (2006) provides a useful framework for developing a research design for 
my project. According to Hansen, to produce a practical research design, one needs to 
clarify the subject matter and research method in terms of (1) the number of selves (How 
many subjects are examined?), (2) temporal perspective (Does the research focus on one 
moment, comparative moments, or historical development?), (3) number of events (How 
many events are analyzed, one or multiple issue-/time-related events?), and (4) 
intertextual models (Which texts are analyzed?).  
The first dimension of a research design concerns the number of subjects that are 
studied in the research. One or multiple selves can be studied, and if multiple subjects are 
chosen, one could examine the discursive construction of these selves responding to the 
same event or policy issue. Or, the study can also be directed to ask how a self constitutes 
itself in relation to an other while this very other constitutes itself (or its selfhood) in 
relation to the self (now the other), a condition Hansen (2006, 68) calls “discursive 
encounter.” The multiple-selves approach “provides knowledge of the discursive and 
political room of maneuver of foreign policy issues” since this approach suggests the 
possibility of dynamic interaction between different representations of identities (Hansen 
2006, 68). Alternatively, if a single subject is examined, the research can draw attention 
to the instability of the self, whose identity not only is contested by competing discourses, 
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but also is transformed according to changes in a dominant discourse. The single-self 
approach can show that the construction of the self never ends, nor does the self ever 
achieve singularity. 
For the second dimension, a temporal perspective, a researcher can look at one 
particular moment, multiple points in time, or even centuries of discursive developments. 
According to Hansen, a single moment study is suitable to conduct a detailed analysis of 
discourses on a particular incident, while a study of comparative moments or historical 
developments will allow one to examine discursive changes taking place through a series 
of events. The value of historical analysis, in part, lies in that “they trace how previously 
important representations have been silenced and written out of the discourse of the 
present” (Hansen 2006, 70). In other words, they can show not only dynamic 
transformation of identities, but also “how deeply rooted particular aspects of current 
identities are” (Hansen 2006, 70). By contrast, a single moment study can reveal the 
complexity of discourses, for example, by analyzing multiple selves produced by 
competing discourses that developed at a particular moment in time.  
The third dimension is the number of events. This dimension is closely related to 
the second dimension; a single moment study can be logically coupled with a single event 
study and a comparative-moments study with a multiple-events study. Yet, these are not 
the only options. For a single moment study, for example, one particular event can be 
picked. But examining two different events happening around the same time is also 
possible. In fact, by doing so, it becomes possible to “generat[e] knowledge of the 
discourses of the Self across politically pertinent areas” (Hansen 2006, 71).    
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Lastly, Hansen suggests three intertextual models of discourse analysis. Model 1 
looks into official foreign policy discourse as seen in such texts as speeches, interviews, 
articles, and books produced by political leaders with official authority. “The goals of a 
[sic] model 1 study are,” Hansen (2006, 53) clarifies, “to carefully investigate the 
constructions of identity within official discourse, to analyze the way in which 
intertextual links stabilize this discourse, and to examine how official discourse 
encounters criticism.” Model 2 broadens the scope of analysis to consider a wider foreign 
policy debate in which discourses of oppositional political parties, influential political 
figures, the media, and corporate institutions such as trade unions, large firms, and 
powerful NGOs come into play. The second model facilitates the analysis of the 
discursive hegemony enjoyed by the government while allowing an investigation of the 
possibility of change in official discourse by showing modifying, challenging, and/or 
silenced discourses that appear in the wider political debate. Finally, the third model is 
concerned with widely dispersed representations manifested in “high” and/or “popular” 
culture (model 3A) or political discourses with a marginal status as they are often seen 
among academics, social movements, and NGOs (model 3B). Referring to the 
complementarity of these models, Hansen (2006, 56) notes:  
The ambition of discourse analysis is not only to understand official 
discourse, and the texts and representations which have directly impacted 
it, but also to analyze how this discourse is presented as legitimate in 
relation to the larger public and how it is reproduced or contested across 
the variety of political sites and genres reflected in different ways by 
models 2 and 3.   
 
Hansen’s research design framework helps to form the basic structure of this 
research. This dissertation focuses on the formation of Japan’s state identity in the 
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postwar era. Thus, it takes a single-self approach, by which it seeks to problematize the 
singularity and stability of Japan’s identity. Japan’s political identity is discursively 
produced and reproduced in relation to a series of others who secure Japan’s subjectivity 
and simultaneously destabilize it. More precisely, Japan’s relationships with Asia and the 
United States create a crucial condition for the contemporary Japanese self. But, by 
constructing Japan as both a victim and an aggressor in relation to these others, the 
Japanese self becomes split between these conflicting identities. Further, contemporary 
Japan is also constructed vis-à-vis past Japan, either a defeated Japan or an imperial 
Japan, whose presence allows Japan to acquire a new, “reborn” identity, while also 
showing the haunting ghost of its own past. In addition, this research reveals the 
construction of a sub-identity, such as an Okinawan self, which constitutes Japan’s whole 
and at the same time constructs Japan’s “internal other.” This means that Japan’s spatial, 
temporal, and ethical identity is always contested and unsettled, and that Japan’s identity 
can never achieve stability. The present research, accordingly, draws attention to the 
competing discourses that are constructing Japan’s subjectivity, and explores the 
possibility of producing a “reborn” identity and overcoming this unsettled identity.   
This research also conducts what Hansen would call a comparative-moments 
study by focusing on multiple events. In Chapter IV, Japan’s relations with the United 
States are explored with a special focus on the issue of US military bases in Okinawa. 
Okinawa constitutes a site where the boundaries between Japan and the United States are 
constantly negotiated and reinscribed. The issue of the rape of Okinawan girls by US 
servicemen is highly politicized and provides an important site of Okinawan/Japanese 
identity vis-à-vis the US military. The chapter closely examines a highly publicized rape 
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case that occurred in Okinawa in 2008 to analyze how the Japanese self is reproduced by 
narrating the rape of “our” girl by an American soldier. In Chapter V, Japan’s identity 
formation vis-à-vis Asia is carefully studied. The focus of this chapter is on the issue of 
comfort women that was raised as a major diplomatic issue between Japan and 
neighboring Asian states in the early 1990s. By examining the ongoing debate on this 
question, the chapter explores how various Japanese selves are constructed through 
representations of this “historical” issue.            
Finally, my dissertation analyzes both official and wider societal discourses about 
Japanese identity. The texts analyzed include defense white papers (Chapter IV), official 
government statements (Chapter V), school textbooks (Chapter III), and newspaper 
editorials (Chapters IV and V). Models 1 and 2 in Hansen’s categorization are thus 
combined to look at the formation of various Japanese selves in different foreign policy 
issues.  
Through a single-self, comparative-moments study of Japanese identity, this 
dissertation will ultimately demonstrate that postwar pacifist Japan is a discursive 
construction that is always haunted by alternative and conflicting images of the Japanese 
self. In this context, Japan’s increasing investment in global peace and stability can be 
understood as one form of performance through which Japan creates the reality of the 
pacifist state and attempts to overcome its unstable and split identity. In its conclusion, 
this dissertation turns to Japan’s growing commitment to the United Nations’ 
peacekeeping operations to examine the ongoing performative construction of what we 
supposedly know as a pacifist Japan, a subject that has learned the evil of war both as a 
victim and an aggressor, and actively contributes to a better world.  
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Before turning to the case studies, the next chapter will first look at different 
approaches to, and analyses of, Japanese foreign policy. It will show how non-
poststructuralist analyses have provided explanations for Japanese policy that have in fact 
constructed what Japan “is.” The next chapter also conducts an analysis of Japanese 
junior high school textbooks. Such a textual analysis is also meant to show how history is 
constructed and how historical narratives have constructed “Japan.” It further seeks to 
explain how historical discourses are not simply a discussion of past situations 
experienced by Japan. Rather, such discourses are productive of Japan’s past. They 
perform stories that actively produce the very identity of postwar Japan as the antithesis 
to wartime Japan. 
  
64 
III. JAPANESE IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Japanese foreign policy in the post-World War II era has long attracted the 
attention of many scholars. Many researchers find that Japan has not played an active role 
in the international political arena despite the nation’s economic power. Indeed, Japan has 
set limits for its military spending and has been heavily reliant on the military protection 
provided by the United States. Its leadership role in setting international agendas also 
seems limited even if Japan’s economic power has given it considerable leverage at the 
negotiating table. Scholars have attempted to explain Japan’s reserved foreign policy 
through different perspectives. As discussed in the previous chapter, since constructivism 
gained momentum in International Relations, such variables as “identity” and “norms” 
have been increasingly used to offer new explanations of Japanese foreign policy. 
Constructivism has raised a set of new research questions, including how Japan’s identity 
shapes its foreign policy, how Japan’s national interests are constructed, and whether 
Japan’s identity has changed over time, thus giving a new direction to its foreign policy.  
Interestingly, however, until around the time constructivist approaches were 
developed and employed in the analysis of Japanese foreign policy, attempts to apply 
conventional International Relations theories to study Japanese foreign policy were not 
very popular. The studies of Japanese foreign policy had long tended to concentrate on 
such questions as whether Japan had formulated its foreign policy as a response to 
American pressure and thus lacked the capacity to develop an independent foreign policy 
agenda. It is only since the 1990s that more researchers have reevaluated Japan’s 
proactive policy making and referred to existing International Relations theories to 
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explain it (Potter and Sudo 2003; Sudo 2007). The shift occurred partly because of 
analytical limitations of the Japan-as-a-reactive-state thesis. But it also reflected changing 
patterns of Japanese foreign policy in the post-Cold War era that many scholars believed 
required new ways of thinking in order to be fully understood. Indeed, Japan has recently 
shown initiative in creating various regional institutions outside its bilateral relations with 
the United States, and has started to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, while 
also strengthening the ties between the Japanese Self Defense forces and the US military. 
To explain these new developments in Japanese foreign policy, more scholars have 
revisited IR theories and tried to offer alternative explanations of Japan’s strategic policy 
making and/or its external behavior. More importantly, by doing so, these scholars have, 
implicitly or explicitly, recognized Japan’s independent agency and thereby regarded 
Japan as a natural actor/subject of international relations. That is to say, Japan’s 
subjectivity is taken for granted and is even discursively reproduced by their theories.  
In this chapter, different theoretical accounts of Japanese foreign policy are 
examined with a particular focus on constructivist explanations. By critically looking at 
various constructivist approaches to Japanese foreign policy, I seek to show how 
constructivists draw attention to the role of identity in Japan’s foreign policy making, but 
in a way that naturalizes Japan’s corporate identity. Thus, I also intend to demonstrate 
how my poststructuralist study of Japanese foreign policy challenges these approaches. 
After examining constructivist and other theoretical analyses, I will conduct a discourse 
analysis of Japanese junior high school history textbooks. In doing so, I intend to show 
how the discourses of Japanese victimhood and Asian victimization, which constitute two 
basic aspects of Japanese experiences during WWII, have played important roles in 
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constructing postwar Japan’s identity. As the first part of this chapter will show, Japan’s 
identity is largely shaped by its unforgettable experiences in WWII. This identity then 
makes certain foreign policies imaginable and legitimate in Japan while conversely 
making others unimaginable and illegitimate. From a poststructuralist point of view, 
however, Japan’s identity as a victim of US (nuclear) attacks or as an aggressor in Asia is 
not natural, but rather discursively constructed. Although Japan’s wartime experiences 
such as the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Nanjing Massacre are, 
in a sense, real, the events require interpretations so that particular meanings are given to 
“fact,” “victim,” and “assailant.”  
Among sites where Japan’s wartime past is discursively produced are history 
textbooks used in Japanese schools. In Japan, the government plays an active role in 
screening and authorizing textbooks, thus exercising administrative pressure over 
historical narratives. And yet, as a series of textbook controversies mentioned below 
would suggest, these textbooks constitute a significant discursive space where 
progressive scholarly accounts of war compete with conservative governmental accounts. 
Changing textbook narratives, in this sense, can reveal the possibility of different 
identities about postwar Japan.     
To examine how Japan’s identity has been constituted through narrating history 
and how the narratives have changed over time, thus producing different identities for 
Japan, I will closely read junior high school history textbooks published in the postwar 
period. Through this analysis, I seek to show the centrality of Japanese victimhood and 
Asian victimization discourses in Japanese narratives of war. In turn, I want to highlight 
the significance of the images of victorious US and victimized Asian others in 
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constructing Japan’s identity. The chapter will thus provide some analytical foundations 
for the subsequent chapters that will examine the discursive construction of Japan’s 
identity and policy toward the United States and Asia. 
 
Japanese Foreign Policy and the Reactive State Thesis 
In the eyes of many researchers of Japanese foreign policy, Japan’s so-called 
passive role in international affairs, despite its enormous economic power, has been a 
puzzling question. Postwar Japan has generally followed the Yoshida Doctrine 
formulated by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in the early 1950s. The doctrine places 
the highest priority in the economic recovery of postwar Japan, while limiting military 
spending and making Japan reliant on the US military protection provided by the Japan-
US security treaty (Chai 1997; Ikeda 2004; Soeya 2008). Under this doctrine, Japan has 
long maintained a low profile on security issues and rarely taken a leading role in the 
international system.  
Among popular accounts of this issue is a school that explains Japan’s reserved 
policy as a response to external pressure, and US pressure in particular. According to this 
school, Japan lacks the capacity to develop a grand geopolitical strategy (Hellmann 1988; 
A. Tanaka 1989; Yamamoto 1987). Kent E. Calder (1988), for example, argues that the 
concept of “reactive state” is particularly relevant to postwar Japan because Japan 
displays two essential characteristics of a reactive state. That is, “(1) the state fails to 
undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it has the power 
and national incentives to do so; and (2) it responds to outside pressures for change, albeit 
erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely” (Calder 1988, 519). This thesis is 
68 
based on Calder’s careful analysis of Japan’s domestic structure that, he believes, creates 
obstacles to Japan’s proactive foreign policy behavior. More precisely, the fragmentation 
of Japanese political authority is considered to undermine its capacity to take decisive 
action, thus giving US pressure paramount importance in Japan’s foreign policy making 
(see also Funabashi 1991/1992; Hellmann 1972, 135-36; R. Orr 1990; Pyle 1992; 
Richardson 1997). 
Others in this school argue that Japan’s reactiveness also comes from historical, 
cultural, and psychological sources—Japan’s defeat in World War II and the subsequent 
occupation increased its sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis American pressure (Berger 
1996a; Pyle 1989, 50, 54-6). In Donald C. Hellmann’s words, the Japan-US relationship 
is one of paternalism, “with the United States serving as a kind of political-cultural 
stepfather” for Japan (Hellmann 1972, 138). Either way, scholars of this school generally 
argue that Japan does not strategically formulate policies on its own, and that external 
pressure provides a powerful stimulus to Japan’s foreign policy making.   
While this thesis is still popular, both those who champion the thesis and those 
who challenge it have revealed its limitations and weaknesses. Some argue that US 
pressure cannot fully explain Japanese foreign policy and that Calder’s explanation too 
easily overlooks Japan’s domestic negotiations and politics (Cooney 2007; Mikanagi 
1996; Schoppa 1997). Others indicate that the thesis neglects the interests that Japan 
carefully pursues while avoiding risks of all kinds (Levin 1993; Lincoln 2003-2004; 
Pharr 1993). According to this view, Japan’s low profile policy effectively serves Japan’s 
national interests and is well planned to benefit Japan. For example, it has been argued 
that Japan has a desire to avoid major disruption in its relations with the United States to 
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keep the military protection and export market provided by the United States (Miyashita 
1999), and that Japan has strategically played a role as a “supporter” of the existing 
international order within which Japan still promotes its interests (Inoguchi 1986; Wan 
1995). This alternative view, thus, suggests that Japanese “responsive” foreign policy is a 
strategic “choice” rather than an indication of Japan’s inability to act on its own.  
Yet, other scholars argue that Japan has been taking more proactive policy 
initiatives that are evident in recent Japanese policies with regard to Asian regional 
institutions, development aid, and UN peacekeeping operations (Laurence 2007; Togo 
2003; Yasutomo 1995). William J. Long (2001, 130), for example, contends that “Japan’s 
use of foreign assistance for [nuclear] nonproliferation is an important exercise of power 
to set agendas, shape international norms, define Japan’s identity in the international 
system, and condition the international environment so as to shape other states’ 
preferences.” Examining Japan’s role in initiating and developing the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), C. K. Yeung (2001, 138) similarly concludes that “Japan 
has been carefully nurtured [sic] the idea of creating an economically integrated Asia in 
accordance to its agenda. Japan’s role in the making of APEC shows the success of its 
subtle, but persistent, strategy in Southeast Asia.”  
Either taking the defensive state thesis or the proactive state thesis, or even taking 
a stance that combines these theses (Berger 2007; Hirata 2001; Sato 2001), Japan’s more 
active and independent policy making is increasingly being reevaluated by scholars. As 
David Potter and Sueo Sudo (2003) recognize, scholars try to characterize Japan’s new 
diplomatic style in such terms as “karaoke diplomacy” (Inoguchi and Jain 2000), 
“consensual leadership” (Maswood 2001), “quiet diplomacy,” “aikido state” (Hook et al. 
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2001), “reluctant realism” (Green 2001), or “indirect leadership” (Blechinger and 
Legewie 2000). That is to say, when Japan’s foreign policy is found to be strategically 
formulated, different perspectives and approaches are encouraged to be applied to Japan 
to explain its international behavior. Indeed, there has been a significant shift in studies of 
Japan’s foreign policy of late. As Sueo Sudo (2007, 168) notes, attempts to apply IR 
theories to Japanese foreign policy had been largely absent until the end of Cold War 
because previous studies tended to stress the “uniqueness” of Japan, thus making it 
difficult to use conventional theories to explain Japan’s special standing in International 
Relations (See also A. Tanaka 2000).3 While many researchers still consider Japan an 
exceptional case (Chai 1997; Tamamoto 1994), the emerging trend has provided 
incentives to employ realist, liberal, or constructivist theory to account for Japan’s 
external behavior.  
 
Japan and IR Theories  
Japan has achieved remarkable economic development since the 1970s, which has 
allowed it to become a world economic power. Although structural realists once said that 
Japan would seek to become a nuclear power and achieve superpower status (Kahn 1970, 
165; Waltz 1993, 66-9), against their expectations, Japan has never chosen to develop 
nuclear weapons. Japan is, accordingly, often regarded as an “anomaly” that “directly 
challenge[s] realist theory” (Johnson 1993, 203). Indeed, as Chalmers Johnson (1993, 
                                                          
3 Akihiko Tanaka (2000) explains that IR theories have been “imported” to Japan from the West (with 
some misunderstanding and misinterpretation), but Japanese scholars have been less interested in the so-
called “great debates” discussed among Western scholars, and have showed little interest in developing 
these “imported” theories further in the context of Japan. This situation has made it difficult for Japanese 
scholars to not only catch up with theoretical trends in Western IR scholarship, but also to contribute to the 
development of IR theory.  
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202-3) asserts, “realism does not inquire at all into the domestic responses to and 
constraints on foreign policies or else assumes that such responses are homogeneous 
across all states facing similar international pressures.” 
Other scholars, however, point to the great relevance of realist premises about 
power and interests for Japanese foreign policy. Samuel P. Huntington (1993, 72) notes 
that, “for decades, Japan as acted in a way totally consistent with the ‘realist’ theory of 
international relations, which holds that international politics is basically anarchic and 
that to insure their security states act to maximize their power.” Huntington (1993, 72) 
continues: “Japan has accepted all the assumptions of realism but applied them purely in 
the economic realm.” Inspired by this argument, Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. 
Samuels (1998, 171) suggest that Japan follows what they call “mercantile realism” 
whereby “Japan recognizes technoeconomic security interests—including, but not limited 
to, those associated with military security—as central considerations of state policy.” 
More precisely, they argue: “policies designed to enhance the technological and 
economic fortunes of states may be pursued to increase a state’s political leverage and 
independence even in the absence of military-security considerations” (Heginbotham and 
Samuels 1998, 190). Heginbotham and Samuels then develop four propositions 
applicable to such technoeconomic states. They are: 
(1) Security threats are economic as well as military;  
(2) powerful technoeconomic states will balance against other 
technoeconomic states;  
(3) when trade-offs must be made, technoeconomic interests may be 
pursued at the expense of political-military interests; and  
(4) the nationality of firms matters as much as or more than the location of 
production (Heginbotham and Samuels 1998, 191). 
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According to this realist view, Japan rationally pursues its interests and acts to maximize 
its power. Balancing is still a norm for Japan, although it takes place against other 
technoeconomic powers. In this sense, if power and national interests are defined in 
technoeconomic terms, realist predictions might still serve to explain Japan’s strategic 
behavior, if structural realism fails to explain it.  
Similarly, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki (2001) employs what Stephen Brooks (1997) terms 
“postclassical realism” to understand Japan’s overall strategic goal. According to 
Kawasaki (1997, 223), Japan’s defense policy is consistent with the predictions of 
postclassical realism that “construes states as actors who, while highly sensitive to the 
economic costs of defense, are maximizing their security without threatening others in a 
situation of the security dilemma.” The wisdom of postclassical realism, he asserts, 
explains Japan’s foreign policy behavior as primarily designed “to reduce the intensity of 
the security dilemma in Northeast Asia” (Kawasaki 1997, 223). By maintaining the 
security alliance with the United States as well as its modest defensive capabilities, Japan 
has long maintained a favorable international environment without creating a power 
vacuum and igniting an arms race in the region (Kawasaki 2001, 223-24). 
As suggested by these arguments, many realists refer to modified versions of 
realism to account for Japan’s external behavior. Yet many others still employ the 
traditional realist explanations of balancing and, at times, bandwagoning. Jitsuo 
Tsuchiyama (1997; 2000), for example, argues that Japan’s alliance with the United 
States reveals Japan’s bandwagoning strategy, while Michael Green (2001) contends that 
post-Cold War Japan mostly balances against rising China.  
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Such realist thinking is, however, attacked by neoliberal institutionalists who 
emphasize the roles played by regimes, institutions, and norms. They question whether 
realists can fully explain, for instance, the maintenance of the Japan-US alliance in the 
post-Cold War era when the power balance has significantly changed. Neoliberals see the 
alliance rather as an institution through which Japan and the United States better 
communicate and increase the predictability and transparency of their relations 
(Tsuchiyama 1997, 170-73). The alliance, furthermore, serves to govern their relations, 
advance bilateral diplomacy, and help them coordinate policies. Neoliberalism, 
accordingly, expects that the alliance will be deepened further in coming years 
(Tsuchiyama 1997, 173). 
If Japan’s foreign policy is not one of balancing, as neoliberals suggest, Japanese 
policy toward China can then be seen from a different point of view too. Mike M. 
Mochizuki (2007) argues that postwar Japan has long cooperated with China, especially 
in economic terms. Between 1972, when Japan normalized diplomatic relations with 
China, and 1989, when the Tiananmen massacre occurred in Beijing, he observes that: 
 
Japan had a keen interest in deepening commercial relations with China. 
From the beginning of the postwar period, Japanese business and political 
elites believed that economic complementarity made the two countries 
natural economic partners and that trade with China would yield 
commercial benefits. Therefore, the Japanese were quite willing to 
transgress the Cold War ideological divide in East Asia and separate 
economics and politics (seikei bunri) to develop trade relations with China 
(Mochizuki 2007, 746-47). 
 
After the 1989 Tiananmen massacre that roused international criticism of China’s 
assertive domestic policy, Japan’s policy shifted toward moderately balancing against 
China’s economic and military rise. However, the policy of engagement was still 
74 
sustained, whereby “rather than trying to isolate or contain China, Japan has been an 
active proponent of embedding the country in a variety of global and regional institutions 
and processes” (Mochizuki 2007, 770). As many other scholars similarly observe, to 
Japan, engagement with China not only offers economic opportunities, but it also gives 
the hope that a prosperous China will develop friendly relations with Japan, and thus that 
increasing interdependence will help mitigate the competition between China and Japan 
(Howe 1996, 126; Shambaugh 1996, 90). Indeed, despite occasional political tensions, 
Japan and China have steadily deepened economic relations, which have allowed them to 
promote economic integration and a complementary relationship (Cheng 2007; Clark 
2007).  
Neoliberalism, thus, provides a perspective on Japan’s promotion of both bilateral 
and multilateral institutions, closer economic interaction with Asian states, and 
development aid through which Japan pursues peaceful and sustainable cooperation with 
other states. In this neoliberal picture, some argue that Japan has actively played a 
“supporting” role in the international system led by the United States (Inoguchi 1986; 
Wan 1995). For example, in his assessment of Japan’s spending strategies, Ming Wan 
(1995, 93) writes: 
 
Japan has used its spending to subsidize U.S.-sponsored projects and 
supported the United States in crunch times. Although Japan’s spending is 
still designed to benefit its earning, there is no evidence that Japan has had 
serious plans to use its economic power to the detriment of other nations. 
There is some suspicion that Japan’s ODA [Official Development 
Assistance] serves its own economic interests at the expense of its 
competitors, such as the United States, but there is little doubt that Japan’s 
spending in this aspect is accommodating, at least from the point of view 
of the recipient countries. Japan’s ODA has facilitated economic growth in 
East Asia and Southeast Asia […]. In addition, Japan has been more 
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accommodating in spending for multilateral financial institutions than 
through bilateral channels. Although Japan has become more assertive in 
the ADB [Asian Development Bank] and the World Bank in agenda 
setting than before, it has become less concerned about its immediate 
economic interests.    
 
Wan argues that, since the 1970s, when the US leadership in the international system was 
placed in great danger, Japan has recognized its serious interests in maintaining the 
regimes sustained by the United States, within which interdependence and 
institutionalization have taken place to change Japan’s calculations and definition of 
national interest. Convinced of the “common interests” of the international community, 
Japan has become more involved in the international system by supporting the leadership 
of the United States and by sharing the burden of maintaining the existing regimes. 
Without understanding the processes of interdependence and institutionalization, Wan 
argues, we cannot adequately explain why Japan has supported a declining hegemon 
instead of challenging it or why Japan has taken more accommodating strategies vis-à-vis 
the United States, Asia, and multilateral institutions. 
 These arguments developed by realists and liberals may be convincing in some 
respects. They indeed offer rich insights into Japanese foreign policy by recognizing 
Japan’s independent policy-making capacity and, thus, its agency. That is to say, these 
theories construct Japan as an international political agent, a corporate actor, which is 
autonomous, rational, and self-seeking. Japanese foreign policy is, in this sense, Japan’s 
strategy to promote its national interest and to enhance its international environment. For 
constructivists, however, these analyses are insufficient since they ignore the roles of 
ideational factors such as norms and identities in Japan’s foreign policy making 
(Katzenstein and Okawra 1993; 2001/2002). For example, constructivists suggest that 
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institutionalized norms not only define standards of conduct for Japan, but also constitute 
its identity and interests, thus informing Japan’s foreign policy options (Katzenstein 
1996a; 1996c). Constructivists believe that the variables of identity and norm more 
successfully explain Japan’s alleged “anomalous” international behavior than realism and 
liberalism, both of which, they claim, easily dismiss the constitutive nature of identity 
and interests.  
 
Constructivist Accounts of Japan’s Foreign Policy 
Constructivists seek to explain Japanese foreign policy by raising such questions 
as how and what kind of identity or norm is formed in/by Japan, and how this 
identity/norm affects its foreign policy. For example, Thomas U. Berger (1996a; 1996b; 
1998) and Peter J. Katzenstein (1996a) discuss the relevance of the sustained norm of 
antimilitarism to Japan’s postwar security policy. They argue that the norm emerged after 
Japan’s defeat in WWII and has since produced Japan’s continued reluctance to expand 
its global military roles and to become a nuclear power despite its increased economic 
strength and changes in its relative position in the international system. Against a realist 
prediction that Japan would seek to maximize its relative gains while adjusting its 
behavior to changes in international power distribution, they assert that cultural factors 
have shaped, and will continue to shape, Japan’s defense policy, thus allowing “no 
fundamental shift in direction, either toward greater defense autonomy or toward the 
assumption of a leadership role on security issues in a multilateral context” (Berger 
1996b, 345). Instead of developing its military capabilities, Berger (1996b, 336-37) 
argues, Japan identifies itself as a “merchant nation” that “concentrate[s] on economic 
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development while eschewing the pursuit of military power.” Similarly, Katzenstein 
(1996a, 18) notes that Japan has developed a collective identity as a “peaceful trading 
state,” thereby defining its national security in comprehensive terms and pursuing it 
primarily through non-military means. 
Importantly, constructivist analyses draw attention to the meanings given to 
policies—which are considered legitimate or illegitimate based on a particular 
understanding of the self. Identity constrains foreign policy while also enabling certain 
policies to be taken by the self (state). Looked at in this light, Japan’s minimalist security 
policy is neither an abnormal nor an unreasonable policy choice. It is rather a rational 
decision based on Japanese culture, institutionalized norms, and/or identity. According to 
Andrew L. Oros (2008, 5, 193), the security identity of postwar Japan has developed 
three central tenets—“no traditional armed forces, no use of force by Japan except in self-
defense, no Japanese participation in foreign wars”—which have then affected Japan’s 
security practice “(1) through its influence on policy rhetoric, (2) its structuring of public 
opinion and the coalition-building opportunities this enables, and (3) its 
institutionalization into the policy-making process.” Once institutionalized, he argues, 
security identity “serves as a structure in which all future policy decisions must operate, 
providing an overarching framework recognized both by top decision makers and by 
major societal actors under which a state shapes its security practices” (Oros 2008, 9). 
Therefore, Japan’s security behavior should be understood to be guided by, and 
constrained within, the context of “domestic antimilitarism,” which is “focusing on limits 
to the reemergence of militarist elements at home, yet still accepting as legitimate a 
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defensive role for a military at home” and “openly accepting of military activity on the 
part of other states” (Oros 2008, 6, 5).        
In this context, the Japan-US alliance is explained as neither Japan’s strategy to 
maximize its relative power nor a mechanism to promote the common interests of these 
states. Rather, it is the result of the “Logic of Appropriateness” (March ad Olsen 1989)—
i.e., the alliance allows Japan to rely on the United States for military protection, limit 
Japan’s own military capabilities, and thereby observe its pacifist and antimilitarist norms 
(Soeya 1998; Tuschiyama 1997, 13-5). Indeed, as Oros argues, the “domestic 
antimilitarist” identity allows Japan to form an alliance with another state by which to 
better enhance its security. These arguments tend to stress the continuity of Japanese 
foreign policy behavior since, once institutionalized, identity and norms constrain 
Japanese foreign policy and produce some continued patterns. Many constructivist 
scholars thus argue that Japanese antimilitarist identity can still explain recent changes in 
Japanese foreign policy. For example, Yoshihide Soeya (1998, 231) finds that postwar 
Japan has developed a dual identity: “that of a potential great power capable of affecting 
the international security structure, and that of a self-restraining state.” Soeya maintains 
that this dual identity has been a source of tension between Japan’s security needs and the 
antimilitarist norm, and that this tension has long informed Japan’s postwar realism. 
Although Japanese foreign policy has recently changed in many respects (for example, 
the increasing commitment to the Japan-US security relationship, regional security, and 
UN-led peacekeeping operations), he argues that it is “likely to take the form of an 
expansion of the framework of Japanese postwar realism” reaffirming the value of the 
alliance and promoting nontraditional security goals for international peace and stability 
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(Soeya 1998, 233). That is to say, Japan’s security policy has always been, and will 
always be, shaped by this dual identity, while its changing security environment, both 
domestically and internationally, will give rise to different reactions within the confines 
of postwar realism (see also Oros 2008). 
Other constructivists, however, emphasize gradual changes in Japan’s identity 
that could cause policy change. Manabu Ikudame (2004), for instance, defines Japan’s 
security policy as an outcome of the conflict derived from Japan’s dual identity, one 
driving toward a more realistic policy, and the other toward a more pacifist policy. Unlike 
Soeya, Ikudame (2004, 275) finds that the recent domestic arguments concerning Japan’s 
peace and security concentrate on “how to utilize the Self Defense Forces to contribute to 
world peace” rather than “if the Constitution recognizes the right of self-defense” or “if 
Japan should declare unarmed neutrality,” questions repeatedly discussed at the 
beginning of the postwar era. He considers this shift in the defense policy debate as 
showing the stronger influence of Japan’s realist identity and thus as an indication of a 
change made in the balance between two conflicting identities.  
From a different perspective, Kuniko Ashizawa (2008) also studies the recent 
change in Japanese foreign policy. Japan has recently promoted the establishment of the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of South East Asian 
Nations Regional Forum (ARF). However, as she observes, “for more than four decades 
since the end of World War II, Japan generally shied away from taking political 
initiatives for regional matters (not least for global matters). It rarely showed interest 
publicly in the idea of intergovernmental regional institutions in Asia, especially in the 
security realm, having appeared quite comfortable with its exclusive reliance on bilateral 
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diplomatic dealings with regional countries and with the United States” (Ashizawa 2008, 
585). Ashizawa attempts to answer this question by focusing on state identity and values 
that shaped Japanese policymakers’ preference for participating in pan-regional 
frameworks. By interviewing governmental officials and closely reading official and 
unofficial documents, Ashizawa finds two basic values shared among Japanese 
policymakers: “reassuring Asian countries about Japan’s activism,” and “keeping the US 
in Asia” (Ashizawa 2008, 585). On the one hand, the policymakers’ conception of Japan 
as “a one-time aggressor in Asia” constitutes the idea that Japan “should not arouse Asian 
neighbors’ fears about the possibility of Japan’s resurgence as a dominant power, 
political and militarily, in the region,” and thereby defines Japan’s preference for 
“cooperative” and “less hierarchical” multilateral approaches (Ashizawa 2008, 585). On 
the other hand, although Japan has long debated whether it should identify itself with the 
West or Asia, a new identity, that of “a sole member of the West in Asia” (which 
identifies Japan with both the West and Asia) has been emerging, thus encouraging Japan 
to secure the US involvement in Asia to reproduce this identity. Institutions such as the 
APEC and the ARF have been given added meaning in this context, and Japanese 
policymakers have started to pursue this new policy option.  
 Interestingly, these latter arguments tend to stress the changing environment of 
Japan as well as its evolving relationships with other states. Indeed, if identity is 
conceptualized as being developed in relation to other entities rather than being derived 
from historical experiences, Japan’s changing interactions with other states are likely to 
produce a change in Japan’s identity and, further, in its foreign policy. This point is 
evident in the analyses of Japanese foreign policy discourse that examine how Japan is 
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represented vis-à-vis other states. There are a few studies on Japan’s foreign policy 
discourse conducted in a constructivist manner. Isao Miyaoka’s study is of particular note. 
By closely reading Japan’s defense white papers published between 1976 and 2006, 
Miyaoka (2009) finds four types of identities that repeatedly appeared in the white 
papers: a “member of the West,” an “economic power,” a “peaceful state,” and a “US 
ally.” During the Cold War, white papers frequently represented Japan as a “member of 
the West” and an “economic power,” whereby the need to reinforce Japan’s defensive 
power was emphasized. To maintain relationships of mutual trust with other Western 
states and to defend Japan from the “threat” of the Soviet Bloc, it was pointed out that 
Japan should improve its military capabilities and make active international contributions 
for the sake of world peace, using its abundant wealth.  
However, in the post-Cold War discourse, the alliance with the United States is 
emphasized, replacing the identity as a “member of the West.” Indeed, the Japan-US 
alliance has further evolved since the 1990s. The Japanese Self Defense Forces now work 
more closely with the US military. Interestingly, Miyaoka observes that this change was 
made possible not only by the end of Cold War, but also by reshaping the meaning of 
“pacifism.” More precisely, although Japan’s longstanding “peaceful state” identity had 
rejected Japan’s self-identification as a military ally of the United States, Japan started to 
publicly call itself a “US ally” and to cooperate with this “partner” in the sphere of 
regional and international security by reinterpreting pacifism and defining it as a goal that 
should be achieved more actively rather than passively by refraining from using its 
military power abroad.  
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Miyaoka’s study is informative and illuminating. Especially, Miyaoka 
successfully shows how the meaning of pacifism has been changing, a perspective not 
adequately addressed by Berger, Katzenstein, Oros, or Ikudame, for example. But there is 
also a pitfall to Miyaoka’s study. For Miyaoka, discourses are simply the reflections of 
identity and thus only a tool for an actor to represent “who it is” in relation to other states. 
That is to say, discourses are merely “data” useful for researchers to study the continuity 
and transformation of Japan’s state identity. It is accordingly presumed that an objective 
reality exists outside discourse. The presumption is shared by other scholars who study 
Japanese foreign policy discourse (Ashizawa 2008; Oga 2003). For them, a pacifist Japan 
is “out there.” Although these constructivists introduce the idea that Japan is not only an 
international agent, but also a social actor whose sense of self is greatly relevant to its 
foreign policy, what is at stake here is which identity persists or transforms into another 
identity within the fixed and naturalized entity called Japan.    
   
Japan as a Discursive Construction 
As suggested in Chapter II, since corporate identity is not a relevant question in 
constructivist analyses, constructivist scholars would rather examine how a particular 
social identity has emerged in Japan. For instance, many constructivists ask how a 
pacifist Japan was constructed in the postwar era. Many consider the Japanese experience 
during WWII to be a key source of Japan’s pacifist identity. Interestingly, however, 
Japan’s antimilitarist culture was not salient right after WWII. In the early 1950s, opinion 
polls showed that the majority of Japanese people were in favor of Japan’s rearmament 
and the revision of the pacifist Constitution (Miyashita 2007, 108-9). Even in 1955, more 
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than 20% of Japanese people favored the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the number 
more than doubled by 1981 (Miyashita 2007, 109). This means that “the pacifist 
orientation was weaker in the immediate postwar years than the subsequent decades,” 
even though memories of WWII were still fresh and vivid among Japanese people 
(Miyashita 2007, 109).  
Researchers provide various accounts of the rise of an antimilitarist norm/identity 
in Japan, which can be explained, for example, as the outcome of domestic political 
conflicts and the institutionalization of the winning norms (Katzenstein 1996a), as the 
result of the American occupation and the subsequent rise of new Japanese democratic 
elites (Berger 1996b;1996c), or as the consequence of the lower level of threat perception 
and the reduced sense of insecurity among Japanese people (Miyashita 2007). Both 
domestic and international contexts would be indeed relevant to the construction of 
Japan’s postwar pacifism (Oros 2008). 
While different factors can be found inside and outside of Japan, it should be 
stressed that Japan’s pacifist identity is not automatic but constructed. The emergence of 
a pacifist state is not the natural consequence of a bitter experience in WWII. Indeed, 
from a poststructuralist point of view, “postwar Japan” is a discursive construction whose 
meaning needs to be articulated and rearticulated by representing “who we are” in 
relation to others, such as the victorious United States, victimized Asia, or even Japan’s 
own militarist past. When particular meanings are assigned to a self and to others, World 
War II can be remembered as a “horrible event,” as a “tragedy,” and “historical lessons” 
can be drawn from it. Further, we would need to ask how such a meaning (e.g., pacifist) 
has been made and attributed to “Japan.” As Chapter II has suggested, language plays an 
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important role in producing what is discussed. The very representations of what Japan is 
give “Japan” meaning and endow it with a particular identity. Japan can, thus, be 
understood as an effect of discourse—a performance that produces and reproduces the 
identity in whose name it operates. 
In the rest of Chapter III, I examine how “postwar Japan” has been produced as a 
particular kind of subject in discourse. Being aware of the performatve nature of language, 
I particularly focus on how the Japanese experience of WWII has been narrated. The 
narration of WWII is indeed integral to the myth of “postwar Japan.” The end of WWII 
gave birth to “postwar Japan,” and thus “wartime Japan” serves as a significant other that 
constitutes what postwar Japan is not (or not supposed to be). To best analyze the 
narration of Japanese history, I closely read history textbooks used in Japanese junior 
high schools. As the highest level of mandatory education, teaching at junior high schools 
offers rich accounts of Japanese history. I first summarize history education in Japan and 
describe a series of textbook controversies that occurred after World War II.     
 
History Textbooks and the Discursive Construction of Postwar Japan 
History textbooks are one of those sites where “postwar Japan” is constituted by 
discourse. Indeed, history textbooks provide various accounts of how Japan emerged 
after the great tragedy of WWII, accounts presented to Japanese students as a part of a 
compulsory education. With regard to the importance of history education, Alexander 
Bukh (2007, 687) writes:  
history taught at schools is conceptualized as providing students not only 
with dry facts regarding past events but also with what has been defined in 
the study of national identity formation as a “historical narrative.” In 
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contrast to “history” which contains only facts and dates, a “historical 
narrative” provides broad interpretations of the national past and links to 
the present. As such, it constitutes a cognitive lens that helps members of a 
national community make sense of the nation’s place in the world and 
serves as an important tool in the construction, re-construction, and 
contestation of national identity. 
 
The Japanese government has long played an important part in history education. 
The government exercised its influence by designing curriculum guidelines and 
authorizing, and at times creating, school textbooks (Caiger 1968). As a result, while 
history textbooks reflect broad academic and societal debates about how to narrate 
Japanese national history, the Japanese government also plays a large part in the 
production of a “historical narrative” or an account of “what Japan was” and “how Japan 
has become what it is today.”  
Due to the enormous importance given to history education, however, the 
screening of history textbooks has occasionally given rise to considerable controversy. 
Critics argue that textbook certification constitutes a form of censorship. Teruhisa Horio 
(1988, 16) notes: “Even though the Ministry of Education has tried to represent this 
system as a neutral attempt to eliminate politically biased opinions, or as scientifically 
objective efforts to correct mistaken information, it in fact constitutes nothing less than an 
attempt to keep out of our schools all ideas which do not fit in with the State’s view of 
the kinds of knowledge which are both appropriate and desirable to administer to 
Japanese youth.” In fact, the Ministry, at times, expressed an opinion that Japan’s 
expansion into Asia in the past should be described as “advance” rather than “invasion,” 
while the authorization of a history textbook written by a nationalist group, Atarashii 
Rekishi Kyokasho wo Tsukuru Kai (the Society for the Creation of New History 
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Textbooks), in 2001 called into question the Ministry’s “unbiased” view of history. 
Against this background, Ienaga Saburo, a history professor and a writer of history 
textbooks, filed a lawsuit against the government in 1965 upon the rejection of his 
progressive history textbook by the Ministry. He argued that the governmental screening 
system violated the Constitution’s guarantees of freedom of expression and thus 
constituted an abuse of power (Buruma 1994, 189-201; Horio 1988, 177-80; Nozaki and 
Inokuchi 2000). After a long battle, the screening was deemed constitutional, although 
the Supreme Court ruled that the Ministry’s demand for the deletion of descriptions about 
Japan’s wartime atrocities was illegal. Some scholars indicate that history textbooks 
constitute a site where ideological conflicts are fought between the “progressive 
academic establishment” and the “conservative bureaucratic and political establishment” 
(Bukh 2007, 684; J. Orr 2001, 72). 
 Given ideological splits among academics, the conflicts over historical narratives 
are much more complicated. While many textbooks offer critical perspectives on Japan’s 
expansionist policy leading to World War II, conservative texts, as represented by the 
Tsukuru Kai’s textbooks, advance a more radical view by glorifying people’s sacrifices 
for the country. The Tsukuru Kai is well funded and strongly supported by conservative 
scholars and politicians, although the use of its textbooks is very limited, with less than 
1% of Japanese junior high school students actually using them (Bukh 2007, 686; Jeans 
2005, 186, 192; Nozaki 2005, 298; Uesugi 2005). It is also important to note that 
historical narratives presented in history textbooks in general have changed over time. 
The discourses produced in these history texts are never static, but occasionally revised 
by new discourses. For example, in 1982, the “neighboring countries clause” was 
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introduced in the screening of history textbooks, whereby the Ministry of Education 
encouraged textbook writers to display sensitivity toward the feelings of Asian people 
when depicting Japan’s history of Asian victimization. As a result, history textbooks 
written after this time increased their references to Japanese aggression against 
neighboring states, including the enslaving of comfort women, the mass slaughter in 
Nanjing (the Nanjing Massacre), and the use of forced labor throughout Asia (Bukh 
2007; Jeans 2005, 184-86; Nozaki 2005, 285-88). The progressive move, however, 
caused a nationalist backlash in the late 1990s, and references to comfort women, for 
instance, were significantly reduced in the 2002 editions of textbooks. They disappeared 
from all junior high school texts in 2012. 
Nevertheless, studies on history textbooks show that there has been some 
coherence among the textbooks, often exhibiting similar patterns of representation of 
Japanese history (Barnard 2003; Bukh 2007; J. Orr 2001). It is largely because much 
importance is attached to “construct[ing] a clear demarcation between the pre-1945 and 
post-1945 Japan” that it is possible to “separate the ‘polluted’ past from the new present, 
as a springboard to construct a new narrative of postwar Japan” (Shimazu 2003, 101). 
This results in the textbooks’ heavy emphasis on the wartime “victimization” of Japanese 
people by the military clique, on the one hand, and the portrayal of postwar Japan as a 
peaceful state having overcome its past militarism, on the other. That is to say, “the 
victimhood of the Japanese people serves […] as a ‘foundational myth’ of postwar 
Japan’s pacifist identity,” while it inevitably “creates a highly critical view of the state 
and its militaristic policies” (Bukh 2007, 691). Although descriptions of victimization of 
Asia by wartime Japan have varied across time, the discourse of Japanese victimhood has 
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long been central to historical narratives. This underlying theme, then, provides 
continuity between different textbooks despite constant revisions made in the texts. 
In the following sections, I will analyze how “postwar Japan” is discursively 
constructed by closely reading history textbooks used in Japanese junior high schools in 
the postwar era. As mentioned above, Japan’s antimilitarist culture was weak in the early 
1950s, but was deeply embedded in Japanese society by the 1960s. Given that history 
textbooks constitute an important site where discourses over Japan’s identity are 
produced and reproduced, and that the textbook descriptions of Japanese history change 
over time, it is important to examine how the textbook narratives of WWII have changed 
since the early postwar period. Therefore, the section conducts a comparative textual 
analysis of textbooks used in the early 1950s, the mid 1960s, and further the late 1990s 
and the early 2000s. To note, the analysis places a special emphasis on the descriptions of 
Japanese victimhood and Asian victimization in the textbooks. The narratives of Japanese 
victimhood and Asian victimization are of fundamental importance not only because they 
are two key aspects of Japanese experiences in WWII, but also because they constitute 
two key dimensions of Japan’s identity that, as the following chapters will explain, have 
grave implications for Japan’s postwar diplomacy. In the end, this analysis will suggest 
that postwar Japan is discursively constructed around two conflicting identities, that of an 
aggressor and that of a victim, and that Japan’s victim—“Asia”—and the conqueror of 
Japan—“the United States”—constitute “significant others” that give “postwar Japan” a 
particular meaning. The present chapter then provides analytical foundations for the 
subsequent chapters that will examine Japan’s relations with Asia and the United States 
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through which Japan performatively produces its identity while dealing with the legacy of 
its past.    
 
History Textbooks in the Early 1950s 
From the beginning of the Allied occupation of Japan, education was considered 
fundamental to Japan’s reconstruction and the creation of a “peace-loving nation.” Under 
the Allied authority, new textbooks were produced to provide what could be called 
“peace education” for Japanese students and, thereby, to rehabilitate the nation as a 
peaceful one. Among these new textbooks were history books that offered a new 
narrative of Japan’s past and future. According to James J. Orr (2001, 72), “occupation-
era texts established two perennial themes” in the new history education: “the people had 
been forced or duped by their militarist leaders into cooperating with the war effort; 
science and culture were the proper realms in which Japan could contribute to the 
postwar international community.” Clearly, underlying this narrative was the Allied 
assumption that “the root of Japanese aggression lay in the people’s servile habits of 
thought that made them so susceptible to such manipulation” (J. Orr 2001, 75). The 
Allied educational policy thus primarily aimed to raise people’s awareness of this “root 
cause” and to reproduce Japan as a reborn pacifist state. 
Reflecting this Allied policy, history textbooks published in the early 1950s 
display critical views about the Japanese military. All analyzed textbooks provide clear 
descriptions of the belligerence of the Japanese military clique and attribute to it the 
occurrence of the Manchurian Incident (1931) and the subsequent outbreak of the Sino-
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Japanese War (1937) and of the Pacific War (1941).4 More precisely, these textbooks 
explain that militarists achieved greater political power by brutally assassinating 
influential politicians, including Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi (1932), enacting the 
National General Mobilization Act to mobilize all available resources to go to war (1938), 
and disbanding political parties to oppress their opponents (1940). The military clique is 
also blamed for having ignored governmental efforts to put an end to armed clashes in 
China through diplomatic means and having escalated the battle to drive Japan into an 
aggressive war.  
The indication of the critical role played by the military clique to start the 
disastrous war accordingly separates the militarists from the people who suffered from 
the imposition of militaristic ideas and the deprivation of freedom of speech. The 
people’s complicity is clearly denied by such descriptions as they “hated the despotism of 
the military” (Kodama et al. 1952, 220) and “hoped for peace” (Ozawa and Sano 1952, 
188). The military, thus, brought the people suffering not only by promoting an 
expansionist policy, but also by controlling every aspect of society—the economy, 
finance, transportation, labor, and even food distribution. These descriptions of military 
control of the people further increased in the 1955 textbooks, becoming more concrete 
than in the 1952 texts. For example, some of the 1955 texts say that the people were not 
only deprived of their freedom, but were also persecuted if they dared to criticize the 
military clique. Most men, including students, were drafted into the army, and even 
                                                          
4 The texts analyzed include: the 1952 texts published by Gakko Tosho, Nihon Shoseki, and Shimizu 
Shoten; and the 1955 texts by Gakko Tosho, Nihon Shoseki, Shimizu Shoin, Teikoku Shoin, and Tokyo 
Shoseki. 
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women and the underage were mobilized for war efforts. In schools too militarism 
became more salient to reinforce the military regime and to promote nationalism. 
Accordingly, the victimhood of the Japanese people constitutes a central theme in 
the textbooks’ narrative, and it is constructed in relation to the military clique rather than 
to the victor of the war—the United States. Although many of the textbooks mention that 
some people initially supported the military because the government was corrupt and 
incapable of dealing with economic and social instability, or that the popular 
dissatisfaction with the government indirectly helped the militarists to increase their 
influence, people are generally depicted as vulnerable victims of militarism and of the 
war it initiated. The role played by the United States in victimizing the Japanese people is, 
therefore, rendered secondary, only reinforcing their victimhood established vis-à-vis the 
Japanese military. These textbooks only briefly mention US aerial strikes, the dropping of 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the occupation of Okinawa to show the 
weakening position of Japanese forces rather than to explain the harm to people caused 
by the United States. Thus, although these textbooks occasionally insert a photo depicting 
Tokyo or Osaka burned as a result of US bombings, these photos serve to evoke the 
image of the miserable end of militarism and not of the US devastation of Japan. That is 
to say, the real enemy for Japanese people was not the United States, but the Japanese 
militarists. Indeed, some textbooks note that the United States initially sought peace with 
Japan, an option Japan turned down by itself. 
 As the narrative centers on Japanese victimhood vis-à-vis the militarists, 
Japanese atrocities in Asia remain peripheral, only serving to stress the brutality of the 
Japanese military. The textbooks simply say that the Japanese military “advanced into” 
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and “occupied” China and South Asia where they faced intense opposition from the local 
people. The centrality of Japanese victimhood does not leave much room for other 
“victims” to be recognized, and China and other Asian nations are depicted not so much 
as victims of Japanese military violence, but rather as “brave fighters” who strenuously 
fought against Japanese interference. The textbooks state that the Chinese “went all out to 
stand up against the Japanese military” (Abe and Katsuta 1955, 227), “fought well” 
(Nakayama et al. 1955, 118), and “never dared to give in” (Mori et al. 1955, 227). Indeed, 
China (or its national government) tends to be represented as a rational actor who had 
long tried to unite the country and, in the face of the Japanese invasion, appealed to the 
League of Nations to stop the Japanese.   
  In this sense, the end of the Pacific War, first and foremost, marked the 
“liberation” of the Japanese people from the military authority and from the suffering of a 
14-year war. Although the Pacific War itself was a tragic event, its end made it possible 
for the nation to make a historic step toward building a “new Japan”—“a democratic, 
peaceful, and cultured state” sincerely hoping to create world peace (Ozawa and Sano 
1952, 204). These textbooks, accordingly, emphasize the dramatic transformation of 
Japan from a militarist state into a people’s state, thereby creating the boundaries between 
an old militaristic Japan and a new pacifist Japan. “Determined to become a pacifist state,” 
they further explain, Japan “denounces war” and “leads the world by totally giving up 
military capabilities” (Kodama et al. 1952, 235). Interestingly, some textbooks indicate 
that pacifist and democratic ideals have a long history in Japan, and are not new to the 
Japanese tradition (Abe and Katsuta 1955, 242; Nakayama et al. 1955, 150). Therefore, 
they argue that the new Japanese Constitution drafted by the Allies was not “imposed” on 
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the Japanese people, who are by nature peace loving and now form the foundation of a 
new pacifist state. That is to say, a new Japan was not started by foreigners, but by the 
peace-loving Japanese people themselves.  
It is important to note here that Japan’s postwar pacifism as described in these 
texts stands in relation to its tragic experience during the war that was brought about by 
its own military. As one of the texts states, it was “due to extreme statism and militarism 
[that] we have suffered the unprecedentedly miserable fate” (Mori et al. 1955, 258). Thus, 
it is imperative that postwar Japan must not only compensate for damages it caused 
abroad, but also change its political system never to allow militarists to gain power in 
Japan again. History education was clearly an integral part of the Allied rehabilitation 
policy aiming at Japan’s demilitarization and democratization.   
 
Textbooks in 1966 
From the late 1950s onwards, and in response to the publication of progressive 
history textbooks and to changes in domestic and international situations, the Ministry of 
Education enforced stricter policies for textbook screening, and thereby reasserted the 
tighter control of textbook history narratives (Nozaki 2005, 277-81, 283-84; Nozaki and 
Inokuchi 2000, 104-7; J. Orr 2001, 72-3, 89-90). Many textbooks were rejected or 
ordered to be revised for their “too progressive” representations of history. It was against 
this background that Ienaga Saburo filed a series of lawsuits against the Ministry to 
question the legitimacy of the textbook authorization procedures.  
The reemergence of a nationalist orientation in the Ministry essentially resulted 
from the wartime governing structure having been left intact during the occupation period. 
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More precisely, “occupation forces chose to use this established governing structure as 
the instrument for democratizing the nation and its education system, thus creating a 
fundamental contradiction within the reform process” (Nozaki 2005, 275). The United 
States also prioritized making an anti-communist front over reforms in the Japanese 
educational system. As such, wartime political and educational leaders were hardly 
replaced, and they reasserted their influence after the occupation ended.  
That being said, there was still strong resistance to the conservative forces. Such 
events as the 1955 Bandung Conference and the rise of an anti-nuclear movement in 
Japan (that developed as a reaction to US nuclear testing in Bikini Atoll exposing a 
Japanese fishing boat to the fallout) encouraged a critical attitude toward Japan’s wartime 
expansionism and further promoted pacifism (J. Orr 2001, 73). Therefore, while there 
were growing political and administrative pressures, the basic discourse seen in the 
textbooks of the early 1950s did not radically change in the 1960s. Among those 
textbooks issued in 1966, five textbooks are examined for this analysis.5 All of these 
textbooks critically view the role played by the military clique in dragging Japan into war 
and bringing considerable suffering to people inside and outside Japan.  
There are, however, two notable changes displayed in these newer books: more 
detailed descriptions of suffering by Japanese people, and increased references to Asian 
opposition to the Japanese military. First, the 1966 versions continue to increase the 
descriptions of strict military control of people’s life and the erosion of freedoms by 
adding a section entitled “war and people’s life” or “preparations for war in a totalitarian 
state.” In this section, the textbooks provide richer depictions of how the militarist 
                                                          
5 The textbooks analyzed are those published by Gakko Tosho, Nihon Shoseki, Shimizu Shoin, Teikoku 
Shoin, and Tokyo Shoseki. 
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government exploited people to carry on the war by detailing their harsh experiences 
such as the lack of daily commodities and their increasing reliance on the distribution of 
food, clothes, and other essential goods. People’s changing living conditions are 
illustrated with pictures that display children and young male and female students—ideal 
images of vulnerable war victims—drafted into the army and for labor, trained to rescue 
the injured in air raids, and evacuating to countryside to take refuge from American aerial 
bombings. 
Under the “people and war” section are also references to US air strikes on major 
Japanese cities. Interestingly, instead of regarding these attacks as showing the strategic 
disadvantages of Japan as was seen in the previous editions, these textbooks now explain 
that the air strikes burned down many cities, produced numerous casualties, and thus 
contributed to the greater suffering of Japanese people. As a result, these US attacks are 
juxtaposed with the Japanese military control of the people, whereby the United States is 
construed as yet another perpetrator who victimized the Japanese civilian population. 
This narrative gives new meaning to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki as well. Although the dropping of these bombs was previously mentioned 
merely as a series of events that had happened toward the end of WWII, it is now stressed 
that those bombings resulted in the total destruction of two major Japanese cities and the 
massive killing of Japanese civilians. Many textbooks now insert a picture of devastated 
Hiroshima with a note that the atomic bomb instantaneously destroyed Hiroshima and 
slaughtered many people. The narrative attaches a deep significance to Japanese pacifism. 
In other words, the atomic bombings create a new source of Japanese pacifism, endowing 
Japan with a special pacifist mission as the world’s first and sole victim of nuclear 
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bombings (J. Orr 2001, 86-9). “As the only state atom-bombed in the world,” the Teikoku 
Shoin textbook states, “it is our strong hope to realize world peace” (Nishida and Suzuki 
1966, 301). In this context, this textbook concludes that “the nuclear weapons terminated 
the war, but they simultaneously started a postwar peace movement” (Nishida and Suzuki 
1966, 299). Japan’s elevated position in the international community, demonstrated by its 
admission to the United Nations in 1956 and its growing economic capability, is also 
considered to further increase Japan’s “responsibility” and “capacity” to work for world 
peace. Japan’s distinct identity as a pacifist state, thus, emerges not only from its 
miserable experience brought by the Japanese military, but also from its unique 
experience with atomic bombings.    
As for the Asian victimization discourse, although the “brave fighter” narrative 
still remains, the greater recognition of the evilness of the Japanese military vis-à-vis 
pitiable Japanese citizens allows Asian nations to be perceived as “fellow victims” of 
Japanese militarism. In some textbooks, there are slightly more references to opposition 
from Chinese and other Asian people to the Japanese invasion, and some even mention 
aggressive Japanese military acts in Asia. The Nihon Shoseki textbook, for example, adds 
a footnote about the Manchurian Incident, clearly indicating that the incident was started 
by the bombing of a Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway train by the Japanese 
military, which then held the Chinese responsible for the incident to make up a reason to 
attack China (Abe et al. 1966, 281). The Nihon Shoseki textbook also explains that not 
only Japanese students but also Koreans were conscripted to solve a labor shortage in 
Japan, a reference that never appeared in its 1952 and 1955 editions (Abe et al. 1966, 
289). Further, in the Tokyo Shoseki texts, “the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” 
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propaganda used by the Japanese military is explained as a concept elaborated with a 
clear desire to “dominate Asia” (Kiuchi et al. 1966, 295n3).  
These references subtly suggest the aggressive and selfish nature of Japanese 
military acts, although Japanese atrocities in Asia are not yet made explicit. Indeed, these 
descriptions do not fundamentally change the dominance of the narrative of Japanese 
victimhood, whereby Japanese suffering rather than Asian suffering remains central to 
the textbook narrative. Thus, the Japanese people’s culpability for this aggressive war is, 
if there is any, unclear. It is stated that many supported the war, and the Nihon Shoseki 
text even mentions that, “when the war started, a spate of reports about victories in battles 
roused people to go to the front and strive for home-front production” (Abe et al. 1966, 
289). Still, the government not only “hid the truth” about Japan’s losses, but also 
“deprived the people of freedom of speech.” The Japanese people were, after all, 
exploited and manipulated into fighting the war. They are thus “presented as somewhat 
lacking in agency to resist the militarists’ proactive policies” (J. Orr 2001, 87). The 
substantial representations of their controlled life, rather, serve to attribute Japanese 
misconducts in Asia to the military only and to maintain the distinction between the 
military and the people. 
In sum, in the early postwar era, the textbooks displayed a strong Japanese 
victimhood discourse that not only constituted a victim identity about the Japanese people, 
but also provided a firm foundation for Japan’s postwar pacifism. As a state that 
experienced a tragic war and even atomic bombings, postwar Japan was endowed with a 
special pacifist mission and destined to contribute to world peace. While Japanese 
victimhood is primarily discussed in relation to the Japanese military (thus, the 
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victimhood is confined to the people), the emerging narrative gives rise to the United 
States as a victorious, but possibly cruel, foreign other. This also creates the possibility 
that Japan’s victim identity (the sole atomic-bombed state in the world) may be 
constituted in relation to its victimizer state. In other words, Japanese victimhood could 
be reconstituted in the context of a state-versus-state structure and thus be extended to the 
Japanese state as a whole. The Asian victimization discourse was, on the other hand, still 
very limited. Even if selfish and (to some extent) aggressive Japanese military acts in 
Asia were attributable to the Japanese military, the Japanese people were scarcely held 
accountable for not stopping their military. Japanese pacifism, in this sense, stands by the 
“innocence” and “victimhood” of the Japanese people who make it possible to 
reconstruct Japan and give it a new pacifist identity. This way, the “formerly victimized 
Japanese nation” could serve as the “foundational myth” of a peaceful and democratic 
Japan, opening a new chapter in Japanese history.  
 
1997 Textbooks 
In 1982, a debate over a history textbooks resulted in a significant shift in the 
Ministry of Education’s screening policy and made textbook publishers more attentive to 
the Japanese history of victimizing neighboring Asia. The news report that the Ministry 
forced the replacement of the term (Japanese) “invasion” with “advancement” during the 
history textbook authorization process (the news was later found out to be inaccurate) 
invited strong protests not only from the domestic progressive camp, but also from China, 
South Korea, and other Asian states. To settle this growing diplomatic controversy, the 
Ministry issued a “neighboring countries clause” that encouraged publishers to be more 
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sensitive to the sentiments of Asian people (Bukh 2007, 689; Jeans 2005, 185; Nozaki 
2005, 284-88). Although the nationalistic educational policy of the government has never 
faded away (Nozaki 2005, 288-90), since then “the narrative on Japan’s colonial past has 
grown thicker, in both a qualitative and quantitative sense, reaching its peak in 1997” 
(Bukh 2007, 689).  
Reflecting this clause, all seven 1997 texts analyzed 6  mention the Nanjing 
Massacre, the sexual exploitation of comfort women, the abduction of Koreans and 
Chinese individuals for compulsory labor, and other imperial policies such as enforced 
Japanese imperialist education, the imposition of statist Shintoism, the forced change to 
Japanese names, the conscription into the Japanese army, and the forced use of Japanese 
language. The Nanjing Massacre, in particular, where the Japanese military 
indiscriminately slaughtered Chinese POWs, children, women, and the elderly, is raised 
as one important symbol of Asian victimization, and many of the textbooks refer to 
wartime Japan’s sanko strategy (three-alls strategy) of “burning all, killing all, and 
destroying all” to emphasize the brutality of the Japanese military. Furthermore, many 
textbooks have extra sections to describe people in Japanese-controlled areas, which now 
include not only China, Korea, and Taiwan, but also Southeast Asia. Students are, thus, 
encouraged to understand life in the Japanese-occupied areas and to sympathize with 
Asian feelings toward Japan. Indeed, some textbooks include quotes from junior high 
school texts used in victimized Asian states and wish to reveal how Japanese military acts 
in Asia were narrated from the victims’ own perspectives (Sasayama et al. 1997, 258-59; 
Teruya et al. 1997, 263). One of the quoted text states: “People will never forget the 
                                                          
6 These texts are those published by Kyoiku Shuppan, Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan, Nihon Shoseki, Osaka 
Shoseki, Shimizu Shoin, Teikoku Shoin, and Tokyo Shoseki 
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suffering and cruelty the Japanese brought to them” (Teruya et al. 1997, 263). Japanese 
barbarism directed against Asian people is, accordingly, represented more clearly than 
ever before in the 1997 textbooks. Along this line, some textbooks implicitly make a 
comparison between Nazi Germany and imperial Japan by placing a picture of the 
German military alongside a picture of the Japanese military and/or inserting a world 
map showing the course of battles around Germany and Japan (Teruya et al. 1997, 258-
59; Yoshida et al. 1997, 258-59). 
This narrative inevitably identifies Japan as an aggressor who brought 
considerable suffering to Asia. Many textbooks indicate that, to Asians, the end of the 
war meant the end of the Japanese invasion and the liberation from Japanese domination. 
As for the responsibility of the Japanese people, textbooks provide mixed views. Some 
textbooks more clearly mention the supportive role played by the majority of Japanese 
people, who used to be regarded merely as victims of Japanese militarism in the 1966 
textbooks. For example, it is now stated that people celebrated Japan’s victories in battles 
and feverishly supported the military. But almost all textbooks still explain that the 
government exerted information control to hide the truth from the people, and further 
prohibited any criticism of the government. Thus, the textbooks give the sense that the 
Japanese people did not support the aggressive war itself nor encouraged their military’s 
brutal behavior in Asia. Nevertheless, the culpability of Japan is generally acknowledged 
without making a distinction between the military and the people. Textbooks by the 
Teikoku Shoin (Teruya et al. 1997, 270-71) and Osaka Shoseki (Atsuta et al. 1997, 264-
65), for example, discuss war responsibility issues debated today, including individual 
reparations to Koreans who were atom-bombed in Japan, former comfort women, and 
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forced laborers from China and Korea. These texts now describe Japan’s state 
responsibility, whereby the responsibility for Japan’s brutality and barbarianism in Asia 
is represented at a state level. 
Interestingly, alongside this Asian victimization narrative are the newly added 
descriptions of the Japanese military as “the losers” who miserably sacrificed many lives 
in the war. This narrative was absent in the older textbooks. These newer editions also 
start to represent the Japanese military as pitiable or even desperate in fighting a war 
against the United States. In other words, the Japanese military was fighting a state that 
was more industrialized and richer in natural recourses. Japanese soldiers had to fight 
despite their supply lines being cut by enemy attacks. And, on some battlefields, the 
Japanese forces were totally annihilated by the United States. Their misery is further 
accentuated by such descriptions as “the soldiers were forced to fight until death” 
(Sasayama et al. 1997, 260) and “suicide attacks resulted in the loss of many young lives” 
(Kodama et al. 1997, 266). While the soldiers’ tragic fate could still be attributed to the 
military clique—the “true” evil of Japan—these soldiers’ sacrificial and pitiable deaths 
remind readers that the military, including the clique, was also the victim of the war it 
nevertheless started. Many textbooks now provide the number of Japanese victims, 
including civilians and soldiers, which is compared with the total number of victims in 
WWII and the victims in Asia. 
As the Japanese military comes to be increasingly identified as the losers or even 
as victims, the victimhood of the Japanese people and of the Japanese state in general is 
established in relation to the United States. Indeed, the descriptions of the US bombings 
of Japanese cities are more detailed in all the textbooks, with, for instance, references to 
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the Great Tokyo Air Raids of March 1945 that indiscriminately killed 100,000 civilians 
in one night. Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Okinawa are now elevated to the status of 
powerful symbols of Japanese victimhood as, in each place, a significant portion of the 
civilian population was lost to US attacks. Regarding Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while the 
devastating power of atomic bombs is effectively demonstrated by pictures, paintings, 
and related experiences of victims, the horrible effects of these weapons suggest the 
immorality of using nuclear bombs that can instantly destroy cities and kill many people 
without making any distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Many 
textbooks state that the United States decided to drop those bombs not only because 
Japan initially ignored the Potsdam Declaration, but also because the United States 
wanted to create a postwar order more favorable to itself than to the Soviet Union. Thus, 
the Kyoiku Shuppan textbook asks: “Were atomic bombs really necessary to make Japan 
surrender?” (Sasayama et al. 1997, 264). In other words, the US choice to use these 
weapons is problematized and rendered immoral in these 1997 textbooks. 
Okinawa as another symbol of Japanese victimhood, however, offers a somewhat 
ambiguous picture of Japan. On the one hand, the rising symbolism of Okinawan 
victimhood leads to substantial descriptions of the Battle of Okinawa where one quarter 
of the local population was lost in the direct confrontation between the Japanese military 
and the US army. The depictions of the Battle of Okinawa are an interesting development 
given that the narrative of the Battle was nonexistent in the 1966 texts. Many textbooks 
now insert a picture depicting Okinawan people, quite often the picture of an unfortunate 
Okinawan young girl carrying a white flag and walking alone in bare feet in the 
wilderness. Some textbooks also mention so-called Himeyuri schoolgirls who served as 
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nurses for the Japanese military and died in the battle (Atsuta et al. 1997, 261; Teruya et 
al. 1997, 267). These young girls serve as powerful symbols of Japanese victimhood vis-
à-vis the United States, representing the abhorrent nature of war.   
On the other hand, these textbooks also note that the Japanese military, 
supposedly fighting for the Japanese state and thus for Okinawa, actually killed many 
Okinawans for suspected spy activity, and sometimes even ordered Okinawan citizens to 
kill themselves so that they would not surrender to the United States. The Okinawan 
people were indeed victims of war, but they were also the victims of the Japanese 
military’s own aggression. This discourse makes a significant revision in the common 
narrative of Japanese victimhood vis-à-vis the Japanese military, in that the victimization 
of the Okinawan people by the military represents the victimhood of Okinawa (thus, not 
of Japan) vis-à-vis Japan, thereby challenging the Japanese victimhood as “a truly 
common and unifying experience” (Bukh 2007, 699). The textbook by the Osaka Shoseki 
even describes Okinawa as a “sacrifice for the defense of Japan’s main islands,” implying 
that Okinawa was not included in Japan in the minds of the Japanese military (Atsuta et 
al. 1997, 261). Okinawa, in this sense, constitutes a distinct identity within Japan or an 
“internal other” destabilizing the unitary identity of Japan. 
In the 1997 texts, therefore, Japan’s identity was constituted more clearly in 
relation to a victimized Asia and to the victorious United States. In relation to Asia, Japan 
was depicted as not only aggressive but also brutal and barbaric, while in relation to the 
United States, Japan was the loser and a victim of indiscriminate and deadly attacks. 
Japan’s identity was, thus, increasingly produced in relation to these foreign others, 
making Japan an aggressor and, at the same time, a victim.       
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Textbooks after the 2001 Debate 
The year 2001 marked another turning point for Japanese history textbooks. 
Central to the 2001 textbook debate was the authorization of textbooks written by 
Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasyo wo Tsukuru Kai. The strong progressive trend in history 
textbooks, as was shown in the 1997 texts, incited the conservative effort to “correct” the 
self-denouncing, “masochistic” view of Japanese history and thereby to write their own 
version of history (Bukh 2007; Jeans 2005, 183-93; McCormack 2000; Nelson 2002; 
Uesugi 2005). After undergoing revisions requested by the newly formed Ministry of 
Education and Science, the Tsukuru Kai textbooks passed the authorization process for 
the first time in 2001, greatly alarming the progressive camp. The conservative 
glorification of history, indeed, constituted an attempt to reshape Japan’s identity, 
particularly that of Asian victimizer. The Tsukuru Kai textbooks have been severely 
criticized for distorting history since then. However, a close examination of other 
textbooks published in 2002 reveals that the revisionist backlash was not limited to the 
Tsukuru Kai textbooks.7 In other words, other history textbooks taught less about Asian 
victimization, providing ambiguous pictures of Japanese military acts in Asia. 
The Nanjing Massacre, for example, was clearly described as one of the Japanese 
atrocities in China in the 1997 editions. But, in the 2002 editions, many textbooks make 
the description brief and abstract. Four of eight junior high school textbooks authorized in 
2001 refer to the massacre as the “Nanjing Incident,” while the description of the 
                                                          
7 In 2002, eight textbooks were authorized by the Ministry of Education and Science: Fusosha, Kyoiku 
Shuppan, Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan, Nihon Shoseki, Osaka Shoseki, Shimizu Shoin, Teikoku Shoin, and 
Tokyo Shoseki. 
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notorious sanko strategy was eliminated from all textbooks, except for one by Nihon 
Shoseki. The reference to comfort women was also largely deleted, resulting in the 
comfort women appearing in only three texts now (down from seven in 1997). Although 
the descriptions of Asian victimization were still present and much more detailed than in 
the 1966 texts, there was some clear regression from the 1997 texts.  
Among these textbooks, the Tsukuru Kai textbook is clearly the most 
conservative in its account of Asian victimization. Although the Manchurian Incident is 
explained as having been initiated by Japan, the textbook gives a justification for it by 
noting that Japan legitimately acquired South Manchuria and the South Manchurian 
Railway from Russia, and that there were 200,000 Japanese people in Manchuria who 
needed the protection of the Japanese military (Nishio et al. 2002, 266). Further, while 
the Chinese people occasionally interfered with the passage of trains, Japan was also 
faced with threats from both the north (the Soviet Union) and the south (the Nationalist 
party of China) (Nishio et al. 2002, 266). The occupation of the entire territory of 
Manchuria was thus alleged to have been planned as a way to solve these issues 
(accordingly, it was a rational decision) by a part of the Japanese military protesting 
against the Japanese government’s excessively generous attitude toward Chinese 
nationalism. The Tsukuru Kai text additionally notes that, after the “incident,” Manchuria 
“achieved economic growth” due to the expanding interests of Japanese heavy industries 
in Manchuria, while the anti-Japanese movement also began (Nisio et al. 2002, 268). 
Such a description of the allegedly favorable influences of the Japanese occupation is 
also seen in depictions of South Asia where the Japanese “advance” resulted in the 
acceleration of the independence of Asian states (Nishio et al. 2002, 280-82). More 
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precisely, in the middle of the war, Japan approved the independence of Burma and the 
Philippines, and the tentative self-government of India. This experience later served to 
stiffen these nations’ strong resistance against the returning colonial powers, from which 
they eventually attained true independence. In this sense, this textbook even attributes the 
cause of Japanese initial victories in the war partly to the support from Asian people who 
had long suffered from white colonialism and thus cooperated with Japan to fight against 
the West (Nishio et al. 2002, 277).  
The effects of Japan’s invasion are, accordingly, considered to be not entirely 
negative. This text also describes the aggressive and selfish nature of Asian opposition to 
the Japanese military in its depiction of anti-Japanese movements in China, thereby 
representing the Chinese as irrational and the Japanese aggression as a natural response to 
this aggression (Nishio et al. 2002, 263-65, 270). Such a revised narrative also appears in 
the Osaka Shoseki text that similarly states that some Taiwanese and Koreans armed 
themselves and attacked Japanese people and military in their countries (Atsuta et al. 
2002, 161, 165).  
That being said, all textbooks mention Japanese colonial policies imposed on 
Asian people, including imperial education, the forced use of the Japanese language, and 
conscription for forced labor and into the Japanese army. The brutal and aggressive 
behavior of the Japanese military and Japan’s intention to invade and control Asia are 
still very clear in these textbooks. The involvement of the government in the Japanese 
occupation of Asia and cooperation from Japanese people for it are even clearer in some 
respects. Some textbooks now refer to Japanese settlers who were sent to China, 
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particularly to strategically important places, to farm the land Chinese people were forced 
to sell cheaply to Japan.  
Indeed, subtle but significant changes in the familiar Japanese victimhood 
narrative were made in some of the 2002 texts as well. For instance, the Nihon Shoseki 
1997 text states: “As the war was protracted, military spending increased, and the 
mechanisms to force all to cooperate for the war were made” (Kodama et al. 1997, 259). 
However, in its 2002 text, it instead writes: “To support this protracted war, the 
mechanism to cooperate for the war was made domestically” (Kodama et al. 2002, 177). 
In other words, the forced element is less clear in the newer version. In another textbook 
(Tokyo Shoseki), the 1997 edition stating that “the government did not tell the truth about 
the war, and the people believed Japan’s victory in the war” (Yoshida et al. 1997, 263) 
was changed in the 2002 edition to read: “many people believed the justice of the war and 
cooperated with the government to win the war” (Tanabe et al. 2002, 174). While there 
are still a few textbooks that increased the descriptions of Japanese suffering brought by 
the military government, these textbooks generally give an impression that people were 
mobilized for the war. They were subjected to strict governmental controls, but they were 
not really “victimized” by the military. Rather, the Japanese state itself was actively 
fighting the war, in which more or less cooperative and supportive Japanese people 
participated. The supportive role played by the people is perhaps best represented in the 
Tsukuru Kai text, ironically because it attempts to glorify the past: both soldiers and 
people shared national goals and fought together. Thus, this textbook shows its 
admiration for the people by stating that “despite these hardships, many people worked 
well and fought well, hoping to win the war” (Nishio et al. 2002, 284).  
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The revised narrative, then, serves to reinforce the Asian victimization discourse 
by making not only the military but also the people and the state as a whole responsible 
for fighting the war, hurting many Asians, and destroying their countries. And yet, as the 
narrative identifying the Japanese people as victims of the Japanese military and of the 
militarist government becomes weak, the Japanese people’s victimhood comes to be 
determined through their fighting the tragic war against the United States. The war 
produced victims and destroyed everything—lives, homes, assets, industries, cities, and 
the country itself. As the defeat in the war is given much importance in the narrative, the 
US aggression is increasingly emphasized in the story of “how Japan was crushed in the 
war.”     
The trend toward stressing the US attacks on Japan more fully can be seen in most 
of the textbooks. It is done, for example, by emphasizing the indiscriminate nature of US 
air raids on Japanese cities and the cruelty of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. In some textbooks, the description of the Battle of Okinawa was also 
changed, not only by further highlighting the victimhood of civilians, but also by deleting 
the brutality of the Japanese military toward Okinawan people from the texts. Thus, the 
Okinawan people are presented more clearly as the victims of the Pacific War and less as 
the victims of internal discrimination by the Japanese mainland. Indeed, sacrificial deaths 
of Japanese soldiers are still present in the narrative, perhaps to a lesser extent though, 
thereby continuing to blur the distinction between the Japanese people and the military in 
terms of their victimhood in the war. The defeat in the war is, therefore, represented as a 
“shared experience” of the entire Japanese nation. The foundational myth of Japanese 
victimhood as well as of Asian victimization accordingly reifies postwar Japan as a 
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particular kind of subject—a state that knows the tragedy of war, the evilness of 
militarism, and the importance of peace—which is destined to face postwar realities as 
both a war victim and a former aggressor and to fulfill its special pacifist mission in the 
world. 
 
Conclusion 
 The above comparative analysis of Japanese history textbooks has revealed the 
centrality of the collective memory of WWII in foundational myths about postwar Japan. 
Indeed, the defeat of Japan in the war put an end to the “era of militarism and state-
centrism” while simultaneously making a new start for postwar Japan, now a pacifist 
state determined to bring peace to the world rather than misery. Wartime Japan, in this 
sense, constitutes what postwar Japan is not. The articulation of wartime Japan makes 
possible the construction of postwar pacifist Japan as a distinct identity. This means the 
very construction of the “past” is a condition of possibility for “pacifist Japan.”    
Yet, my analysis also showed that the “past” could be constructed in different 
ways. The above analysis revealed that different entities could be recognized as victims 
and assailants. Thus, it is not inevitable that Japan should be identified as a victim of 
atomic bombings or Asian peoples as victims of Japanese aggression. History does not 
present itself as the meaningful story of a given subject. Rather, the very representations 
of what “our” past is give meaning to certain events while omitting others in history 
books, thereby producing “our” national history to be remembered. In this sense, history 
textbooks are not simply sites of discussion about “what happened” in “our” history. 
They are also productive of the “past.” The past is a discursive construction.  
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The discussion of the past is, however, not limited to history education. How to 
narrate history has grave implications for policies, too. For instance, as the following 
chapters will show, Japan is still haunted by the legacy of World War II and thus is faced 
with a series of issues with other states as a loser of the war and as a former international 
aggressor. Historical narratives are, in this respect, intertwined with policy formulations. 
Foreign policy discourse can also be a critical space where Japan’s “past” is articulated, 
whereby the “past” provides the discursive foundation for policies to be taken by a 
subject invoked as an initiator of action.  
In the following chapters, I will analyze two crucial postwar issues that still haunt 
Japan: (1) the issue of the rape of Japanese girls by US GIs in Okinawa, where the United 
States has maintained its military presence since World War II; and (2) the comfort 
women issue, whereby Japan has been blamed for its wartime sexual enslavement of 
Asian women. Although the focus is placed on women’s issues, these two detailed case 
studies aim to examine the conflicted images of postwar Japan as both a victim of 
crushing attacks by the United States and a former aggressor in Asia. In each case, Japan 
performatively creates and recreates itself as a reborn state by articulating its “past” as 
Japan’s haunting shadow that, in turn, makes possible pacifist Japan as an antithesis to 
the past self. Yet, as history can be constructed in many different ways, competing 
narratives also problematize the boundaries created between the past self and the new self. 
The legacy of WWII brought up as foreign policy issues, therefore, both offers a 
condition of possibility for “pacifist Japan” and constitutes a site of contestation where a 
distinction between a new Japan and an old Japan becomes problematic.    
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IV. BETWEEN PARTNER AND OCCUPIED VICTIM: OKINAWA AS 
FEMALE BODY AND THE DESTABILIZATION OF A NEW JAPAN 
 
On August 15, 1945, Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced the end of the Pacific 
War to his subjects on the radio. By “endur[ing] the unendurable and bear[ing] the 
unbearable,” the emperor declared to have accepted the Potsdam Declaration and 
expressed his hope to “open the way for a great peace for thousands of generations to 
come” (Dower 1999, 36). This broadcast symbolically marked the beginning of “postwar 
Japan,” while it also brought an end to the imperial era of Japan. Yet, the “end” meant to 
the Japanese people nothing less than the “defeat” of Japan in the war. Countless lives 
were lost not only on the battlefields in Asia and the Pacific, but also in the homeland, 
where civilians were killed in air raids, in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and in a fierce battle in Okinawa. People lost houses and suffered a lack of 
food and medicine. Indeed, “after U.S. forces finished their work, sixty-six of Japan’s 
largest cities were devastated, with only 60 percent of built-up areas still standing” 
(Kovner 2009, 784). The homeless, the malnourished, and the poor became part of the 
everyday scene of postwar Japan.    
When the war ended, the Japanese people were left in chaos and overwhelmed by 
a great sense of loss. People in Okinawa, in particular, were faced with the catastrophic 
situation as a result of the ground war fought between the Japanese military and US 
forces on their islands. The “Battle of Okinawa,” known as one of the largest and 
bloodiest battles between Japan and the United States during World War II, ended in the 
loss of one quarter of the local population, victimizing combatants and non-combatants 
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alike. After the battle, Okinawa was placed under the direct military control of the United 
States and thereby detached from the rest of Japan, which fell under the Allied authority 
instead. Due to the geostrategic importance given to this area, the United States promptly 
established a military government and constructed military facilities to transform 
Okinawa into America’s “keystone of the Pacific” (Matsumoto 2004, 38). The US 
governance of Okinawa continued until 1972. For almost 30 years, the reversion of 
Okinawa to Japan had been an earnest desire for both Japan and Okinawa. Since the mid-
1960s, Japan had actively addressed the issue of Okinawa’s reversion and negotiated the 
conditions for the reversion with the United States. Prime Minister Sato Eisaku 
occasionally showed his determination to “resolve the last vestige of the Pacific War” 
and thus to put “the postwar period” to an end by achieving Okinawa’s return to Japan 
(Togo 2005, 65).  
After years of negotiation, Okinawa was finally returned to Japan in 1972. But, as 
Sheila A. Smith (2001, 181) notes, what was really ended by the reversion was “Japan’s 
postwar”—that is, “Okinawa’s postwar in fact began as Japan’s ended.” Indeed, even 
after the reversion to Japan, Okinawa remained under the constraint of US military bases. 
The US bases constructed during the occupation era still occupy 10% of Okinawa 
Prefecture or 17% of Okinawa Island (the main island in the prefecture), now serving as a 
“pillar of the Japan-US alliance.” The continued presence of foreign military keeps 
reminding people on Okinawa that they remain trapped in the postwar reality of a 
“defeated state,” and thus that the “postwar era” has not yet ended in Okinawa.  
Okinawa has since been an important source of national imagination for postwar 
Japan. While US bases in Okinawa represent a strong military partnership between Japan 
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and the United States, Okinawa’s continued subjugation to the US military indicates 
Japan’s relative weakness, vulnerability, and subordination vis-à-vis its alleged “partner.” 
The US bases serve as a reminder of the tragic history of Okinawa and nurture the 
Okinawan/Japanese sense of victimhood vis-à-vis the United States. In the eyes of many 
Okinawans and Japanese, thus, Okinawa is still under the virtual occupation of the United 
States, and the history of victimization continues in Okinawa. The more Japan 
strengthens its ties with the United States, the more deeply these bases become rooted in 
Okinawa. Although the security treaty between Japan and the United States legitimizes 
the US military presence in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan as “public assets” providing 
security for Japan and beyond, these US bases signal Japan’s compromised sovereignty 
and American intrusion into Japan’s “internal” space.     
In this context, US bases keep fostering the senses of insecurity and victimhood, 
especially among the local people whose deep-seated feeling of hostility becomes 
heightened by occasional crimes and accidents caused by US GIs. Since their landing on 
Okinawa during World War II, US military personnel have repeatedly perpetrated crimes 
and caused accidents that have victimized the local population. According to the Military 
Base Affairs Division of Okinawa Prefecture, between 1972 and 2011, there were 5,747 
documented crimes committed by US GIs in Okinawa, including 568 heinous crimes 
(e.g., murder and arson) and 1,039 crimes involving injuries. In addition, since the 
reversion, the US military has caused 522 aircraft accidents, 528 fires, and a number of 
serious environmental pollution episodes in Okinawa (Okinawa kenchiji koshitsu kichi 
taisaku ka 2012, Chapter IV). These incidents have greatly threatened the safety of the 
Okinawan people. The repeated crimes and accidents not only directly hurt the local 
114 
people, but they also reinforce their awareness of foreign military domination. In fact, 
despite the fact that a significant number of crimes are committed by US personnel in 
Okinawa, these crimes are rarely tried and, even if tried, American suspects tend to be 
acquitted or leniently sentenced (Hayashi 2006, 1).8 Quite often, the Status of Forces 
Agreement also prevents the local police from investigating incidents and taking 
American GIs into custody. Even a small crime can thus trigger a strong emotional 
response from people, which further intensifies the belief that Okinawa remains an 
occupied territory of the United States. 
It is in this context that the crimes and accidents by American troops often 
become issues of national importance. Among the crimes that become highly politicized 
are rapes, particularly the rapes of young Okinawan girls. According to a survey, there 
were 111 rape incidents committed by US GIs and their families in Okinawa between 
1972 and 1994.9 In spite of their limited number (approximately 2% of US military 
crimes reported in Okinawa), assaults on women and vulnerable young girls in particular 
have caused strong emotional reactions among the Japanese people, developing into 
diplomatic issues between Japan and the United States. In 1995, for instance, the rape of 
a 12-year-old Okinawan girl by three US GIs inspired an organized protest by 85,000 
people who demanded official US apologies to the victim, the review of the Status of 
Forces Agreement, and the reduction of US military bases in Okinawa. The Japanese and 
                                                          
8 According to Ryukyu Shinpo, approximately 80% of crimes by US GIs in Japan are not brought to justice. 
“Zainichi beigun hanzai, 8 wari ga fukiso: ‘tokubetsu atsukai’ ukibori” [Crimes by the US 
Military in Japan, 80% Not Prosecuted: “Special Treatment” Revealed], Ryukyu Shinpo, 16 
May, 2009. 
 
9 Oga, Kazuo, “Kisha no me: Okinawa joji boko jiken: Chii kyotei dake ni torawarezu kichi no sonzai koso 
saiko wo” [Journalist’s Eyes: The Rape of a Female Child in Okinawa: Reconsider Not Only the SOFA But 
the Presence of Military Bases], Mainichi Shinbun, 26 September, 1995. 
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US governments were pressed to renegotiate the terms of the treaty as a result of the 
victimization of one girl by American GIs.  
As discussed in Chapter II, rape not only constitutes one kind of crime against a 
particular woman, but also often serves as a symbol of national defilement and 
humiliation. As Michael S. Molasky (1999, 51) observes, 
No single act, not even murder, surpasses rape in its ability to dramatize 
the fear and humiliation of life under foreign occupation. And no victim 
better symbolizes the vulnerability of the social body than does a young 
girl. The girl who was raped on 4 September 1995 comes as close to 
embodying pure victimhood as any figure, real or imagined, in Okinawa’s 
postwar collective memory. And the fact that she remains unknown by 
name while her fate is known to everyone only heightens her allegorical 
value. 
 
In the national imagination of Okinawa, the body of the innocent Okinawan girl raped by 
American soldiers symbolizes the historical subjugation, oppression, and humiliation of 
Okinawa’s body politic. As a perfect symbol of Okinawa, the rape victim, thus, comes to 
embody the Okinawan/Japanese victimhood vis-à-vis the United States, while being also 
transformed into an instrument of the “politics of Okinawan ‘victimization’ by American 
troops” (Osius 2002, 57). 
 To explore Okinawa as an important political space that defines the identity of 
postwar Japan, this chapter looks into one of the recent rape incidents committed by US 
servicemen in Okinawa. The case studied occurred in February 2008. This time, a 14-
year-old girl was assaulted by a US Marine. Just like the 1995 rape case, the 2008 
incident evoked a strong public response and was widely discussed in the media as well 
as in the political arena. The close examination of the discourses on this rape case will 
show that the rape was shaped and reshaped into various “symbols,” which created the 
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possibility that different Japanese national selves could be constructed vis-à-vis the US 
other. In particular, the analysis will demonstrate that, by talking about the rape, Japan’s 
emasculated identity was discursively constructed in relation to the dangerous American 
other, and that the image of Japan as an equal partner of the United States was seriously 
challenged. 
 Analyzing Okinawa as a critical space where “Japan” is constructed is crucial for 
several reasons. First, the Battle of Okinawa was one of the few ground battles waged 
within present-day Japanese borders during WWII. Okinawa’s harsh experience of the 
war and occupation has produced a strong culture of peace in Okinawa. Thus, “second 
only to Hiroshima, Okinawa is considered the most pacifist of Japan’s prefectures” 
(Osius 2002, 54). Given that pacifism is believed to characterize “postwar Japan” in 
opposition to “wartime Japan,” Okinawa lies at the heart of postwar Japan’s collective 
memory, offering a source for its postwar identity and pacifism.  
 And yet, Okinawa is also a place where differences within Japan can be revealed. 
As suggested, Okinawa had a unique experience that other Japanese territories did not 
share during and after World War II. For instance, while in mainland Japan the war was 
ended by the Emperor on August 15, few listened to the broadcast in Okinawa, where the 
end of the war was brought by the United States, or more precisely, by Okinawa’s 
complete subjugation by the US military. Further, while the Allied occupation started in 
mainland Japan after the war, for Okinawa, American occupation started and gradually 
expanded during the Battle of Okinawa. This means that Okinawan people did not share 
with their fellow Japanese the “myth” of a new Japan born on August 15, 1945 through 
the voice of the Emperor (Kitamura 2009, 45). Moreover, after the war, Okinawan people 
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were placed under the direct control of the United States and “outside” of Japan. 
Okinawan people were required to obtain a visa to go to the mainland and could not even 
become part of independent Japan when Japan regained sovereignty (S.A. Smith 2001, 
181). Although Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, many parts of the islands are still 
occupied by US military bases as was mentioned above, and Okinawa’s landscape has 
not changed much. Although Okinawa represents less than 1% of the entire Japanese 
territory, US bases there account for approximately 75% of the US military areas 
established throughout the territory of Japan (Okinawa kenchiji koshitsu kichi taisaku ka 
2011, 1). The heavy concentration of American bases in Okinawa thus suggests the heavy 
burden placed on Okinawa by mainland Japan, showing a deep division within Japan.   
  These different postwar situations, however, provide only a partial picture of 
Japan and Okinawa. Historically, Okinawa was an independent state, known as the 
Ryukyu Kingdom, which was integrated into Japan in the 19th century. Inheriting the 
cultural heritage of the Ryukyu Kingdom, Okinawa has retained a unique culture and a 
language, which still serve as signifiers for their distinct identity. Although the 
“Japanization” of Okinawa was vigorously promoted during WWII, when Okinawans 
found a chance to be fully integrated into the Japanese nation, Okinawa has always been 
Japan’s “periphery” and/or an “internal other” (Angst 1997; Furuki 2003; Inoue 2007). 
Okinawa’s distinct cultural, economic, and social structures often influenced political 
leaders to treat Okinawa differently (e.g., making Okinawa a battlefield to delay US 
invasion to the Japanese mainland and thus using Okinawan civilians as “human shields”) 
(Inoue 2007, 59; Kitamura 2009, 37-8; Osius 2002, 54). Yet, more importantly, the 
“primitive,” “premature,” “dependent,” and “feminized” images of Okinawa have also 
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offered  “a necessary  and perfect reverse (gendered) image to a Japanese political 
identity of cultural, technological, and moral superiority” (Angst 1997, 101). Okinawa’s 
distinctiveness is, in this sense, integral to Japan’s progressive and superior identity—it is 
a mirror onto which Japan needs to project what it is and what it is not. 
 The rapes of Okinawan girls should also be situated in the context of these 
complex relationships between Japan, Okinawa, and the United States. To explore this 
dynamic space of identity/boundary formation, this chapter first looks into the historical 
context of the Okinawan problem. A special focus is placed on how women became 
symbolic of the history of Japan or Okinawa. This historical analysis will demonstrate 
that women’s bodies became a key site of contestation between Japan and the United 
States. The historical analysis is followed by a close reading of Japanese White Papers on 
Defense, which provide an official account of the Japan-US alliance and the Okinawa 
problem. This analysis will reveal how, in official foreign policy texts, Japan projects its 
identity as a reliable, equal partner of the United States, thereby trying to create 
discursive boundaries between itself and the past dependent Japanese self. The 
subsequent part of the chapter looks at the 2008 rape incident and examines media 
discourses on the rape of the Okinawan girl. It will show the crucial role played by the 
rape victim in reimagining Okinawa and Japan vis-à-vis the United States. It will be 
argued that Japan is still haunted by the image of itself as a defeated/victimized state, the 
very image provided by the Okinawan girl raped by a US GI. Still, the girl also represents 
a distinct Okinawan identity, which powerfully undermines a unitary Japanese self 
projected in official discourse. One can say that Japanese identity politics is, therefore, 
waged over the body of an Okinawan raped girl.  
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Struggling with Defeat: Subjugated Nation, Subjugated Bodies, and Postwar Japan 
 The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty that formally terminated the Second World 
War between Japan and the Allies marked a new start for postwar Japan. The treaty 
recovered Japan’s full sovereignty and thereby ended approximately seven years of 
Allied occupation. With this new departure, Japan and the United States concluded a 
military alliance, which has since legitimized the continued military presence of the 
United States in Japan. The simultaneous conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
and the Japan-US Security Treaty accordingly changed the nature of the US military 
deployed in Japan. That is, “America was no longer the imposing occupying force but 
became a kind of ‘big brother’” (Togo 2005, 55). The security treaty, in fact, reproduced 
the unequal relationship between Japan and the United States. The security treaty of 1951 
imposed the obligation on Japan to provide facilities for use by US forces in Japan while 
not obliging the United States to defend Japan if attacked. Further, the language of the 
treaty suggested that the United States was expected (at the request of the Japanese 
government) to intervene in large-scale domestic riots and other disturbances in Japan, 
which was now recognized as an “independent,” “sovereign” state under international 
law. The treaty, moreover, did not grant Japan the right to abrogate the treaty and even 
the competence to decide the nature and scope of the US forces stationed in Japan.10 
While it allowed Japan to take the option of maintaining its defense forces to a minimal 
level and thereby to uphold pacifism and focus on economic reconstruction, the treaty 
still exhibited traces of the relationship between “the occupying force” and “the occupied 
                                                          
10 The security treaty was revised in 1960, and these terms of the treaty unfavorable to Japan were changed. 
Most importantly, the 1960 security treaty obliges the United States to defend Japan, while the domestic 
riot clause was removed from the treaty.  
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nation,” and even reproduced it. Indeed, the treaty served to define the security position 
of postwar Japan as a member of the West and thus provided the grounds for the United 
States to use Japan as America’s strategic stronghold in the Asia-Pacific area (Sakamoto 
1999, 66-7). 
  The relationship between the United States and Japan, in this sense, did not 
fundamentally change after the occupation. Japan remained subordinate to the United 
States, and the US military in Japan was given a privileged status according to the Status 
of Forces Agreement. More importantly, Okinawa was left under the direct control of the 
US military that had taken Okinawa during the bloody Battle of Okinawa in 1945. Under 
Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the United States was given the right to 
exercise all administrative, legislative, and jurisdictional rights over the Ryukyu Islands. 
Thus, in the eyes of Okinawans, the United States was still “the occupier” who 
suppressed their autonomy and prevented their reunification with the Japanese nation. 
The reality of Okinawa reminded many that the Japan-US relationship was not so much 
an “allied” partnership as “a loser and a winner” type of relationship (Tadokoro 1999, 
134-35). 
  Okinawa’s special standing was not accidental, but developed out of the 
geostrategic concerns of the United States. Since WWII, Okinawa has been regarded as 
an important site of US strategic military presence. First as a “base necessary to monitor 
or control Japan” and later as a “deterrent, as well as a potential forward base against the 
Soviet Union (and Communist China),” US military bases in Okinawa have served US 
global military strategy (Eldridge 2001, 10). Against the background of the birth of 
Communist China (in 1949) and the outbreak of the Korean War (in 1950), the US 
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military started to construct permanent military facilities throughout Okinawa with a 
clear intention to retain the islands in the long term. As a ground war had resulted in the 
military occupation of Okinawa, the construction of military bases was initially justified 
on the grounds that Okinawa was a battlefield becoming an occupied territory where the 
United States was given the right to use land for military purposes under the Hague 
Convention of 1907 (Ibata 2010, 118-19; Okinawa kenchiji koshitsu kichi taisaku ka 
2008, 1). In Article 23 of the Hague Convention, it is stipulated that “it is especially 
forbidden […] (g) To destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or 
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war” (emphasis added). This 
provision, however, does not apply to Japan after its surrender and, thus, does not justify 
the requisition and construction of bases after August 1945. The Hague Convention’s 
Article 52 also prescribes: “Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from 
municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation.” For the US 
military, this provision provided the legal ground for US requisition of land until the 
peace treaty entered into force in 1952 (see CA Proclamation 26 December 5, 1953). 
However, it is important to note that the Hague Convention prohibits confiscation of 
private property (Art. 46) and pillage (Art. 47) by the occupying power, and requires 
compensation if requisition is needed (Art. 52). Such payment was never made during the 
US occupation. 
 While Japan was given its independence in 1952, the conclusion of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty hardly altered the situation of Okinawa. While the entry into 
force of the treaty meant the formal end of WWII between Japan and the Allies, thus 
making the Hague Convention inapplicable to Okinawa, the peace treaty also gave the 
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United States the status of administrator of Okinawa. A United States Civil 
Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) issued a series of ordinances and 
proclamations to keep and expand military areas where it constructed facilities for US 
forces. In fact, USCAR “was effectively a military government in disguise” that 
established a harsh and oppressive military rule over Okinawan people (Aldous 2003, 
488). USCAR not only suppressed those who promoted the cause of reversion of 
Okinawa to Japan by labeling them “communists,” but it also forcibly removed 
democratically elected figures from office to prevent any potential challenge to its 
authority (Aldous 2003, 487-90; Gabe 2004, 122-24; Inoue 2007, 41-8). In particular, 
USCAR assumed an intolerant stance on the issue of land for military bases, which 
provoked an intense opposition among Okinawans. Initially, under CA Ordinance No. 91 
“Authority to Contract” (November 1, 1952), the US authority tried to draw up a contract 
on a volunteer basis with the owners of the land that the US military had already 
occupied. Facing their reluctance to lease to the occupier at an excessively cheap price, 
however, the US military expropriated the land by force. CA Proclamation No. 26 
“Compensation for Use of Real Estate within Military Areas” (December 5, 1953) 
unilaterally legitimated the continued use of already acquired land, while, under the 
provisions of CA Ordinance No. 109 “Land Acquisition Procedure” (April 3, 1953), 
USCAR authorized itself the right to forcibly acquire new land. In many places, houses 
were destroyed and properties were taken by force (Okinawa kenchiji koshitsu kichi 
taisaku ka 2008, 2). Anti-US military bases movements were organized throughout 
Okinawa where the resentment against the US military developed rapidly. Despite an 
“island-wide struggle” of Okinawans (shima gurumi toso) (1953-58) that achieved some 
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minor changes in the American manner of expropriation, by the time of Okinawa’s 
reversion, US military facilities occupied 14.8% of Okinawa Prefecture and 27.2% of 
Okinawa Island (Okinawa kenchiji koshitsu kichi taisaku ka 2008, 6). Today most of 
these facilities remain in use by the US military, which have returned only 17.2% of the 
expropriated/leased lands to Japan since the reversion (Okinawa kenchiji koshitsu kichi 
taisaku ka 2008, 11). The violent way of taking land away from the locals in order to 
construct military bases has left a lingering tension that has plagued Okinawa and the US 
military until today. 
 The construction of US military bases in Okinawa eventually resulted in the 
“militarization of Okinawa,” forcing Okinawan people to live with US forces indefinitely. 
Yet, as Tsuyoshi Kitamura (2009, 46) points out, it should be noted that the United States 
constructed military bases in Okinawa exactly when mainland Japan was reconstructed as 
a peaceful democratic state under the Allied guidance. This means that the 
“militarization” of Okinawa and the “demilitarization” of Japan occurred 
simultaneously. Indeed, while Okinawa fell under the sole and direct control of the 
United States, the rest of Japan was placed under the indirect control of the Allies whose 
primary goals were to demilitarize and democratize postwar Japan.11 Thus, at the time 
democracy and human rights were severely restricted in Okinawa, the pacifist 
Constitution was promulgated in mainland Japan, bringing about a series of democratic 
reforms in Japanese society. Moreover, in the 1950s, when USCAR doubled the number 
of military areas in Okinawa, US military bases in mainland Japan were steadily reduced, 
                                                          
11 A Government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI) was formed in 1952 succeeding to the previous governmental 
body of Okinawa. However, GRI was subordinate to USCAR that severely limited the authority of GRI 
(Aldous 2003, 488). 
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putting an end to their role as occupying bases. With regard to Okinawa, Japan instead 
concluded and even renewed in 1960 a security treaty with the United States that 
eventually promoted the militarization of Okinawa as a way to provide security for the 
main islands of Japan. Thus, since the reversion of Okinawa, the Japanese government 
has in fact striven to maintain US military bases by signing contracts with Okinawan 
landlords and paying them rent on behalf of the United States. “Contrary to the heartfelt 
pleas of the majority of Okinawans,” therefore, “the reversion meant not the end, but a 
new beginning, of Okinawa’s role as the foundation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
system” (Inoue 2007, 36). Japan’s postwar stability and peace have always resulted in the 
sacrifice of Okinawa. Takazato Suzuyo describes Okinawa as “the prostituted daughter of 
Japan.” Takazato argues: “Japan used her daughter as a breakwater to keep the 
battlefields from spreading over the mainland until the end of World War II. After the 
war, she enjoyed economic prosperity by selling the daughter to the United States” 
(Gerson 1996, 26) 
 The militarization of Okinawa has since created a structural dependence of 
Okinawans vis-à-vis the US military. During the first few years after the war, Okinawans 
heavily relied on the occupier for food, clothing, shelter, and work. Indeed, the US 
military placed Okinawans into internment camps, where Okinawans “virtually lived 
with the American occupiers” (Molasky 1999, 19). Even after people were allowed to 
leave the camps, the local economy remained dependent on the US military since the war 
had devastated the entire economic structure of Okinawa. The expansion of military areas 
further created obstacles to economic growth, while also developing new businesses 
around bases. Okinawans have, thus, developed an uneasy relationship with the American 
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troops. That is to say, the US military has been both Okinawa’s “occupier” and an 
important “customer.” 
 The ambivalent relationship between Okinawans and the US military was also 
displayed through sexual relationships between Okinawan women and American soldiers. 
In occupied Okinawa, many women sold their bodies for sex for survival. Concerned 
about the spread of venereal disease, the US military initially banned Okinawan 
prostitutes from dealing with US GIs. Yet, as the decision was made to retain Okinawa in 
the long term, more military bases were constructed, resulting in a heavier concentration 
of American troops in Okinawa. There were not only those young American soldiers 
deployed in the military bases in Okinawa but also those who temporarily stayed in 
Okinawa while involved in the Korean War and later in the Vietnam War. Upon request 
of the US military, “special eating and drinking shops” (tokushu inshokuten) catering 
specifically to American soldiers were created, becoming entertainment centers where 
prostitution was publically committed (Hayashi 2006, 3-4). Many US servicemen were 
involved in this mode of prostitution, although rapes of Okinawan women also occurred 
frequently. An estimate suggests that, in the three-month military campaign in Okinawa 
from April to June 1945, more than 10,000 women were raped by US troops (Schrijvers 
2002, 212). Military orders could not stop frequent sexual assaults on local women as 
well as on female American soldiers even after the battle ended. Women were kidnapped 
and raped inside and outside internment camps, in their own houses, and in the fields. 
Rape victims included not only elementary school girls but also a nine-month-old baby 
(Omori 2005, 82-3).  
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 Among such sexual crimes is a famous rape incident that happened in 1955. A 
six-year-old girl was kidnapped and repeatedly raped by a US GI before being brutally 
murdered. Her lower abdomen was slit up, and her body was discarded in a garbage box 
in a military area. The rapist was court-martialed and sentenced to death. However, after 
he was sent back to the United States, the sentence was commuted into 45 years of hard 
labor (Omori 2005, 83). In fact, those US servicemen and women who committed crimes 
against the local Japanese population were usually given lenient punishment by the US 
military. 
 Such an insecure situation surrounding women was not so much different in 
occupied Japan where the Allied forces entered Japan in droves after the war ended. 
Hundreds of rapes were committed against Japanese women, although the censorship by 
the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), 
which aimed at democratizing postwar Japan, ironically led to the concealment of these 
incidents by US soldiers (Dower 1999, 412; Hayashi 2006, 8-9). A concern about rapes 
by American troops had been strong in Japanese society even before the occupying forces 
came to Japan. It was widely believed that “the enemy, once landed, [would] violate 
women one after another” (Dower 1999, 124). To stave off such a danger, Japanese 
police and officials organized the “Recreation and Amusement Association” (tokushu ian 
shisetsu kyokai or RAA), a prostitution system specifically designed to handle the sexual 
desires of foreign occupiers. The RAA had a clear goal “to serve as a ‘female floodwall’ 
(onna no bohatei), channeling this foreign male desire into designated (lower-class) 
female bodies, thereby protecting the pure women of Japan’s middle- and upper-classes” 
(Molasky 1999, 105). Not only professional prostitutes but also inexperienced women 
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were recruited for the RAA. Many women who volunteered to offer their bodies were 
poor, but quite a few of them worked in the spirit of “self-sacrifice” that the wartime 
Japanese government had fostered among the Japanese population (Dower 1999, 127). 
 The Japanese fear of rapes of the nation’s women was so intense that the planning 
of RAA started only a few days after Japan surrendered. Such an enterprise was, in fact, 
not new in Japan. Special pleasure quarters were set up for foreigners soon after Japan 
was pressed to abandon its national isolation policy at the demand of US Commodore 
Matthew Perry in 1854 (Dower 1999, 126). Japan also had experience with establishing 
state-sponsored brothels for the Japanese Imperial Military, or so-called “comfort 
stations,” which were built throughout Japan and Asia during WWII (see Chapter V). 
 Thanks to Japanese experience and efforts, on the very day the Allied Forces 
arrived in Japan, RAA facilities were opened and visited by hundreds of American 
occupiers. This “postwar comfort women system” (Molasky 1999, 105) was a successful 
enterprise in that rapes by American troops were to some extent prevented and the 
number remained relatively low (Dower 1999, 130). The number of brothels rapidly 
increased in Tokyo and many other cities as the demand for cheap girls available at these 
facilities grew. Since many soldiers caught venereal diseases, however, the RAA was 
abolished within a year of its establishment, eventually increasing the number of rapes by 
US GIs (Dower 1999, 579n16). The GHQ rendered registered prostitution illegal, 
although brothels never disappeared in Japan. Rather, they took a new form known as 
“special eating and drinking shops.” Many prostitutes worked legally in these shops in 
designated areas called “red line districts” (akasen chitai) or illegally on street corners 
outside the red line districts called “blue line districts” (aosen chitai). 
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 Prostitutes, who were more commonly called “panpan,” became a new symbol of 
postwar Japan. On the one hand, these women “became associated with the liberation of 
repressed sexuality” (Dower 1999, 133) and the “rejection of traditional female 
domesticity” (Molasky 1999, 109). Although many women became prostitutes because 
they faced acute economic insecurity as war orphans or widows, many others chose to 
prostitute themselves out of curiosity and for ephemeral pleasures (Dower 1999, 133-34). 
While defiant of the sexual authority of Japanese men, they wore fashionable dresses, 
high heels, and heavy makeup—literally, they “embraced not only the occupiers 
themselves but American mannerisms and fashion” (Molasky 1999, 103). While they 
were an object of derision and disdain, many people also looked at the panpan with 
admiration and envy. Their intimate contact with the occupiers suggested their closeness 
to America’s affluence and luxury—food, liquor, sweets, cigarettes, and lipsticks—which 
were attractive to many people living in the devastated land. As John W. Dower (1999, 
137) writes, “the sensual panpan was as close as anyone in Japan might hope to get, in 
the flesh, to Hollywood.” 
 On the other hand, while they were symbolic of the “Americanization” of postwar 
Japan, the panpan who sold their bodies to the conqueror hurt the national pride, 
especially that of the Japanese males. The intimate relationship between the panpan and 
American soldiers not only threatened the purity of Japan’s body politic, but also allowed 
the occupiers to transgress the national boundaries embodied in and by Japanese women. 
Moreover, Dower (1999, 138) writes, 
The ubiquitous sexuality linking conqueror and conquered had far-
reaching ramifications insofar as American perceptions of the defeated 
nation and its people were concerned. To some members of the occupation 
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force, native women came to be regarded as little more than available 
sexual objects […]. More strikingly, the defeated country itself was 
feminized in the minds of the Americans who poured in. The enemy was 
transformed with startling suddenness from a bestial people fit to be 
annihilated into receptive exotics to be handled and enjoyed. That 
enjoyment was palpable—the panpan personified this. Japan—only 
yesterday a menacing, masculine threat—had been transformed, almost in 
the blink of an eye, into a compliant, feminine body on which the white 
victors could impose their will. 
 
The panpan were, in other words, a symbol of “sexualized” and “feminized” Japan. In 
fact, Molasky (1999) suggests that, in Japanese literature, particularly in the writings of 
Japanese men, the panpan were often described as vulnerable “victims” whose fall was 
attributed to the Americans, who had destroyed Japan and violated its autonomy. As such, 
many men’s writings “deploy[ed] women’s sexual subjugation to construct a gendered 
national allegory of the occupation era, thereby ensuring that Japanese men [were] 
included among those victimized by the foreign occupiers” (Molasky 1999, 129).  
 After the occupation ended, like Okinawa, mainland Japan was used as a “rest and 
recuperation center” (R&R center) for those soldiers fighting the Korean War. R&R 
facilities were constructed in several sites, where sexual services were also offered. 
According to Hayashi (2006), Japan and the United States actually developed cooperative 
relations for regulating prostitution both around US military bases (including R&R 
centers) and in blue line districts. Like South Korea, where the government exercised 
strict control over prostitution camps around US military bases so as to provide American 
troops with a better environment and thus to secure US military commitment to South 
Korea, the Japanese government supported the US military by controlling Japanese 
women and providing “safe sex” for the American soldiers (Moon 1997). Yet, by 1960, 
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most of the US military withdrew from Japan, resulting in lower demand for prostitutes 
and a lower number of crimes committed by Americans.  
 The decreasing sexual interaction between Japanese women and American troops 
in mainland Japan was, however, in clear contrast to the situation of Okinawan women. 
As mentioned earlier, the demilitarization of mainland Japan led to the militarization of 
Okinawa, where a larger number of American servicemen and women contributed to the 
continued subjugation of the Okinawan people. Although Okinawa was returned to Japan 
in 1972, the end of US military control did not become the end of US domination of 
Okinawa, as we saw above. The US military still provided a source of revenue for 
Okinawa, even if many Okinawan people were victimized by crimes and accidents 
committed by US GIs.12 Indeed, 60% of the crimes perpetrated by US military personnel 
in Japan between 1972 and 2004 have been concentrated in Okinawa (Hayashi 2006, 1). 
To this day, the structure of Okinawan victimization has not changed much, keeping 
Okinawan women insecure and vulnerable to US military violence.  
 To note, there have been a few major changes in the Okinawan prostitution 
industry since the reversion. First, the end of Vietnam War led to a reduction in the 
number of American soldiers in Okinawa, and thus their demand for prostitutes has 
naturally declined. Second, especially since the 1980s, Filipino women have replaced 
Okinawan prostitutes serving the American soldiers. In fact, factors such as the economic 
growth of Okinawa, the improvement of the living standards of Okinawans, and the 
                                                          
12 Researchers argue that Okinawa’s economy today is characterized by three “K”: kichi (military bases), 
kokyo koji (construction), and kankou (tourism). The US military contributes to the local economy by 
giving payments to landowners for the use of their land (63 billion yen was paid by the Japanese 
government on behalf of the United States in 1996), providing employment for the local people (more than 
8,000 people in 1996), and purchasing local products (5.7% of the local GDP) (Hook and Siddle 2003, 3-8; 
also see Inoue 2007, 65-6).   
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depreciation of the US dollar vis-à-vis the Japanese yen have made Japanese prostitutes 
less affordable for Americans (Hayashi 2006, 13). Thus, while Okinawan prostitutes 
continue to service “more respectable customers,” i.e., Okinawan or Japanese men, more 
“affordable” Filipino prostitutes service the Americans in base towns (Inoue 2007, 67; 
Molasky 1999, 68, 113). As a result, the sexual interaction between Japanese prostitutes 
and American GIs has steadily decreased. Although the cases are not that frequent, 
instances of sexual violence against Okinawan women have nonetheless attracted much 
public attention, especially since 1995, as rape victims, especially young victims, have 
offered a perfect symbol for Okinawa’s historical humiliation, suffering, and victimhood. 
Elevated to the status of iconic characters, rape victims embody Okinawa’s tainted, 
violated, and humiliated political body. Okinawa is imagined and reimagined through 
these victimized women.  
  
Official Discourse: From Defeated State to Independent Nation and Reliable Ally 
Japan-US security arrangements have been integral to Japan’s national defense 
since an alliance was first formed between Japan and the United States in 1953. The 
arrangements allowing the US military to use military facilities and areas in Japan while 
obliging the United States to defend the hosting state have long served as a “pillar” of 
Japan’s defense policy. As an integral part of Japan’s defense system, Japan’s white 
papers describe these arrangements at length, thereby providing official Japanese 
accounts of Japan-US relations. Generally, these papers articulate the alliance as the 
foundation of the “partnership” between Japan and the United States, a form of 
relationship developed between two independent states that mutually support each other 
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to achieve common security goals. That is, the alliance represents the “equal” relationship 
between Japan and the United States, whereby the security arrangements are shown to be 
a manifestation of Japan’s maturity and reveal its “macho” qualities as America’s 
strategic partner. More importantly, this description allows Japan to articulate itself as an 
independent and respectable self, thus also giving rise to a discursive boundary between 
Japan’s past self (as a loser of WWII) and its present self (an equal partner of the United 
States). 
The discourse of “equal partnership” is at the core of the way the alliance is 
articulated in Japan’s white papers. This discourse is combined with other key 
representations of Japan as “independent,” “capable of acting of its own will,” and 
“responsible,” each of which serves to depict Japan as an honorable, masculine self that 
has achieved equal status in relation to the victor of the Pacific War.  
For instance, Japan’s independence is symbolically represented in the 
explanations of the formation of the security alliance, which, white papers assert, was 
created on the basis of Japan’s own “desire” or “choice.” White Paper on Defense 2006 
states: “When restoring independence after the end of World War II, Japan has decided to 
form an alliance with the United States and become a member of the Free World based 
on freedom and democracy, as Japan’s security strategy. This decision led to the 
prosperity and development of Japan since then” (MOD 2006, 212). Capable of making 
important decisions, Japan is presented as being able to act “of its own free will” and 
“independently” choosing its own path of security strategy through which it can achieve 
postwar prosperity and development. The alliance is indeed described as something that 
serves Japan’s security goals, i.e. developing a “watertight defense posture” while “not 
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becoming a military power” that would pose a threat to neighboring states. The discourse 
of strategic choice, in this context, gives rise to a particular kind of Japanese subject. That 
is, Japan is independent, free of US influence, and pursuing its security interests by 
skillfully choosing a defense partner without any outside pressure or interference.    
On the other hand, articulated as a strategic partner, the United States is depicted 
not only as a reliable military power, but also as a cooperative, rather than authoritative 
or commanding, state that pursues a shared interest in international peace and stability 
with Japan. It is repeatedly stated that the United States “shares with Japan the basic 
values and ideals of democracy, respect for freedom and human rights, and interests in 
the maintenance of peace and stability in the world” (MOD 2006, 213), and “also has a 
shared interest in the Asia-Pacific region” (MOD 2010, 271). These depictions represent 
Japan and the United States as sharing fundamental virtues and values, and their alliance 
comes to be interpreted as a form of “shared commitment” in regional peace and stability. 
In other words, “common security goals” as well as “shared ideals and principles” 
symbolically turn two entities differing in power and military capabilities into “equal 
partners” or even “comrades” in what is now presented as a horizontal relationship. 
It is in this context of the alliance that US bases in Japan are presented as a 
linchpin of the “cooperative efforts” ensuing Japan’s safety and regional stability. The 
US military presence “serves as a deterrent against aggression towards Japan”; it enables 
“a swift Japan-U.S. joint response […] in the event of an armed attack on Japan”; and it 
further “forms a foundation” for the additional assistance provided by “the reinforcement 
of other U.S. Forces” (MOD 2010, 272). The presence of the US military in Japan is thus 
understood largely from a strategic/functional point of view, and the foreign military is 
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unproblematically given the part of safeguarding and ensuring Japan’s territorial integrity 
from within Japan. 
 The papers further add that “while Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 
stipulates the obligation of the United States to defend Japan, Article 6 allows for the use 
by the United States of facilities and areas in Japan for maintaining the security of Japan 
and international peace and security in the Far East, and overall Japan-U.S. obligations 
are kept in balance” (MOD 2010, 272-73). Reference to “a balance of obligation” is 
repeatedly made in the white papers. Such a balance is represented as a manifestation of 
“mutual commitment.” That is, by offering military bases to the United States and even 
paying US military expenses for maintaining their presence in Japan, Japan equally 
shares a burden with the United States and fulfills its responsibility as a reliable ally, 
instead of contributing nothing and totally relying on US efforts to defend Japan—like a 
son simply expecting the father to provide him with unconditional protection. Japan’s 
“commitment,” therefore, means that Japan is a responsible and equal partner of the 
United States—Japan is not a US protectorate, a burden, or even a dependent child as it 
was during the Allied occupation.     
In this respect, Okinawa, once again housing 75% of all US military areas in 
Japan, is depicted as a symbol of mutual commitment and equal partnership between 
Japan and the United States. The bases in Okinawa prove Japan’s commitment to the 
alliance, while the presence of the US military there shows America’s will to defend 
Japan and to stabilize the region. Okinawa considerably supports Japan-US joint efforts 
and thereby “contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace 
and stability of the Asia Pacific region” (MOD 2010, 274). Indeed, “in comparison to 
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areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located close to 
countries in East Asia,” while “it has a certain distance from countries neighboring Japan” 
(MOD 2010, 274). US forces in Okinawa thus have the capacity to respond to 
contingencies in the region promptly and effectively, taking a decisive part in the security 
arrangements. By accommodating many American bases, Okinawa accordingly serves as 
a “fortress” for peace in Japan and the surrounding areas, or as a “peacekeeper” for the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
A natural corollary to such a meaning given to US bases in Okinawa is that white 
papers are largely silent about the so-called Okinawa problem—a historical issue 
concerning the subordinate status of Okinawa vis-à-vis the United States. As mentioned 
earlier, the military presence of the United States in Okinawa is often regarded as a 
fundamental problem that suggests the unchanging reality of Japan as a defeated state and 
thus signifies the continued victimhood of Okinawa and, further, of Japan. However, 
since Okinawa is simply represented as a “strategic” place where many US military bases 
are located, if the presence of the US military causes any problem in Okinawa, the white 
papers recognize these merely as “social issues” resulting from the heavy concentration 
of military facilities there and/or the close proximity of residential and industrial areas to 
US bases. In other words, problems in Okinawa refer to the adverse influences of US 
military facilities on the living environment of the local people (e.g., noise, pollution, 
crimes, etc.), which, by nature, can be caused by any military base, including US military 
bases in other parts of Japan as well as facilities used by Japanese Self Defense Forces. In 
fact, issues in Okinawa are often mentioned as part of general issues arising between 
“people and defense facilities” (MOD 1990) where “harmony” is needed so that these 
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bases can function adequately. If there is anything particular to Okinawa, therefore, it 
simply results from the densest concentration of military bases in Okinawa, where 
various social problems are just displayed more visibly than in other places. That is to say, 
there is no essential difference between the problems experienced by Okinawans and 
those experienced by other Japanese people living around US military bases in the main 
islands or around SDF bases.   
Following the establishment of SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) 
by Japan and the United States after the 1995 rape incident that heightened national 
awareness about the Okinawa problem, white papers have tended to pay greater attention 
to Okinawa, thus significantly increasing the references to issues that Okinawan people 
have long faced. Since 1997, white papers have often described the construction of US 
bases in Okinawa as a result of US military occupation and requisition of land, whereby 
these bases are presented as a “legacy of World War II.” Today, white papers more 
clearly recognize the great burden the presence of these bases has had on the local 
communities, and acknowledge an increasing need to address a range of issues 
concerning Okinawa.  
Yet, the previous narration of problems in Okinawa has not fundamentally 
changed, and white papers continue to treat the problems as a series of technical issues 
that can be solved through additional agreements between Japan and the United States. 
Indeed, white papers show in detail the progress in the implementation of the SACO final 
report, including efforts to “realign, consolidate, and reduce” US military bases in 
Okinawa, to enforce measures to regulate the way military exercises are conducted, and 
to reduce the noise produced by these bases. These efforts are presented as part of Japan’s 
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attempts to overcome the “Okinawa problem” and ultimately to create “harmony” 
between the US military and Okinawan local people.  
Accordingly, this narrative erases the element of the Okinawa problem as the 
issue of compromised autonomy/sovereignty of Japan and of its relative weakness vis-à-
vis the United States. While the US military has occupied a large part of Okinawa since 
the war, its presence is simply articulated as a source of noise, a hindrance to local 
development, and a potential hazard to people’s safety. In a way, official discourses 
construct the problem as that which is experienced at an individual or a communal level, 
thus having few implications for the nation as a whole. By doing so, even in the face of 
the so-called (localized) Okinawa problem, a contemporary Japanese self can still be 
articulated as one that has achieved a dramatic transformation in terms of its relationship 
with the United States and thus is competent to make arrangements with the US military 
to alter the situation in Okinawa. That is to say, through coping with Okinawa’s issues 
with the United States, Japan can even reproduce its “equal footing” status with this 
“partner” and, consequently, it can distance a contemporary Japan’s national self from a 
past self—an entity that was subjugated, occupied, and emasculated by the United States. 
Japan’s past is, therefore, given an identity that is distinct from a contemporary 
“independent” and “respectable” Japan. 
This forgetting of the Okinawa problem as an issue that suggests Japan’s 
continued vulnerability vis-à-vis the United States is, however, disturbed by voices that 
treat the problem as a national issue that affects the autonomy and independence of Japan. 
According to these voices, American bases are neither the knots of the “partnership” 
between Japan and the United States, nor merely a source of social problems. They are 
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rather symbols of Japan’s continued subjugation and emasculation vis-à-vis the United 
States. When a vulnerable girl is assaulted and humiliated by a US GI, competing images 
of Japan are produced too, and they challenge the official accounts of equal partnership 
between the two states. In the following sections, I turn to one of those discursive sites 
where Okinawa is represented as a haunting shadow of Japan’s own past as a result of the 
symbolic role played by an Okinawan girl raped by a US GI.    
   
Repeated Crimes: The Rape of Okinawan School Girls 
If official discourse represents Japan as an independent, masculine, and reliable 
ally of the United States, the discourses on the US military rape of Okinawan women can 
produce a powerful challenge to the official representation of Japan. Each incident 
committed against Okinawan women can give rise to a discursive space where alternative 
images of Japan are created and recreated, thus destabilizing the official discourse. The 
rape incident that took place in 2008 was one of such sites where a masculine Japan was 
called into question.   
On February 11, 2008, a 14-year-old Japanese girl was raped by a US Marine in 
Chatan Town, Okinawa. The US Marine was immediately arrested outside a military base 
by the local police, but he denied raping the girl and only admitted that he had forced her 
down and kissed her. On February 29, the girl withdrew the charge against him, telling 
the prosecutor that she no longer intended to be involved in this case and wanted to be 
left alone.13 The Marine was released and turned over to the US Forces in Japan. The US 
                                                          
13 “Boko jiken, beihei wo shakuho: Okinawa shojo, kokuso torisage” [Rape Incident, US Soldier Released: 
Okinawan Girl Withdrew the Charge], Asahi Shinbun, 1 March, 2008. 
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military later tried him by court-martial, and the suspect finally confessed the crime and 
was found guilty.14  
This case aroused strong resentment against the US military, developing into a 
diplomatic crisis between the Japanese and US governments. In Okinawa and Tokyo, 
protest rallies were organized. The Okinawa protest, in particular, was attended by 6,000 
people. 15  Moreover, a number of prefectural and city assemblies in Okinawa and 
throughout mainland Japan passed a resolution to protest the act of the Marine and 
demanded US official apologies to the victim as well as the enforcement of strict military 
discipline.16 These resolutions also insisted on the reduction in the number of US military 
bases in order to protect the local people against crimes by US military personnel. Indeed, 
repeated crimes against the locals had proved the ineffectiveness of military discipline to 
prevent crimes. It was thus maintained that the fundamental solution to the repeated 
crimes would be a radical review of the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement and a 
substantial reduction of US military facilities and personnel presence in Okinawa.  
The incident was highly politicized while stirring up strong emotions on the part 
of the Japanese people. It reminded many Japanese of one of the most painful rape cases 
in Okinawa: the infamous “1995 rape incident” in which a 12-year-old Okinawan girl 
was abducted and gang-raped by three US GIs near Camp Hansen. After spending all day 
                                                          
14 “Bei gunpo kaigi: Beihei sabakenu jiken no hansei wo” [US Court Marshal: Reflect on the Incident That 
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15 “Taishikan shuhen de shimin ra ga kogi” [Citizens Protested Around the Embassy], Asahi Shinbun, 14 
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16 Such a resolution was adopted, for instance, in Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, all city, town, and village 
assemblies in Okinawa, and many other assemblies in mainland Japan. 
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partying, these men plotted to “get a girl” and kidnapped a 12-year-old schoolgirl from 
the street. They bound her arms and legs, taped her eyes and mouth, and took her to a 
remote beach where they repeatedly beat, raped, and eventually left her. The suspects 
were quickly identified and arrested by the United States Naval Criminal Investigation 
Service at the request of Okinawa’s local police. However, the investigation was severely 
blocked by the SOFA. In Article XVII 5(c), the SOFA provides that “the custody of an 
accused member of the United States armed forces or the civilian component over whom 
Japan is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of the United States, remain 
with the United States until he is charged by Japan.” This provision is often manipulated 
by US personnel who commit a crime in Japan and take refuge in US bases so as to 
escape legal punishment in Japan (Inoue 2007, 33). Once again, the 1995 rape case 
revealed the discriminatory nature of the SOFA and greatly increased Japanese anger 
against the US military. As many as 85,000 people assembled for a protest rally in 
Okinawa, the largest protest in Okinawan history.17 Many local assemblies also adopted a 
resolution to oppose the unfair treaty.18 This rape case eventually led to governmental 
negotiations for the reform of the Agreement, as a result of which Japan and the United 
States agreed to hand over a criminal of US origin to the Japanese police if he or she is 
accused of committing an atrocious crime (i.e., murder or rape).19 In the 1995 rape case, 
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the suspects were, after being charged, handed over to the local authority and tried in 
Japanese courts. This case marked “the first such trial and conviction in the half century 
since the start of the U.S. occupation,” thus providing a critical moment of reflection 
about Japan-US relations (Angst 2003, 137). And yet, “the U.S. and Japanese 
governments did not forget to reassert the importance of the Security Treaty for the sake 
of ‘peace and prosperity’ of the Asia-Pacific region” (Inoue 2007, 34). The governments’ 
position intensified Okinawa’s indignation against the US military as well as the Japanese 
government.    
The rape case in 2008 was thought to demonstrate the unchanging nature of the 
US military (e.g., its brutality, militancy, and disrespect for the local people), and it again 
galvanized public opinion to demand that the Japanese government review the 
agreements legitimizing the US military presence and granting American soldiers 
privileged status in Japan. More importantly, the incident urged people to rethink “who 
we are” in relation to the US military that had stayed in Japan since WWII. This 
individual incident in Okinawa revealed the continued reality of Japan as a defeated 
nation. That is, Japan is still occupied by the victor of WWII and is still at the mercy of a 
foreign military that continues to treat Japan like a subject state.  
In this context, the rape case carried symbolic weight, and the victim became a 
symbol of the continuing US victimization of Okinawa. In the media coverage of the 
incident, the rape of the Okinawan schoolgirl was not only politicized and discussed 
within a larger context of base issues in Okinawa, but it was also considered to be 
emblematic of 50 years of US oppression, subjugation, and victimization of Okinawa. 
Thus, the rape incident also represented the US violation of the Japanese body politic 
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and, ultimately, its emasculation. At the same time, however, the victim was a symbol of 
Okinawa’s victimhood vis-à-vis mainland Japan, which had sacrificed Okinawa to regain 
its independence and to become an ally of the United States. In this sense, the victim gave 
rise to Okinawa as Japan’s internal other, an internal otherness that questioned and 
destabilized the idea and image of Japan’s unified identity. The incident, thus, both 
reproduced and called into question the idea of a Japanese national self.   
 
Media Discourses: The Rape of Okinawa and the Construction of a Feminized 
Okinawan Identity 
The 2008 rape case provoked an immediate media response, making the front 
page of many Japanese national and local newspapers. These newspapers carried feature 
articles and editorials on the incident, which they commonly described as an abhorrent, 
atrocious, and unforgivable crime committed against a vulnerable teenage girl/child in 
Okinawa. The victimization of the young girl itself constituted an act of violence that not 
only hurt her body and heart, but also violated her dignity. The portrayal of the girl as a 
victim of the sexual assault would, accordingly, raise issues about women’s/children’s 
security and human rights, while, in the context of national imagination, it would also 
offer an iconographic image of Okinawa’s historical subjugation and humiliation by the 
US military and perhaps even by mainland Japan. Placed within these particular 
discursive spaces, the rape incident could be shaped and reshaped into a variety of 
symbols that could produce different political and ethical outcomes. Further, it would 
construct various Japanese subjective identities vis-à-vis the United States and Okinawa 
as Japan’s otherness. A broad public debate about the rape thus opened up a critical space 
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where powerful counter discourses were produced and reproduced to challenge the 
official discourse and to problematize the official narratives about the historical 
transformation of Japan into an equal partner of the United States.  
The media narrative of the rape case first told the story of a pitiful teenage girl in 
Okinawa who had been brutally assaulted by a US Marine. On the night of February 10, 
2008, three junior high school girls were approached by a US Marine and offered a ride 
home. The Marine “skillfully” talked one of the girls into riding his motorcycle with him 
and took her home. Forced to have a sex with him, the girl “cried” and “tried to run 
away,” but the Marine “chased” and eventually “raped” her inside his car. Strong 
sympathy for the girl was manifest in the newspaper narratives. Indeed, the editorials 
tended to tell the story from the victim’s point of view and to graphically depict her 
intense fear, anger, and deep suffering. The Okinawa Taimuzu wrote: “It is reported that 
the girl felt there was something strange about the suspect’s behavior and asked her 
friend for help on her cellular phone when he was off guard. It is unbearable to imagine 
her scream for help and her tense demeanor and fear suggested by her words such as ‘[he 
is] coming’ and ‘I can’t get off his car.’”20 The empathy with the victim was especially 
prominent after she withdrew a charge against the rapist. The Asahi Shinbun stated: “This 
incident is extremely regrettable considering the psychological trauma the girl 
experienced as a result of this American soldier’s selfish behavior. How scary it was for 
her to be with this American soldier. She must have felt deep chagrin and resentment at 
                                                          
20 “Beihei boko jiken: Naze konzetsu dekinainoka” [The US Military Rape Incident: Why We Can’t 
Eradicate], Okinawa Taimuzu, 13 February, 2008.  
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him when she was taken into protected custody. The girl, nevertheless, dropped her 
accusation. This decision shows how a sex crime rips a woman apart.”21  
The vivid depiction of her fear, mortification, grief, anger, and physical and 
psychological wounds would conjure up the iconographic image of a “naïve,” “innocent,” 
and “pure” teenage girl tragically victimized by an aggressive American soldier. She was 
only 14 years old and became a victim of rape. The editorials emphasized the atrocity of 
the incident by underlying the victim’s youth and immaturity that rendered her extremely 
vulnerable to a crime like this. Indeed, the editorials commonly referred to the victim as a 
“girl” rather than a “woman” or a “rape casualty,” and called the incident an “assault on a 
(school) girl” instead of an “assault on a woman,” a term generally used to talk about 
rape in the Japanese media. 
 The representation of the incident as a sexual assault on a teenage girl gave rise 
to an urgent need to reconsider issues regarding the provision of security for women and 
children in Okinawa. Rape, first and foremost, constitutes a serious human rights 
violation, which “strips a victim of her dignity and the life that could have been more 
joyful.”22 Thus, when narrated as an individual sexual crime, this rape incident would 
invoke the responsibility of the society never to let a crime like this happen again on 
Okinawan soil. In other words, it was claimed that effective preventive measures must be 
developed against recurrent crimes by US troops in order to protect Okinawan women 
and children from danger. The Japanese nation must also urge US Forces in Japan to 
strengthen military discipline and control soldiers who “could act on instinct and wait for 
                                                          
21 “Beihei shakuho: Soredemo jiken ha kienai” [The US Soldier Released: Still Incidents Will Never 
Dissappear], Asahi Shinbun, 2 March, 2008. 
 
22 “Nanpuroku” [Nonpuroku Colum], Minami Nihon Shinbun, 13 February, 2008.  
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a chance to assault women.”23 “What we all are seeking for,” the Okinawa Taimuzu 
stressed, “is not repeated words of apology but peaceful lives where there is no worry 
about our children being involved in such a loathsome crime as this one, with the 
guarantee of day-to-day safety.”24  
When the victim withdrew the charge against the Marine, the issue of increasing 
the protection of women and children further shifted to the question of how society could 
support rape victims and provide them with thoughtful care. In the Japanese judicial 
system, a rape is a crime that requires the victim to bring an accusation against the rapist 
so he can be prosecuted. The victim, thus, needs to command extraordinary courage to 
report an incident to the police and to describe in detail the rape in court. This hurts and 
demeans the victim even more deeply and further compounds her miseries. As the Asahi 
Shinbun noted, “many [victims of rape and indecent assaults] choose to bear silently, 
hoping to forget as soon as possible rather than to be asked for details [of their incidents]. 
Some decide to drop charges after filing, because they no longer want to get hurt.”25 In 
this rape case, the victim was also exposed to popular curiosity/interest aroused by the 
media, which also invited some criticism toward her for being “unguarded” and “not 
cautious enough.” Some editorials challenged such a view by maintaining that “it must 
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not be the victim but the offender who is to blame [for the rape],”26 and that “even if she 
had been more cautious, the rape would not have been prevented.” 27  Yet, more 
fundamentally, the editorials invoked the structural problem that lay in the lack of legal 
protection and social support for the victim and led her to reach the decision not to 
prosecute the crime. As some pointed out, there occurred a “second damage”28 or a 
“second rape,”29 which society should have prevented but did not stop. This case, thus, 
confronted Japan with not only the issue of how to best protect “its” women, particularly 
young girls, from the danger of (sexual) violence, but also with “how we could support 
victims of crimes of this kind.”30 
In short, when this incident was construed as a crime committed against an 
individual girl, the media discourse legitimately addressed the issue of protecting 
Okinawan women and thereby problematized Japanese society where effective measures 
were not taken to protect and support them. Thus, by narrating a crime against a teenage 
girl, media discourse also constructed the incident as one kind of women’s issues, more 
specifically the issue of women’s security and human rights, which, by requiring 
protection for them, invoked the image of a paternalistic Japanese self who should/would 
take the responsibility for the safety of “its” women. 
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More interestingly, for the purpose of the present study, the editorials soon 
replaced the story of the “pitiful young girl” with that of a “historically victimized 
Okinawa.” They started to shift the narrative of the incident from sexual violence against 
a particular young girl to broader political and historical issues concerning Okinawa. 
Indeed, gradually, the victimized girl was given extra symbolic weight as a “victim of 
historical violence by the US military.” More precisely, the rape was understood to have 
occurred not simply because of the rapist’s aggressive behavior, but fundamentally also 
because of the presence of US bases on Okinawa. In Okinawa, people living around US 
military bases had been occasionally victimized by US GIs. Rapes and attempts to rape 
by US military personnel and their families occurred in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 
and 2007.31 And, of course, the 1995 case mentioned above was still present in many 
people’s minds. This time, once again, a young girl would be sexually assaulted and 
humiliated by an American Marine. Many editorials wrote that “again, a loathsome crime 
has happened,”32 and they asked “why is such an unforgivable sexual crime committed 
again and again?”33 “Until when will we let such a tragedy be repeated?”34 As long as 
there were US military bases in Okinawa, they claimed, accidents and incidents involving 
the US military would occur and cause harm to Okinawan people.  
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148 
“For 63 years, Okinawa has been left with the excessive burden of US bases,”35 
another editorial stated. It was at this point that the rape victim came to signify Okinawa 
and its history of victimization. Just like the girl, Okinawa had been repeatedly 
humiliated by the US military. During World War II, Okinawa was turned into a 
battlefield by the United States, and since then, its people had been forced to live 
alongside US bases and to suffer from the continued victimization by US forces. The 
Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun, for example, described a girl in a famous picture taken 
during the Battle of Okinawa and created an association between the rape victim and the 
girl in the picture.36  In the picture, a small girl in tatters is carrying a white flag in her 
hand and walking toward American GIs with frightened eyes. The editorial stated: “Even 
though times are different, both war and violence always crush girls.” As the Battle of 
Okinawa victimized the local population, including the girl in the picture, the ongoing 
violence by US troops had produced a number of young female victims in Okinawa. The 
editorial continued: “Although more than 60 years have passed, our children and 
grandchildren are still humiliated by American soldiers. Nothing could be more painful 
than this.” “The US military considers Okinawa their colony,”37 a local resident stated, 
thus suggesting Okinawa’s continued sense of victimization by the United States. As the 
Ehime Shinbun wrote, trained to be soldiers whose mission is to kill enemies, those 
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American troops must have become “insensitive” to the suffering of others and come to 
feel no sympathy toward Okinawans in general.38  
In this context, the rape case became construed as a manifestation of the so-called 
Okinawa problem or the continued subjugation and victimization of Okinawa. In this 
respect, Okinawa was also represented as a victim, a victim of World War II, and a 
victim of repeated crimes by the US military. Identified as a victim, the suffering of the 
victimized girl came to be linked to the suffering of Okinawa as a whole, and the anger of 
the girl became the anger of Okinawa. Through the body of an Okinawa girl, Okinawa 
had also been “hurt,” “humiliated,” “sacrificed,” and “victimized.” The raped girl herself 
represented Okinawa, and the Okinawan body politic was symbolized in the body of the 
raped girl.  
Symbolized by a raped girl, then, Okinawa’s identity was constructed in relation 
to Okinawa’s aggressor or the victimizing US military. While the US military was 
depicted as “apathetic,” “arrogant,” “dishonest,” “immoral,” “unruly,” and “wild,” 
Okinawa was conversely given such attributes as “peaceful,” “gentle,” “naive,” 
“sensitive,” and “vulnerable.” That is to say, constructed vis-à-vis the “hyper-masculine” 
other, Okinawa became “feminized.” Okinawa too was a raped woman. Indeed, sexual 
rhetoric was used in one of the editorials to describe the US bases issues in Okinawa. 
Referring to the metaphor used by a former US Defense Department official who had 
compared Okinawa’s housing of many US military bases with a basket carrying too many 
eggs, the Asahi Shinbun indicated that American soldiers originating from these “eggs” 
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had come out to commit crimes and humiliated the (motherland) basket. 39  From a 
historical viewpoint, it could be said that these eggs are in fact the product of the wartime 
invasion/rape of Okinawa by the US military, which imposed the burden of taking care of 
their “boys” even after Okinawa was returned to the Japanese family.  
In this context, some editorials even considered that, if Okinawa was a feminized 
part of Japan, such a feminized part emasculated Japan as a whole, particularly since 
Japan had not fully played the role of guardian or father for Okinawa. Okinawa was 
indeed a constitutive part of Japan. The Okinawa problem was not simply “Okinawa’s 
problem,” but “Japan’s own problem.” Thus, the Japanese government would have to 
fulfill its responsibility to protect Okinawa from foreign danger. Many editorials urged 
the government to show fortitude by negotiating with the United States and earnestly 
working on the bases issues. Still, other editorials were not very optimistic about the 
government’s ability to improve the situation in Okinawa. In fact, despite the 
government’s repeated request to US Forces for the enforcement of military discipline, 
rapes and other crimes had been repeatedly committed by US personnel. Some argued 
that the government did not seem ready for drastic reforms to the Status of Forces 
Agreement with the United States because this might undermine the partnership between 
Japan and the United States. As the Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun noted, Japan “cannot 
even protect a girl.”40 It is in this context that the rape incident as “a particular sexual 
crime of violence against a young girl” had been transformed into “a crisis of 
sovereignty” (Angst 2003, 138). 
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And yet, this incident would also suggest the unfair structure of Japanese society. 
As already noted, 75% of US military bases in Japan are “concentrated on Okinawa, 
which accounts for only 0.6% of the Japanese territory.” 41  The Tokyo Shinbun 
importantly noted that the Japan-US alliance, although it was supposed to ensure the 
peace and security of the “Japanese nation,” had rather given Okinawans a sense of fear 
and insecurity.42  That is to say, the rape incident had actually shown that Japanese 
“national security” was achieved through the “insecurity of Okinawa,” particularly of 
Okinawan girls/women. In this picture, Okinawa was not included in the Japanese nation. 
Okinawa was rather Japan’s sacrifice. In this way, Okinawa was given a distinct identity 
in relation to the Japanese national self. As a result, Okinawa also started to problematize 
the idea of a unitary Japanese self that had one history, one people, and one common 
experience. Rather, it showed that Japan was divided and had many histories and 
experiences. It suggested that Okinawa remained Japan’s prostituted daughter, who 
would continue to tell a different story about Japan’s so-called glorious reconstruction 
after WWII. That is, Japan had achieved reconstruction and security by “selling” 
Okinawa to the United States, maintaining the structural subjugation of Okinawa within 
Japanese society, and depriving Okinawans of a peaceful life. Okinawa, by contrast, 
would continue to ask: Is Japan really an equal partner vis-à-vis the United States? Has 
Japan really overcome the legacy of the war?  
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Thus, many of the discourses about Okinawa show that Japan is still living as a 
victim of the war and that peace-loving Japan can exist and claim an identity/self only as 
a result of the internal victimization of Okinawa. The 2008 rape case in Okinawa would 
thus reveal another reality about Japan: Japan’s postwar struggle had not ended in 
Okinawa. 
 
Conclusion 
Since the defeat in the Pacific War, to put an end to the postwar situation in which 
Japan was treated as a defeated, occupied, and dependent state, and to regain international 
acceptance, particularly by the United States, as a respectable state have been long-
cherished desires for Japan. The key to realize these wishes was the development of an 
equal partnership alliance between Japan and the United States and the reversion of 
Okinawa to Japan. While the new Japan-US security pact of 1960 allowed Japan to 
remove some unfair clauses and significantly improve its relations with the United States, 
more critical to the opening of a new era was the unification of Okinawa in 1972. Indeed, 
the reversion was supposed to end the victor-loser relationship by formally terminating 
the postwar occupation of a part of the Japanese territory. Becoming an “undivided” 
whole again, Japan would be able to cooperate with the United States as an independent 
state and as a truly equal partner. 
However, as a result of the reversion, Japan incorporated the “last vestige of the 
Pacific War” and was thereby brought to yet another phase of the postwar era. In fact, if 
mainland Japan’s postwar had really ended, Okinawa’s postwar had actually started when 
30 years of US occupation came to an end. Further, as the reversion was achieved in 
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return for the consent given to the continued military presence of the United States in 
Okinawa, Japan came to integrate the “islands of US military bases” and thus subsumed a 
symbol of lingering US power and of Japanese subjugation to the United States into its 
internal space. In this sense, as a consequence of ending the US occupation of Okinawa, 
Japan rather became stuck in the ongoing postwar reality. That is, the uninterrupted 
presence of US bases—which now serve as the “foundation of the Japan-US 
partnership”—effectively destabilizes the boundaries between the previous Japanese self 
as a loser and subjugated nation and the contemporary Japanese identity that hopes to 
posit Japan as an equal partner of the United States. 
Once again, this points to Okinawa’s peculiar position in Japan-US relations. On 
the one hand, official discourses tell us that US bases in Okinawa are symbols of the 
Japan-US alliance and pillars of the Japanese defense system. In official discourses, 
Japan is indeed articulated as an independent, responsible, and equal partner of the 
United States. Japan can display an honorable masculine identity that has overcome the 
victor-loser relationship with regard to the United States. On the other hand, when we 
look at Okinawa-US relations through societal issues and discourses, particularly 
discourses on US military rapes of Okinawan girls, it is revealed that public and media 
discourses construct US bases in Okinawa as symbols of Japan’s subordination and 
emasculation vis-à-vis the mighty and dominant United States. In this respect, the 
“Okinawa problem” goes straight to the question of Japan’s identity in the postwar era.  
This chapter has thus shown that Japan remains an unsettled subject/self. A series 
of competing discourses variously produce and reproduce what Japan is and is not. 
Through strengthening the alliance, Japan increasingly reasserts its masculine identity. 
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Yet, as long as Japan maintains its alliance with the United States, Japan will still be 
haunted by the “Okinawa problem,” which keeps reminding Japan that its postwar era has 
not ended and that Japan and the United States have never been equal partners. In a way, 
Okinawa embodies Japan’s past self: a defeated, occupied, and emasculated image of 
Japan. And Okinawa thus keeps on bringing back the “living ghost” of Japan’s own past 
that official discourses try to master and domesticate, but never successfully or 
completely.  
As symbols not just of Okinawa but also of subjugated and emasculated Japan, 
raped Okinawan girls keep on questioning the equal partnership between Japan and the 
United States. They also call into question the unitary Japanese self that speaks on behalf 
of Okinawa. Okinawa, therefore, lies at the heart of Japan’s national imagination of its 
self and identity. Okinawa simultaneously constitutes and problematizes the Japanese self.  
It is in this context that Japan always needs to reassert the renewed image of itself 
as an equal partner of the United States and thus as having an identity distinct from the 
emasculated self of the past. Through foreign policy, Japan has to reproduce the reality of 
an independent, masculine, and respectable Japan and, thereby, to cast away this 
emasculated image. However, it is an ongoing struggle against an anxiety about the 
feminine self that inhabits the Japanese national self. As a living ghost of Japan’s own 
past, Okinawa remains a critical point in Japan’s identity politics. It is a site where Japan 
is brought back to the reality of being a defeated state and where, nevertheless, it insists 
on creating the temporal boundaries between a new Japan and an old Japan.    
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V. THE COMFORT WOMEN ISSUE AND THE DISCURSIVE 
CONSTRUCTION OF “POSTWAR JAPAN”  
 
The issue of comfort women has been a source of great controversy in Japan for 
decades.  “Comfort women” (ianfu in Japanese) generally refers to those women who 
were drafted as sexual laborers for the Japanese Imperial Military before and during 
World War II. A significant number of women from Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the Philippines served the Japanese Imperial Forces at so-
called “comfort stations” established not only in Japan but also throughout Asia and the 
South Pacific. Neither military prostitution nor wartime sexual violence is unique to 
Japan (Enloe 1990, Chapter 4; Hicks 1995, 28-32; Niarchos 2006, 274-89; Moon 1997; 
Stiglmayer 1994; Y. Tanaka 2002). However, the wartime Japanese comfort women 
system is distinct by virtue of imperial Japan’s “governmental initiative in establishing 
the mechanism and apparatus that the government authorities systematically and 
methodically carried out” (Oh 2001, 4). Thus, the comfort women phenomenon 
represents not a series of regrettable acts by individual soldiers during wartime, but rather 
a system of state-sanctioned and organized rape. 
With the rise of comfort women movements at national, regional and international 
levels in the early 1990s, this wartime comfort system has gained widespread attention 
and has become a target of international criticism. Resolutions demanding Japan’s sincere 
apologies and compensation to former comfort women have been passed not only in 
states that had once been victimized by imperial Japan, but also in North America and 
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Europe.43 At the United Nations, the problem of the comfort women has been a repeated 
topic of discussion since 1992. 44  Various UN organs have passed resolutions and 
recommendations, while also issuing reports on the topic, including the much talked 
about Coomaraswamy (1996) and McDougall (1998) Reports. These reports identify the 
Japanese comfort women system as “sexual slavery” and indicate that the acts committed 
by imperial Japan constitute gross violations of international law that amount to “crimes 
against humanity.” Based on this understanding, Coomaraswamy explicitly states that 
Japan is obligated to acknowledge its violations of international law, to express an 
official apology, to provide legal compensation for individual women, to fully disclose 
historical documents concerning the comfort women system, to develop awareness of the 
issue among Japanese people through formal education, and, if possible, to punish the 
perpetrators.   
In Japan, the question of comfort women has provoked considerable debate 
throughout the nation, generating various discourses about these women and postwar 
Japan. The Japanese government did issue several proclamations to apologize to former 
comfort women, including the statements delivered by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato 
Koichi (1992), Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei (1993), and Prime Minister 
Murayama Tomiichi (1994). In these statements, the Japanese government publicly 
                                                          
43 For example, resolutions concerning comfort women have been passed in United States (House of 
Representatives 2007; House Committee of International Relations 2006), Canada (House of Commons 
2007), the Netherlands (House of Representatives 2007), European Parliament (2007), Taiwan (Legislative 
Yuan 2002, 2008), the Philippines (House Committee of Foreign Affairs 2005, 2008; House Committee of 
Human Rights 1999), United Kingdom (House of Commons 2008), and Korea (2003, 2008).     
 
44 The issue has been discussed in, for instance, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the 
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Commission on the Status of Women workshop (NGO), 
and the UN Fourth World Conference on Women. 
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recognized the involvement of the government in establishing and managing comfort 
stations and formally expressed regret and remorse for the acts committed by imperial 
Japan against the comfort women. In order to support the victims financially and 
medically, the government instituted the Asian Peace and Friendship Foundation for 
Women (AWF) in 1995, through which Japan launched national atonement projects. 
Such an official stance, on the other hand, also invited a nationalist backlash. Many 
conservative politicians and commentators questioned the forced recruitment of comfort 
women and denied Japan’s responsibility for this matter (Fujioka 1996; Hata 1999; 
Kobayashi 1997). Even cabinet members have publicly called comfort women 
“prostitutes” and claimed that the Japanese military did not forcibly draft these women 
(Nishino 2008, 51n28; Omori and Kawada 2010, 29, 48-9). The government did not 
negate these remarks but rather let them go, although all successive administrations 
formally inherited the official stance explained in the previously issued government 
statements. Today, this issue remains highly controversial in Japan, especially in the 
context of depictions of the war in history textbooks (Nishino 2005; Omori and Kawada 
2010, Chapter 3). The government’s ambiguous and even contradictory behavior further 
invites intense debates on this topic, while also giving momentum to comfort women 
movements worldwide. 
The question of comfort women concerns Japan’s national pride and carries grave 
implications for Japan’s identity in the postwar era. Indeed, the comfort women issue 
brings up fundamental identity questions for Japan such as “who we were,” “who we 
wish we had never been,” “who we really are,” and “who we might become,” questions 
whose answers may construct Japan’s political subjectivities and historical trajectories 
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toward becoming a moral state/subject/self (Weber 2006). These questions play a key 
part in the definition of “postwar Japan,” which wants to define itself not as a 
continuation of “wartime militarist Japan,” but rather as a distinct entity incompatible 
with what it once was. In other words, the unsettled issue of the comfort women 
confronts Japan with its haunting legacy once again, but simultaneously offers Japan an 
opportunity to reimagine itself in contrast to its “past self.”  
There is yet another important dimension of the comfort women issue that greatly 
concerns Japanese political identity. An often overlooked aspect of the comfort women 
issue is that sexual servants were also recruited in Japan, with native Japanese women 
serving the same role as those recruited abroad. Nevertheless, not only activists but also 
Japanese officials generally represent the issue as existing between Japan and former 
victim nations, neglecting the existence of comfort women of Japanese origin (Yamashita 
2009, 279-82). In fact, no Japanese comfort women were entitled to receive 
compensation from the AWF, which was established to atone and provide support for the 
former comfort women of victimized nations. In other words, the official narrative of the 
comfort women problem constitutes the issue as a “diplomatic question” or a “question of 
foreign policy” by making it an issue between Japan and those who are not part of it. This 
means that the comfort women problem actually helps reconstruct Japan’s spatial 
boundaries with the “outside” and thereby reproduce Japan’s political self that is clearly 
distinguished from “foreign others.”  
In this sense, comfort women are a source of imagination, that is to say, a way to 
imagine Japan’s own self in contrast to the other. Official discourse performatively 
reproduces Japan in relation to “subjugated Asia” that is symbolically represented by 
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“former comfort women.” By apologizing to these women, however, government 
statements also recreate Japan as a new entity different from, and incompatible with, 
“wartime militarist Japan.” The comfort women problem, therefore, serves to constitute 
not only spatial boundaries between Japan and Asia, but also temporal ones between 
wartime Japan and postwar Japan. Contemporary Japan is thus produced as a distinct 
political subject that is rebuilt out of Japan’s great tragedy of the 20th century. 
In this chapter, through an analysis of various discourses about comfort women, I 
will evaluate how “postwar Japan” is performatively constructed as a moral 
subject/identity in relation to both a geographical other (Asia) and a temporal other 
(wartime Japan). I will examine both official and unofficial texts to explore the broad 
political debate on this issue. Official government documents examined here include 
statements by prime ministers and chief cabinet secretaries about the comfort women 
issue. Statements made by the AWF will also be read as part of the official discourse. To 
collect official documents relevant to this question, I used the archive of Digital Museum: 
The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund, an online museum established 
by the AWF to keep a record of its projects. In addition to documents issued by AWF 
itself, this archive includes statements by prime ministers, chief cabinet secretaries, and 
other government officials as well as resolutions and an official survey report on this 
problem, all of which have afforded a basis for AWF activity. The English translations of 
the documents quoted in this paper were also obtained from this museum archive. 
For the analysis of wider societal discourses, national and local newspaper 
editorials discussing the comfort women issue will be analyzed. In order to evaluate the 
extent of changing societal discourses, I will look at the newspaper editorials published 
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between 1992 and 1993 and in 2007. These years are chosen to explain the rise of 
competing discourses in Japanese society. The period between 1992 and 1993 is when the 
government published a series of official proclamations about the comfort women issue. 
While the Japanese public was generally sympathetic to the former comfort women 
around this time, nationalistic reaction gradually intensified in the late 1990s. The 
opposition culminated in 2007 when the US House of Representatives passed a resolution 
blaming Japan for poorly dealing with the comfort women issue. The analysis of these 
two periods will show conflicting discourses that constitute various Japanese 
subjectivities in relation to the comfort women. 
Before looking into discourses about the comfort women issue, I will briefly 
explain the historical background of the problem. I will also analyze how particular 
discourses make comfort women a political problem. After closely reading official 
discourses, I will conclude this chapter by arguing that the comfort women issue is 
exactly the site where the identity of “reborn Japan” is performatively constituted, 
thereby providing a condition of possibility for the idea/image of Japan as a moral state in 
the postwar era. 
 
Problematizing the Comfort Women System 
It was in the early 1990s that the question of comfort women became a subject of 
political debate in Japan. After nearly 50 years of silence, the Japanese government 
finally recognized the comfort women problem as a forgotten legacy of the past involving 
Japan’s relations to former victim nations. Researchers provide a number of explanations 
for Japan’s long silence. For example, it is said that Japan did not problematize the 
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comfort system because: abnormality is a feature of war; both military prostitution and 
rape are common in war; former comfort women wanted to hide their shameful 
experiences; victims’ states also wanted to avoid exposing their shame of not having been 
able to protect their women; the US occupation forces took over the comfort women 
system for their own sexual needs; the US military also raped many Japanese women 
during and after the war (as we saw in Chapter IV); and there were many local 
collaborators who helped recruit comfort women in victimized Asian states (Soh 2008; Y. 
Tanaka 2002; Ueno 2004). 
However, 50 years after the war, the issue of comfort women was finally brought 
up by South Korea, where public awareness of the Japanese comfort women system grew 
rapidly in the late 1980s. In South Korea, following 30 years of dictatorial rule that ended 
in 1987, feminist scholarship and activism gained momentum alongside wider democratic 
movements (Soh 1996; Tsutsui 2006). Influenced and supported by international feminist 
activism, Korean women’s groups sparked popular interest in sexual violence against 
women, including the wartime Japanese comfort system that had humiliated a substantial 
number of young Korean women.45 The rise of these groups led to the foundation in 
November 1990 of the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan, 
an activist umbrella organization for the comfort women problem.   
Against this background, during South Korean President Roh Tae Woo’s visit to 
Japan in May 1990, the South Korean Foreign Ministry requested official records of 
wartime labor draftees, including comfort women. Acceding to the demand, Japan 
provided South Korea with a list of draftees, which did not yield any critical evidence of 
                                                          
45 Korean comfort women are said to account for 80% of the entire comfort women serving the Japanese 
Imperial Army (Mendoza 2003, 249; Oh 2001, 9-10). 
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the system of forced prostitution (Oh 2001, 15). After Roh’s visit, the issue of the 
comfort women was raised occasionally in the Japanese Diet. When Motooka Shoji, a 
member of the Socialist Party, demanded an official investigation of the comfort women 
issue in the Diet Budget Committee in June 1990, the Japanese government stated that 
the comfort women had been taken around with the military by “private entrepreneurs” 
(AWF n.d.a).  This statement outraged Korean activists further. In 1991, a Korean woman 
testified for the first time in public that she had been forced to serve the Japanese military 
as a comfort woman. Later in the same year, three former Korean comfort women filed 
lawsuits against Japan in the Tokyo District Court demanding a formal apology and 
individual compensation. This led to the eventual politicization of the wartime comfort 
women system and pushed Japan to define its responsibility toward these women. 
As a result of these events, the comfort women issue had become a subject of 
contentious debate in Japan. Not only in the National Diet, but also in the academic 
setting, the problem had become an important topic of conversation and discussion. This 
does not mean, however, that the existence of comfort women was unknown to, or hidden 
from, the Japanese people up until that point. Since the end of the war, there had been 
hundreds of publications in Japan referring to the comfort women issue, including 
biographies, memoirs, magazine articles, and nonfiction books (Oh 2001, 15; Soh 2008, 
146-59; Yamashita 2009, 273-74). Several films concerning the comfort women have 
also been made since the 1970s.46 Even in comparison with Korean publications, “the 
Japanese literature has encompassed a wider range of viewpoints, dealing not only with 
war veterans’ intimate memoirs of their encounters at comfort facilities and the personal 
                                                          
46 For instance, there were films such as Jugun ianfu (1974), Okinawa no harumori: Shogen—Jugun ianfu 
(1979), Senso daughters (1989). 
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stories of former comfort women, but also with humanitarian and socially critical works 
sympathizing with the plight of the exploited women of colonial Korea” (Soh 2008, 146). 
Nevertheless, this issue was not politicized until around 1990. Chizuko Ueno (2004, 69) 
notes: “Even though the fact of the military comfort women was on occasion raised as an 
issue after the war, this never went beyond regarding the women as wretched or pitiful, 
and was naturalized as the kind of cruelty or ‘going too far’ that accompanies war, or 
even as a sacrifice to male lust.” Simply put, it was mostly a matter of popular discussion, 
not of foreign policy.   
In the face of worsening diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea, and 
faced with developing Japanese women’s activism mounting evidence from scholars 
along with intense media coverage of the issue, Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa 
Kiichi apologized for the first time to the South Korean President in January 1992, 
recognizing the involvement of the Japanese military in establishing comfort stations 
(Omori and Kawada 2010, 9). The Japanese government also formally conducted 
investigations of the comfort women question, the results of which were released in July 
1992, together with a statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Koichi. The reports 
acknowledged governmental involvement in constructing and managing comfort stations, 
although forcible recruitment was not confirmed. Thus, the Japanese government did not 
explore the possibility of legal compensation, even though more women launched 
lawsuits against Japan. Lawsuits were now being filed not only by Korean women, but 
also by Filipino (and later by Dutch and Chinese) women, indicating the widening impact 
of the comfort women issue. 
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The second survey report was published in August 1993. The report concluded 
that many comfort women were recruited against their will (Naikaku kanbo gaisei shingi 
shitsu 1993). Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei, who succeeded Kato in December 
1992, delivered a statement that the government confirmed that “in many cases they 
[comfort women] were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc., 
and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments,” 
even if the recruitment “was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in 
response to the request of the military” (Kono 1993).   
Murayama Tomiichi took the position of prime minister in June 1994, following 
relatively short administrations led by Hata Tsutomu and Hosokawa Morihiro after 
Miyazawa. In 1995, Murayama established the Asian Peace and National Foundation for 
Women (AWF), a private foundation through which Japan would fulfill its moral 
responsibility toward former comfort women. For Murayama, this fund was “an 
expression of atonement on the part of the Japanese people toward these women,” and it 
would provide support for them through medical, welfare, and other projects (Murayama 
1995). The establishment of the Fund meant that in practice the Japanese government 
abandoned direct governmental compensation for individual women. Indeed, the 
dominant opinion of the government was “that the issues of reparation, material 
restitution and the right to claim compensation for events in the war had already been 
dealt with by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, bilateral treaties and other relevant accords,” 
and that “for this reason, Japan could not offer compensation to individuals” (AWF n.d.b). 
Accordingly, the government instead sought to express remorse by promoting a series of 
“national,” if not governmental, atonement projects carried out by AWF. More precisely, 
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the government called for citizen contributions to the AWF that would be used for 
atonement to the former comfort women, while the government itself financed the Fund’s 
medical and welfare projects in support of these women. The government also prepared a 
letter of apology given to the recipients of the atonement project and worked to gather 
historical documents and materials concerning the comfort women system so as to 
remember the lessons from history (AWF 1995). The AWF declared that all projects 
were completed when it built the last welfare facility in Indonesia, and was dissolved in 
2007 (Murayama 2007).                 
The politicization of the comfort women system in the 1990s marked the critical 
moment for Japan to rebuild its diplomatic relations with Asian states. However, for 
postwar Japan, it was also a moment to reestablish its relationship with its wartime past 
and, thus, to redefine “who we were” and “who we are.” 50 years after the war, Japan 
was once again faced with the legacy of the past that it had hoped to have overcome, and 
was reminded that the wartime past was still haunting Japan in the postwar era. The 
comfort women issue was, in this sense, not only about improving relations with 
neighboring states, but it was also about rethinking and remaking the distinction between 
“postwar Japan” and “wartime Japan.” Also as an issue of identity, the comfort women 
issue started to occupy an important position in Japanese politics.  
 
Defining Comfort Women: The Politics of Representation 
The politicization of the question of the comfort women not only required former 
comfort women and feminist activists to speak up, but it also entailed the 
reconceptualization of the experiences of these women. By employing particular 
166 
discursive strategies, international comfort women movements successfully transformed 
“a minor detail of the Second World War” into a “historical truth” to be uncovered by the 
testimonies of victims (Kimura 2008; Mendoza 2003). The use of a particular language, 
in other words, made it possible to construe the issue of the comfort women as a problem 
that could bear political relevance for today’s world and, thereby, could achieve sufficient 
international public attention.    
In this sense, a key issue lies in the problematique concerning representations of 
the comfort women and of their experiences. How to define comfort women is always 
political. Indeed, depending on the definition, the responsibility of Japan could be 
conceived differently. While the term “comfort women” itself is “not so much a 
euphemism as a form of officialese” (Hicks 1995, 18), historically, the comfort women 
have also been labeled in many other ways. Chunghee Sarah Soh (2001; 2008) identifies 
multiple terms that have been employed to refer to the comfort women, ranging from 
“imperial gifts,” “pi” (genitals), and “sex slaves” to “chongsindae” (volunteer labor 
corps) and “prostitutes.” These labels give rise to competing meanings about comfort 
women, thereby producing their identity in vastly different ways. According to Soh, each 
term reflects the political ideology of those who use that specific term to name comfort 
women: the fascist paternalism of wartime Japan, the masculinist sexism of the Japanese 
imperial troops, the feminist humanitarianism of feminist activists, and the ethnic 
nationalism of ethnonationalist activists in South Korea and Japan.     
The term “imperial gifts” was often used by wartime Japan, which devised a 
comfort women system not only to prevent soldiers from perpetrating sexual violence 
against women in occupied territories, but also to raise the morale of the imperial military. 
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“For imperial Japan, the comfort system was an institutionalized ‘gift,’ rewarding the 
emperor’s warriors—in a spirit of paternalistic omoiyari (consideration)—with a 
regulated liberation from their battlefield duties: the gift of brief moments of rest and 
recuperation in the comforting company of young and healthy ianfu” (Soh 2008, 38). 
Receiving such “gifts,” the soldiers felt grateful and obliged to repay the emperor by 
trying their hardest to win the war. The comfort women were, in this respect, a useful tool, 
not only to sustain military discipline, but also to preserve the unity between the emperor 
and his soldiers.47 The comfort women were, thus, “commodities” that provided “comfort” 
to soldiers and served imperial purposes (Y. Tanaka 2002, 173). In fact, these women 
were regarded as essential “goods” for the military, which, according to the military 
records, transported comfort women on military ships nominally as “military materials” 
or “supplies” (Hicks 1995, 17; Soh 2001, 75; Ueno 2004, 85-6).   
The dehumanization and commodification of the comfort women by wartime 
Japan were parallel to the soldiers’ depictions of comfort women as “pi.” “Pi” is a 
Chinese slang term referring to female genitals (Hicks 1995, 18; Soh 2001, 77-8; 2008, 
39). The term was initially used by soldiers stationed in China and was later employed 
widely among Japanese troops. As Soh writes, “the use of slang phrases such as pi-
kankan (pi viewing) and pi-mai (pi purchase) by Japanese soldiers stationed in China 
unequivocally reveals their perceptions of comfort women as prostitutes and hence the 
soldiers’ objectification and commodification of these women’s sexuality” (Soh 2008, 
39). The comfort women were also called “kyodo benjyo” (public toilet) in the military, a 
                                                          
47 Along these lines, Katharina R. Mendoza interestingly argues that, “seen though a Foucauldian lens, the 
comfort system can be understood as a disciplinary institution that, through the use of women’s bodies, 
disciplined the soldier with the intent of creating a body that was both intelligible and useful for furthering 
the Japanese imperial project” (Mendoza 2003, 251). 
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word equally reflecting the soldiers’ “dehumanization and objectification of women as 
sexual receptacles” and a Japanese “conventional attitude of male superiority” (Soh 2008, 
40). Comfort women were, in this sense, essential goods to be supplied, purchased, and 
consumed to satisfy men’s natural sexual needs. For these Japanese soldiers, the comfort 
stations were nothing more than facilities where they could exercise their “masculinist 
sexual rights” and enjoy access to the commercial service of recreational sex (Soh 2001, 
78).   
Such terms as “imperial gifts” and “pi” as used by wartime Japan and its troops 
did not problematize the system of comfort women. Nor did it invoke the responsibility 
of Japan. Feminist activists who seek to problematize the Japanese comfort women 
system, therefore, redefine comfort women as “sex slaves,” a powerful terminology that 
construes the creation of comfort system as a violation of a jus cogens norm of 
international law. Any violation of jus cogens norms gives rise to universal jurisdiction, 
according to which any state may prosecute offences of these norms (McDougall 1998). 
This discourse is widespread today as it is seen in a series of UN reports and resolutions 
that describe the comfort system as “military sexual slavery” and identify Japan’s past 
misconducts as constituting serious international crimes (Coomaraswamy 1996; 
McDougall 1998; Ueno 2004: 87-91). According to Soh, such a perception regarding 
comfort women is shaped by the emerging idea that “human rights include a woman’s 
right to her bodily integrity,” which effectively makes Japanese wartime military 
practices “human rights problems” (Copelon 1994; Soh 2001, 79-80; 2008, 41). Although 
both municipal and international laws often characterize rape as an attack against the 
“honor” of women (women, accordingly, become “dishonored” in the attack), feminists 
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argue that “such characterizations are incorrect, as the only party without honour in any 
rape or in any situation of sexual violence is the perpetrator. While rape is indeed an 
assault on human dignity and bodily integrity, it is first and foremost a crime of violence” 
(McDougall 1998; see also Niarchos 2006, 292-97). From this perspective, the comfort 
women system is defined as an institution of systemic rape and sexual slavery “resulting 
in gross violations of women’s human rights and requiring state compensation to the 
survivors” (Soh 2008, 31-2). Some feminists further insist that the comfort women should 
also be identified as victims of “war crimes” and of “crimes against humanity,” thereby 
highlighting the seriousness of the issue and placing the legal, rather than moral, 
responsibility on Japan (Copelon 1994; Coomaraswamy 1996; McDougall 1998; Soh 
2008: 41-2; Y. Tanaka 2002). 
It is through this reconceptualization of the comfort women system that former 
comfort women have gained considerable sympathy around the world since the 1990s. 
The victim status of comfort women makes their voice more reliable and privileged as 
they are “construed as innocent” and “somehow free from sin” (Elshtain 1997, 251). Yet, 
more importantly, it is argued that such a redefinition has also made it possible for the 
former comfort women who had been viewed as mere “bodies” by imperial Japan to 
dauntlessly break their silence and fight against the wrongdoers who have caused their 
suffering. Many comfort women went through the great embarrassment of having such 
experiences and often blamed themselves for becoming “unworthy” and “stained” 
(Kimura 2008; Mendoza 2003; Ueno 2004). The new narrative about the comfort system, 
however, suggests that sexual exploitation “became no longer an experience that the 
‘Comfort Women’ should feel ashamed of or for which they should blame themselves,” 
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and that Japan ought to be responsible for all their hardship (Kimura 2008, 13). By 
redefining themselves as “victims,” the former comfort women believe that “the 
victims/survivors should face up to their past bravely in order to regain their dignity” 
rather than remain ashamed of their painful experiences and suffer from low-esteem as 
tainted bodies (Kimura 2008, 14).   
Today, “sex slaves” is an internationally accepted term to describe comfort 
women, but some other names are also used locally in the victimized countries. In South 
Korea, the comfort women are more commonly called “chongsindae” (teishintai in 
Japanese) or Volunteer Labor Corps. This Korean term actually refers to the corps 
formed by unmarried women in Japan and Korea to support the war economy during the 
last couple of years of the Pacific War. Although these women were mobilized to provide 
labor for manufacturing, construction, and food production, some of them are said to 
have been taken as comfort women. As a result, in South Korea, the term “chongsindae” 
is widely abused when referring to comfort women since most Korean comfort women 
were actually not deceptively drafted into becoming comfort women under the guise of 
“chongsindae,” and most Volunteer Labor Corps members never engaged in sexual labor 
(Soh 2008). Rather, as Soh (2008, 62) writes, “the Korean usage of the term chongsindae 
to refer to comfort women proved to be a sociopsychologically as well as a politically 
effective decision on the part of activists in order to highlight the deceptive and/or 
coercive methods used in the recruitment of Korean comfort women.” Further, it 
“help[ed] avoid the negative image of prostitutes evoked by the term wianbu” (comfort 
women) (Soh 2008, 62). In this sense, “chongsindae” has become a nationalist 
euphemism in South Korea that accentuates the innocence and purity of the comfort 
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women, thereby provoking a nationalistic reaction and mobilizing wider public support 
for the comfort women movement.  
In the Philippines, former comfort women are generally referred to as “lolas” or 
grandmothers. To carry the Filipino comfort women movement forward, activists faced 
the need to “reinvest those [dehumanized and commodified] bodies [of the comfort 
women] with value and agency” so that their voices could be heard in society (Mendoza 
2003, 257). The activists confronted this challenge by depicting the survivors as 
“paragons of virtuous Filipino womanhood and as gentle old grandmothers” (Mendoza 
2003, 258). This way, they successfully constructed “the true ‘crime’ of the comfort 
system as the threat it posed to the ideal family unit,” something that Filipino men and 
the state must bravely combat (Mendoza 2003, 259). The discourse of motherhood also 
helped to give the former comfort women a positive self-image through which they could 
overcome their sense of “dirtiness” or “impurity” and openly come forward as former 
comfort women. Indeed, the symbolism of the grandmother “conveniently erases the 
actual feminine sexuality of former comfort women, whose suffering was rooted in the 
very exploitation and violation of their youthful sexual bodies” (Soh 2008, 75).  
It is interesting to note that the term “grandmother” is also used for the survivors 
in South Korea (“halmoni”) and Taiwan (“ama”). There, the term is used to avoid the 
image of prostitution and to show respect for the survivors (Soh 2008, 72-4). The wide 
usage of the term “grandmother” is indicative of a nationalistic and patriarchal ideology 
underlying local comfort women movements. That is, women are “the community’s—or 
the nation’s—most valuable possessions,” “the principal vehicle for transmuting the 
whole nation’s values from one generation to the next,” and “nationalist wombs,” which 
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must be protected at all costs (Enloe 1990). Any attack on them should be regarded as an 
attack on the nation or the entire national community, thus creating the comfort women 
issue as a “national” matter rather than as a women’s human rights concern (Soh 2000). 
Lastly, in the face of these international feminist movements, the conservatives in 
Japan put up a strong resistance by continuing to define comfort women as “military 
prostitutes” or “licensed prostitutes.” This conception not only denies the legal 
responsibility of Japan, but also questions the “victimhood” of the comfort women by 
challenging the discourses of forced prostitution and systemic rape committed against 
these women. These conservative ethnonationalists argue that military prostitutes were 
rewarded for their services, and that these were merely commercial transactions between 
the prostitutes and the Japanese soldiers. In fact, “in the comfort women system, soldiers 
usually purchased a ticket to receive service from a comfort woman. Entering the 
woman’s room, they personally handed the ticket to her” (Y. Tanaka 2002, 173). It is also 
well known that among these comfort women were professional prostitutes recruited in 
both Japan and abroad (Hicks 1995; Soh 2001). If the comfort women were “whores” or 
“fallen women” who were already “dirty” and “unchaste,” and who voluntarily offered 
their bodies to men and sold sex, they could never be “raped” nor claim “victimhood.” 
This discourse, thus, conceals a coercive element in the comfort women system while 
ironically recognizing the agency of the former comfort women (Ueno 2004, 82-6). As a 
result, there continues to be a fierce controversy throughout Japan and the world as to 
whether comfort women were “sex slaves” or “public prostitutes,” a debate that weighs 
heavily on the question of Japan’s responsibility toward the survivors (Soh 2001; 2008). 
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As Soh rightly notes, these vastly different representations of the comfort women 
suggest that “there is more than one side to the identity of the ‘comfort women’” (Soh 
2001, 71). In fact, the experiences of comfort women were as diverse as their ethnic 
backgrounds, the methods of their recruitment, and the location of comfort stations 
(Hicks 1995; Oh 2001; Soh 2008). Thus, competing discourses that seek to define 
comfort women are various parts of a representational politics endowing comfort women 
with a particular identity. All these representations are “only partial truths, deriving from 
the political interests and the ethical stances of the opposing camps” (Soh 2001, 71). 
From this perspective, it can be argued that the reconceptualization of the comfort 
women as victims of state violence has made it possible to invoke the responsibility of 
Japan toward the survivors while also constructing the comfort women issue as an 
international problem. Japan’s policy on this issue can thus be understood as a normal 
reaction to the construction of comfort women as those who deserve Japan’s formal 
apology and atonement. More importantly, Soh’s argument suggests the normative power 
of language, which produces meanings and naturalizes a certain practice as an adequate 
response. As a result of taking certain discursive strategies, Japan’s official apology and 
compensation for the survivors could be normalized.   
While affording great insight into this study, this argument seems to imply that 
Japan as an unproblematic subject/self acquires a “former aggressor” identity in relation 
to these “victims” and formulates foreign policy based on such an understanding of the 
self and the other. Japan’s foreign policy is, in other words, a consequence of both Japan 
and the comfort women gaining certain identities, whereby identities serve as the basis 
for foreign policy. However, I would argue that Japan’s identity is a performative 
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construction that is produced through foreign policy. As we saw in Chapter II, from a 
poststructuralist perspective, there is no identity prior to foreign policy. Rather, the 
haunting legacies of war transformed into foreign policy issues (including the comfort 
women issue) create a condition of possibility for Japan, whose identity is constituted and 
maintained by making discursive boundaries not only between “neighboring Asia” and 
“Japan,” but also between “wartime Japan” and “postwar Japan.” In this sense, Japan 
needs these wartime legacies so that its postwar identity can be secured. “Postwar Japan” 
is a construction, an effect of discourse, not an entity existing prior to foreign policy. 
In the following sections, I analyze Japanese official discourses on the comfort 
women issue. Through this analysis, I seek to show how the identity of postwar Japan is 
performatively created through the issue of the comfort women.      
 
Official Discourse: The Discursive Construction of “Postwar Japan” 
The official narratives about the comfort women issue in the early 1990s 
represented a radical revision to Japan’s overall approach to the problem. It was the first 
time that Japan had directly engaged the issue and thereby broken away from an 
unofficial policy of not remembering the comfort women. The problematization of the 
comfort women system was made possible by a series of statements delivered about the 
matter by the government. Although the Japanese government had previously denied the 
involvement of the wartime government in establishing and managing comfort stations, 
these statements construed the Japanese wartime institution of comfort women as a 
serious “mistake,” and expressed Japan’s formal apology and remorse toward former 
comfort women. The recognition of the problem invoked the responsibility of Japan to 
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take appropriate action toward these women. The official statements, in this sense, 
articulate Japanese political self now facing the problem of the comfort women head on, 
while also constructing the comfort women as an object of policy discussion.   
Underlying the problematization of the comfort women system is the recognition 
of comfort women as victims of state violence. Among others, the Kono statement (1993) 
clearly admits that many women were drafted as comfort women “against their own will,” 
through “coercion” and “coaxing,” and “lived in misery at comfort stations under a 
coercive atmosphere.” As both Prime Minister Murayama (1994, 1995) and Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Kono (1993) said and clarified, the problem lies in the reality that the 
comfort women system as an officially-organized system of sexual exploitation 
“seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women” and brought them 
“immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds.” The portrayal of 
the comfort women as pitiful victims is central to the discourse on the comfort women 
issue that seeks to invoke Japan’s moral responsibility to deal with this matter.    
The official statements also place the issue in the larger picture of the Pacific War, 
whereby the problem of the comfort women is understood as one of the wartime and 
colonial legacies in Asia. Murayama (1995) states: “During these past 50 years we have 
worked hard to cultivate, step by step, friendly relations with our neighboring Asian 
countries and others. However, the scars of war still run deep in these countries to this 
day. The problem of the so-called wartime comfort women is one such scar.” Identified 
as a legacy of war, the problem is represented as a matter between Japan and neighboring 
Asian nations, or between a former aggressor state and its victims. This means that the 
issue is understood in the manner of “we victimized their women,” that is to say, as an 
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issue of Japanese victimization of Asia and Asia’s women. The question of the comfort 
women is, in this sense, spatially constructed as an “Asian” problem rather than as a 
general issue arising between the Japanese government and women from various parts of 
the region. Prime Minister Murayama (1994), accordingly, states that “one way of 
demonstrating such feelings of apologies and remorse is to work to further promote 
mutual understanding with the countries and areas concerned.” In other words, the 
comfort women issue is to be solved by improving Japan’s relationships with victimized 
Asian states through foreign policy.   
Note that missing from this picture is the existence of those Japanese women who 
also served the Japanese military as comfort women. Identified with Asia, the “former 
comfort women” only refer to women of the formerly subjugated nations and thus 
constitute an identity distinct from Japan. Thus, the Asian Women’s Fund was established 
to conduct national atonement projects for the former comfort women in the victimized 
states, leaving out former comfort women inside Japan. As the appeal for donations for 
the Fund declares, “of paramount importance […] is the need for as many Japanese 
citizens as possible to appreciate the suffering of the victims and to express a genuine 
desire for atonement” (AWF 1995). The appeal goes on to say: “we are convinced that, if 
each and every citizen of Japan would do his or her best to understand the plight of the 
victims, and then act in a concrete manner to make amends, and if such a commitment—
coming, as it must, from the heart—could reach the women involved, then our actions 
would help mitigate, to some extent, the trauma they have lived through and continue to 
live with” (AWF 1995).  
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This discourse makes the comfort women of Japanese origin merely a constitutive 
part of the now apologizing Japanese self/state. Defined as “Asian” or “foreign” women, 
the comfort women constitute Japan’s external other, thus making possible the dichotomy 
between “Japan” and “Asia” or Japan’s “inside” and its “outside.” In this picture, the 
institution of the comfort women system symbolizes Japan’s victimization of Asian 
others, while the comfort women themselves become symbolic of the victimhood of Asia 
as a whole. In this sense, what is at stake with the problem of the comfort women is not 
Japan as a sex criminal, but Japan as an aggressor and a victimizer in its international 
relations with Asia. 
The comfort women issue, therefore, invokes the question of what Japan was for 
Asia. The comfort women are a reminder of Japan’s wartime aggressiveness, or of its 
past militarist self. Accordingly, as the successor to wartime Japan, Japan today is held 
responsible for what it did in the past against these Asian women. The discourse of 
succession or continuation is implicated not only in Japan’s official apology and remorse 
for its past actions, but also in its declared determination to “face historical facts” and/or 
“never repeat the same mistake,” the phrases repeated by Chief Cabinet Secretaries Kato 
(1992) and Kono (1993) and successive Prime Ministers, including Murayama (1994, 
1995) and Hashimoto (1996). In the appeal for donations to the AWF, the continuum is 
more clearly indicated. It reads: “It is the Japanese state of the past that created the 
‘comfort women.’ […] To make amends for the past, then, fifty years after the fact, is our 
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responsibility—we, the present generation, owe it to the victims, to the international 
community, and to future generations” (AWF 1995).48 
However, the repeated claims made in governmental statements that those pitiful 
comfort women were victimized by “the then authorities” produce “wartime Japan” as a 
distinct identity in contrast to “contemporary Japan.” The 1993 Kono statement, as well 
as the second official survey report on the issue of comfort women that was released with 
the Kono statement (Naikaku kanbo gaisei shingi shitsu 1993), explicitly note that 
“comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of 
the day,” and that “the then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the 
establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women” 
(emphasis added). The responsibility of wartime Japan is further emphasized in the 
statement by Prime Minister Murayama (1994), in which he characterized wartime 
militarist Japan by such words as “colonial rule,” “acts of aggression,” and “caused such 
unbearable suffering and sorrow for so many people.” These descriptions are in striking 
contrast to depictions of contemporary Japan in official statements, which indicate that 
Japan today “express[es] its sincere apology and remorse” to former comfort women 
(Kato 1992), “reiterate[s] our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake” 
(Kono 1993), and further hopes to “take an active part in dealing with violence and other 
forms of injustice to the honor and dignity of women” (Hashimoto 1996). Indeed, as 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato explicitly stated in his statement, postwar Japan is 
determined to become a “pacifist nation” and “will endeavor to build up new future-
                                                          
48 In the official translation, “the Japanese state of the past” is translated as “the Japanese nation of the 
past.”  However, in the original Japanese statement, the term “kokka” is used.  As this term means “state”’ 
rather than “people,” to avoid the confusion, I replaced the word “nation” in the original translation with 
“state.”  
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oriented relations with the Republic of Korea and with other countries and regions in 
Asia.” 
In short, if wartime Japan is identified as colonialist and aggressive, postwar 
Japan is conversely constructed as having an identity that is pacifist, cooperative, and 
sympathetic to the comfort women. Official discourse continues to articulate postwar 
Japan as possessing the capacity to learn from the past and, thus, as a temporally 
progressing self in relation to wartime Japan, which these statements present as the 
temporal other to be negated and overcome by this new postwar entity and identity. 
Accordingly, it becomes imperative for postwar Japan, given its depiction as a 
“reborn” entity distinguishable from wartime Japan, to accept its moral responsibility 
toward the former comfort women who have been suffering unbearable wounds since the 
war. The portrayal of pacifist Japan and pitiful victims invokes the responsibility of Japan 
to help and support the former comfort women (but only Asian ones). Indeed, the very 
acts of atonement and support can reproduce the identity of postwar Japan as a 
responsible state and as a subject benign enough to heal their wounds and salve their 
suffering. “A new Japan,” in other words, is a performative construction.  
However, the distancing of wartime Japan from postwar Japan means that Japan 
produces its otherness by the externalization of evil elements found within the self. “Who 
we were” and “who we are not anymore” define “who we now are,” and “wartime Japan” 
becomes integral to the construction of “postwar Japan.” In this respect, no matter how 
much Japan’s foreign policy discourses are trying to make this past self into a distant 
other, postwar Japan will never be able to fully overcome wartime Japan. Postwar Japan 
continues to take on meaning as an antithesis to wartime Japan. And to produce its 
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renewed identity, postwar Japan needs this wartime self as its shadow, a shadow or 
haunting presence that embodies characteristics contemporary Japan allegedly does not 
have.  
In this respect, postwar Japan is, and must be, always haunted by its past self. It is 
in fact this otherness that secures the identity and meaning of postwar Japan. Ultimately, 
postwar Japan is always in the shadow of its past and always threatened by another self 
that nonetheless makes possible the peace-loving identity of postwar Japan. Postwar 
Japan’s identity, in this sense, will never be settled, nor will it “achiev[e] the completion 
or wholeness toward which it strives” (Edkins and Pin-Fat 1999, 1). It must continuously 
reproduce itself by performance. As a critical site of Japanese identity politics, the 
comfort women issue offers a condition of possibility for “postwar Japan.” By talking 
about the past, defining “what it was,” apologizing to the victims, and expressing its 
determination to maintain its stance as a pacifist state, the reality of a reborn Japan is 
constituted, albeit in the shadow of a haunting ghost of wartime Japan 
 
Media Discourses: Posing Challenges to the Moral State 
If a series of government statements discursively construct the comfort women 
issue as an issue of wartime sexual exploitation of Asian women by militarist Japan, 
newspaper editorials instead construct this issue as a “contemporary” problem that 
questions the very possibility of a distinction between wartime Japan and postwar Japan. 
Since the early 1990s, even before the government acknowledged the officially 
administered comfort women system, newspaper editorials have repeatedly taken up the 
issue and urged the government to adopt a determined attitude to solve the problem. 
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While the initial discussion of the issue problematized the fact that the Japanese 
government had neglected former comfort women for almost 50 years, thereby 
destabilizing the morality of postwar Japan, the media debate gradually shifted its focus 
to the question of why Japan is still not fully accepted as a responsible/respectable 
member of the international community. These editorials, although written from different 
perspectives, represent Japan as being haunted by its wartime legacy and thus struggling 
with the contradictory image of seeing itself as a reborn moral state and the 
regional/international perceptions of Japan as an insincere and irresponsible aggressor. 
Here too, similar to the Okinawa rape case/situation discussed in Chapter IV, the media 
discourses give rise to powerful counter-narratives that not only redefine the “comfort 
women problem,” but also go to the heart of Japan’s unsettled identity. 
Many editorials written between 1992 and 1993, when the government issued the 
Kato and the Kono Statements, generally construed the comfort women issue as a 
problem that destabilized the boundaries between wartime Japan and postwar Japan. 
While official discourse problematized wartime violence and thereby made the comfort 
women issue a “past issue” having to do with militarist Japan, these newspaper editorials, 
by contrast, emphasized the fact that Japan had long ignored the former comfort women 
and thus called into question the morality of postwar Japan, that is to say, the very quality 
that should distinguish postwar Japan from wartime Japan. Indeed, up until 1992, Japan 
had never adequately addressed the issue nor showed any sincerity toward the victims 
even though Japan’s past crime was such that Asia’s “grudge against Japan [would] never 
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disappear in a generation or two.” 49 What these editorials questioned was, therefore, not 
what wartime Japan had done to the women, but rather how it was that postwar Japan had 
left this problem unaddressed for so long. The Nihon Keizai Shinbun asked: “Why didn’t 
former Japanese leaders deliver the message [of apology and remorse to former comfort 
women] earlier? Although they gave the excuse that facts had been unclear, the truth is 
probably that the Japanese government lacked the proper attitude to readily clarify the 
facts.” 50 The Mainichi Shinbun similarly maintained that, although some people might 
wonder why Japan has to face demands for reparation some 50 years or so after the war, 
“what is indeed ridiculous is that this issue has been sealed off for half a century.”51 “The 
fundamental problem,” the Asahi Shinbun explained, “is our national tendency to avoid 
dealing with dishonorable history.”52 From this viewpoint, the comfort women issue was 
presented as an ongoing and contemporary issue, a current situation and problem. Japan 
had failed to make it a “problem of the past only.” 
Thus, these editorials fundamentally questioned the transformation of “old Japan” 
into a “new Japan.” If wartime Japan had humiliated these women by forcing them to 
serve as part of the comfort women system, postwar Japan left them to suffer and to cry 
themselves to sleep in silence. That is, postwar Japan, although claiming to be a moral 
subject and a responsible member of the international community, continued to hurt and 
                                                          
49 “Nikkan ‘fudangi no kaidan’ wo kasaneyou” [Let’s Have Numerous Casual Meetings between Japan and 
South Korea], Mainichi Shinbun, 6 November, 1993. 
 
50 “Nikkan kankei ni shinjigen no hatten wo kitaisuru” [Expecting the Development of a New Dimension of 
Japan-South Korean Relations], Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 18 January, 1992. 
 
51 “Sengo hosho: 48 nenme no aratana senso ninshiki” [Postwar Reparations: A New Perception Toward 
War in the 48th year], Mainichi Shinbun, 17 August, 1993. 
 
52 “Nikkan no mirai hiraku dodai zukuri wo” [Establish the Foundations for Opening a Bright Future for 
Japan and South Korea], Asahi Shinbun, 18 January, 1992. 
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humiliate the former comfort women by refusing to accept their sexual exploitation as an 
ongoing “problem.” As a result, Japan continued to face Asian mistrust and hatred, and 
overall the suspicion that postwar Japan was qualitatively different from wartime Japan. 
The emergence of the comfort women question in the 1990s—almost 50 years after the 
war—suggested that Japan remained tied to, and haunted by, the wartime legacy. Japan, 
in this sense, still “dwel[t] on its past.”53 As the Asahi Shinbun stated, there was still a 
huge gap between the ideal self (a responsible, moral state and a moral leader in Asia) 
and the real self (a mistrusted state still blamed for what it did a half century ago). 54   
It is in this context that the comfort women issue was considered as a critical 
question where “Japan’s morality [was] put to the test.”55 That is to say, at stake was 
postwar Japan’s identity, or the question of whether Japan could finally differentiate itself 
from its past self or not. In fact, many editorials found a possibility for Japan to overcome 
its wartime history. Indeed, the comfort women issue, by evoking a responsibility toward 
the neglected women, now offered a chance for Japan to become a trusted state and to 
break away from its shameful past. For example, the Mainichi Shinbun argued that the 
“adverse legacy” of Japan’s “dark past” could now be transformed into a “positive asset” 
by educating young people to become “global citizens” and thus to help build a 
                                                          
53 “Sengo hosho: 48 nenme no aratana senso ninshiki” [Postwar Reparations: A New Perception Toward 
War in the 48th year], Mainichi Shinbun, 17 August, 1993. 
 
54 “Asia no fushin wo tachikiro” [Dispel Asia’s Mistrust], Asahi Shinbun, 19 August, 1993; “Nihon no dogi 
ga tamesareteiru” [Japan’s Morality Is Being Tested], Asahi Shinbun, 20 March, 1993. 
 
55 “Nihon no dogi ga tamesareteiru” [Japan’s Morality Is Being Tested], Asahi Shinbun, 20 March, 1993. 
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relationship of mutual trust among Asian nations.56 The Yomiuri Shinbun also noted that 
Japan could turn the lessons of the past to its advantage by actively fulfilling international 
responsibilities, such as taking part in UN peacekeeping operations (more on this matter 
in Chapter VI).57 Yet, immediate challenges for Japan would be to face historical truths, 
to sincerely express regret, to deeply reflect on its past behavior, to learn from history, 
and to help the stories of the past circulate from generation to generation. In this sense, 
these editorials also welcomed Japan’s move toward a recognition of its responsibility for 
the former comfort women system and toward a final resolution of the issue. Indeed, it 
was the first step Japan had ever made to “show both domestically and internationally 
that Japan can admit its past faults as faults.”58 Accordingly, through these efforts, Japan 
would finally be able to establish a “dividing line” between its irresponsible, immoral self 
of the past and its new responsible and moral self in the making.    
While the editorials written in the early 1990s raised the possibility that Japan 
would become a moral state through dealing with the comfort women issue, the persisting 
criticism of Japan for trying to evade its responsibility as a former aggressor in Asia 
pointed to an unchanging regional and international perception of Japan as immoral and 
reluctant to face history. Indeed, although the AWF was severely criticized for allowing 
the government to not officially compensate the former comfort women, the Japanese 
government never took further action to solve the problem of the comfort women 
                                                          
56 “Shusen kinenbi: ‘shinryaku senso no hansei’ no jisshitsuka wo: Soreha hosho to kyoiku no tettei” [The 
Anniversary of the End of WWII: Materialize a “Regret over the Aggressive War”], Mainichi Shinbun, 15 
August, 1993. 
 
57 “‘Kyoseisei’ mitometa ‘ianfu’ chosa” [The “Coerciveness” Recognized in the Investigation on “Comfort 
Women”], Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 August, 1993. 
 
58 “Kyonju no seika wo atarashii soseki ni” [Make the Achievement in Gyeongju a New Cornerstone], 
Asahi Shinbun, 9 November, 1993. 
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(Nishino 2008). Many women refused to accept compensation from the AWF and, in 
2000, the Japanese government ignored international feminist efforts to hold the 
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, a 
people’s tribunal designed to bring Japan to justice on the basis of international law. This 
tribunal was largely ignored by the Japanese media, too. While the Japanese government 
simply repeated the already issued statements, the media started to show less interest in 
problematizing the wartime comfort women system, as if the problem had been 
completely solved. 
2007 was a landmark year for the situation of the comfort women. In the spring, 
the Women’s Fund completed all its planned projects and finally disbanded. While Japan 
believed that it had made sincere efforts to solve the problem, in July, the United States’ 
House of Representatives passed Resolution 121 that severely criticized Japan for not 
acting appropriately about the issue of the comfort women (Arai 2008). Although similar 
resolutions had been submitted to the House of Representatives several times prior to this, 
the 2007 resolution was the first one to be actually adopted. This US action was followed 
by those of other states, including the Netherlands, Canada, and the European Parliament, 
which also adopted resolutions against Japan on the comfort women issue by the end of 
2007.  
Increasing international criticism of Japan was a great shock to Japanese society. 
Most importantly, it meant that not only Asian states but also the West did not regard 
Japan as a responsible or fully moral member of the international community. As the 
media debate concentrated on the persisting international distrust of Japan, what was at 
stake in the comfort women issue was no longer either the “past” or the morality of 
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postwar Japan. Rather, the comfort women issue was interpreted as a manifestation of 
how the world saw Japan. It was an issue of international acceptance of Japan in the 
contemporary era.    
“Why are we still fettered by the wartime legacy?”, editorials asked. These 
editorials tried to analyze the causes of the unchanging international perception of Japan 
as an aggressor while revealing a constant fear of international mistrust. Many editorials 
found the immediate cause in the irresponsible remarks made by then Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzo and by some other conservative politicians who occasionally cast doubt on the 
forced recruitment of the comfort women by the Japanese military. They argued that it 
must have been not the military, but private entrepreneurs that had abducted women and 
forced them to serve as comfort women. According to newspaper editorials in 2007, such 
assertions invited fierce international criticisms and overall suspicion toward Japan, thus 
undermining Japan’s continued efforts to convey its apologies to the survivors, to 
improve relations with China and South Korea, and to enhance its international 
credibility. They also argued that Prime Minister Abe’s remarks might have created the 
image that Japan did not dare to face its history and that Japan instead tried to distort 
history and escape responsibility, something that the international community would see 
as “unsightly” and “shameful.” That is to say, because of Japan’s inconsistent attitude 
toward the comfort women issue, Japan remained unable to dispel international mistrust 
and thus hurt its own honor and confidence. 
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Many of the editorials also expressed concern that Japan appeared to speak with a 
“double tongue.”59 That is, Prime Minister Abe questioned the coerced prostitution while 
his administration formally inherited the official stance expressed in the Kono Statement. 
These editorials, accordingly, blamed Prime Minister Abe for his thoughtless words and 
urged the government to explicitly describe Japan’s official stance so that Japan could 
gain international acceptance. After all, Japan had to admit that, whether as a result of the 
Japanese military or of private entrepreneurs, “upon request from the military, an 
inhumane system of military comfort women was established,” and that “many women 
were compelled to go through a humiliating and tragic experience.”60  
Other editorials, however, expressed frustration at the fact that Japan was not 
understood by the international community and blamed the United States for its attitude 
toward Japan. Some editorials asserted that the US resolution was unacceptable because 
it ignored all of Japan’s efforts to solve the problem, including the repeated official 
apologies and the projects launched by the Asian Women’s Fund.61 Some also believed 
                                                          
59 “Ianfu ketsugi: Beikoku no shusho he no keisho da” [The Comfort Women Resolution: This Is America’s 
Warning to the Prime Minister], Minami Nihon Shinbun, 2 August, 2007; “Ianfu mondai: Hansei koso 
sonkei wo eru michi da” [The Comfort Women Problem: Expressing Regret Is the Way to Earn Respect], 
Kanagawa Shinbun, 4 April, 2007; “‘Ianfu’ ketsugi: I wo tsukushi setsumei shitaka” [The “Comfort 
Women” Resolution: Did Japan Explain Sincerely?], Kyoto Shinbun, 28 June 2007; “Abe shusho hobei: 
Shakumei de hajimaru to ha irei” [Prime Minister Abe’s Visit to the US: The Unprecedented Start with 
Excuses], Kyoto Shinbun, 28 April 2007. 
 
60 “Abe gaiko ga tamesareteiru”[Abe’s Diplomacy is Being Tested], Nishi Nihon Shinbun, 5 August, 2007; 
“Reisei na taio ga motomerareru” [A Calm Response is Needed], Nishi Nihon Shinbun, 28 June, 2007; 
“Jugun ianfu mondai: Taio ha Kono danwa wo kihon ni” [The Comfort Women Problem: The Kono 
Statement Should be the Basis of Japan’s Response], Nishi Nihon Shinbun, 11 March, 2007.  
 
61 “Ianfu ketsugi: Beikoku no shusho he no keisho da” [The Comfort Women Resolution: This Is American 
Warning to the Prime Minister], Minami Nihon Shinbun, 2 August, 2007; “Jugun ianfu: Fushinkan 
fusshoku suru doryoku wo” [Comfort Women: Make Efforts to Dispel Their Mistrust], Minami Nihon 
Shinbun, 18 March, 2007; “Nichibei kankei sokoneru ianfu ketsugi” [The Comfort Women Resolution 
Harming Japan-US Relations], Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 1 August, 2007; “Abe hobei de nichibei domei wo 
seijoka dekiruka” [Can Japan Normalize Japan-US Alliance by Abe’s Visit to the US?], Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun, 16 April, 2007; “Ianfu ketsugi: ‘Nichibei no mizo’ umeru doryoku wo” [The Comfort Women 
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that the resolution exhibited an American misunderstanding about “historical facts.” That 
is, the forced prostitution by the Japanese military was not objectively supported by 
evidence. Indeed, it was pointed out that some academic debates had concluded in the 
mid-1990s (after the official apology was made to the former comfort women) that the 
Japanese military did not force women to serve as comfort women (comfort women were 
rather recruited by private entrepreneurs, in some cases forcibly).62 In this respect, the 
Kono Statement, creating the impression that forced prostitution had indeed happened, 
did not adequately reflect the historical facts and should be reviewed by the government 
to remove any international misperception of the situation.63 A more disturbing issue, 
these editorials observed, was that other states also used to have their own comfort 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Resolution: Make Efforts to Bridge the Gap between Japan and the US], Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun, 2 
August, 2007; “Abe gaiko ga tamesareteiru”[Abe’s Diplomacy is Being Tested], Nishi Nihon Shinbun, 5 
August, 2007; “Reisei na taio ga motomerareru” [A Cal Response is Needed], Nishi Nihon Shinbun, 28 
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Gokai wo hirogeta shusho toben” [Comfort Women: The Prime Minister’s Statement That Bred 
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seyo” [The Comfort Women Resolution: The Prime Minister Must Recognize the Seriousness], Asahi 
Shinbun, 28 June, 2007. 
 
62 “Ianfu ketsugi: Oshu deno rensa hanno ga shinpaida” [The Comfort Women Resolution: Concern about 
the Domino Effect in Europe], Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 December, 2007; “Ianfu ketsugi: Beigikai no ‘gokai’ 
no nemoto wo tate” [The Comfort Women Resolution: Root out the American Parliament’s 
Misunderstanding], Yomiuri Shinbun, 28 June, 2007; “Ianfu mondai: Kakushin wo sorashite giron suruna” 
[The Comfort Women Problem: Don’t Discuss the Issue Without Getting to the Heart of the Problem], 
Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 March, 2007; “‘Ianfu’ ketsugian: Nihon seifu ha kichinto hanron seyo” [The “Comfort 
Women” Resolution: The Japanese Government Should Object to It Decidedly], Yomiuri Shinbun, 16 
October, 2006. 
 
63 Some editorials argued that the Kono Statement was rather the product of a political compromise 
between Japan and South Korea. More precisely, Japan issued the statement since South Korea had told 
Japan that it would not ask for individual compensation if Japan conceded forced prostitution. “Ianfu 
ketsugi: Kajo hanno shinai kotoda” [The Comfort Women Resolution: Don’t Overreact], Hokkoku Shinbun, 
16 March, 2007; “Ianfu mondai: Gaiko ni fusawashiku nai” [The Comfort Women Problem: It Is Not 
Adequate to Treat It as a Foreign Policy Issue], Hokkoku Shinbun, 1 August, 2007. Also see “Ianfu ketsugi: 
Oshu deno rensa hanno ga shinpaida” [The Comfort Women Resolution: Concern about the Domino Effect 
in Europe], Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 December, 2007; “Ianfu ketsugi: Beigikai no ‘gokai’ no nemoto wo tate” 
[The Comfort Women Resolution: Root out the American Parliament’s Misunderstanding], Yomiuri 
Shinbun, 28 June, 2007. 
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women system. In particular, the US occupational forces “reused” the Japanese comfort 
women system for their own sexual needs. However, instead of facing its own dishonor, 
the United States decided to criticize Japan and to hurt Japan’s international moral 
credibility.64  
Although these editorials interpreted international criticism in different ways, they 
all depicted Japan as struggling to dispel international mistrust and to be fully accepted as 
a respected member of the international community. Despite repeated formal apologies to 
former comfort women and the atonement made through the Women’s Fund, Japan was 
not regarded as fulfilling its responsibility of facing its history. Because of Prime 
Minister Abe’s remarks, an international misunderstanding of historical facts, or 
American biased views of Japan, postwar Japan remained haunted by its former victims 
and by misinformed or frustrated international others. These editorials thus constructed 
Japan as an “international pariah” since Japan continued to be hated, misunderstood, and 
mistrusted in Asia and throughout the world. In this sense, the boundaries between 
wartime Japan and postwar Japan that the official discourse tried to articulate became 
unsettled and disrupted in the media. There was no such a thing as a “postwar Japan” that 
had totally overcome its haunting others.  
 
                                                          
64 “Ianfu ketsugi: Ayamatta rekishi no hitori aruki ga shinpaida” [The Comfort Women Resolution: Anxiety 
about the Misinformed History Becoming out of Control], Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 August, 2007. Also see 
“Ianfu ketsugi: Kajo hanno shinai kotoda” [The Comfort Women Resolution: Don’t Overreact], Hokkoku 
Shinbun, 16 March, 2007; “Ianfu mondai: Gaiko ni fusawashiku nai” [The Comfort Women Problem: It Is 
Not Adequate to Treat It as a Foreign Policy Issue], Hokkoku Shinbun, 1 August, 2007. 
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Conclusion   
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the comfort women issue 
constitutes a crucial site where Japan performatively constructs its postwar identity. The 
comfort women issue represents a disgraceful history that Japan wants to forget and 
overcome. Although the issue of the comfort women is one of many postwar reparation 
problems that have arisen between Japan and the former victim states, among these 
wartime legacies, the issue is given significant weight and continues to be hotly debated 
in Japan and across Asia.  
For the former victim states, the question is not only about Japan’s war 
responsibility, but also about their own national pride that was damaged through the 
bodies of the comfort women. For them, the rape of Asian comfort women is the rape of 
Asia itself, which eventually emasculates the identities of these Asian states (Kim 1997). 
In South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, former comfort women are now represented not 
only by activist groups but also by their national states that fight against Japan on their 
behalf (Soh 2000). The former comfort women’s bodies are, accordingly, “nationalized,” 
while the issue is represented as a matter of national importance.  
On the other hand, for Japan, these unfortunate female victims are a powerful 
reminder of wartime Japan’s evil, aggressiveness, and hyper-masculinity. Their presence 
calls into question Japan’s proud and noble identity, all the more so since most of these 
victims were “weak,” “naïve” young women in occupied territories. The comfort women 
issue, therefore, occupies an important place in any discussion of Japan’s wartime 
responsibilities, and continues to generate tremendous controversy in Japan.  
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Yet, this chapter has suggested that, in official discourses, the comfort women are 
not merely symbolic of Asian victimhood vis-à-vis Japan, but also present a condition of 
possibility for postwar Japan, making Japan’s pacifist identity possible. The question of 
the comfort women allows Japan not only to reinscribe its spatial/political boundaries 
with Asia, but also to reestablish temporal boundaries between a moral and pacifist 
postwar Japan and a militant wartime Japan. The comfort women were once a symbol of 
Japanese domination over Asia, and thus of “macho” Japan. Today, the apology to these 
women performatively continues to produce a masculine identity, but a seemingly more 
benign one as a state/self that claims to have bravely faced its past and wants to take the 
lead in addressing women’s issues as well as realizing world peace. 
In this sense, Japan’s policy toward the former comfort women is not simply a 
way to express formal apologies for past misconduct, but also an attempt to 
performatively reconstruct Japan’s postwar identity. This actually means that, at the 
moment the comfort women achieved official apologies from the Japanese government, 
the comfort women problem was relegated to the politics of speaking of/for the comfort 
women, where these women not only became an object of policy discussion, but also 
became instrumental in the construction of a moral Japan. While national atonement 
projects were carried out for the sake of former comfort women, the comfort women 
themselves would lose control of the definition of the “issue” before Japanese identity 
politics. 
Still, as the analysis of newspaper editorials has also suggested, this matter is still 
very much contested. Despite official discourses, competing images of postwar Japan still 
abound. Postwar Japan is haunted not only by its own past, but also by the US and 
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international others that constantly confront Japan with its past ghosts and challenge its 
allegedly reborn honorable and moral identity. Thus, the comfort women issue remains a 
performative and discursive space that is critical for the ongoing reconstruction of the 
Japanese self. An endless controversy over the comfort women keeps producing a source 
for Japan’s national imagination of its self and identity.  
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VI. CONCLUSION: UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND THE 
ENACTMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL JAPAN 
 
This dissertation has shown the performative construction of postwar Japan 
through foreign policy discourses. Instead of proving a causal or constitutive relationship 
between identity and foreign policy, this study has examined their “co-constitutive” 
relationship by conceptualizing foreign policy as a set of practices that construct, 
reproduce, and maintain the state identity in whose name it operates. As a discursive 
construction, identity is always unstable and unsettled. It cannot be possessed by any 
actor like a “thing,” nor is there an end to identity formation. Rather, identity is itself a 
“fabrication” or a “fantasy.” Subjects are “only produced as the truth effects of a 
discourse of primary and stable identity” and sustained through the repeated practices of 
signification that reenact the subjects (Butler 1990, 174).  
In this sense, the state is a political subject whose subjectivity is performatively 
constructed by discourse. The state continuously reproduces its identity or self through a 
series of signifying practices that establish a boundary for the state through a distinction 
between internal/domestic and external/foreign. That is, it is by the very signification of 
the state’s identity and the instituting of the other that the state comes into being as a 
subject. As Weber notes, “the identity of the state is performatively constituted by the 
very expressions that are said to be its result” (1998, 90).  
Based on this understanding of identity, this dissertation examined foreign policy 
as a crucial site where state identity is performatively constructed. Foreign policy 
documents, statements, as well as media discussions of foreign policy issues were 
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analyzed as various forms of performative enactment of the state’s “I.” Indeed, foreign 
policy suggests a moment of crisis, since the identity of the state comes into question or 
is even challenged in the face of problems, dangers, or threats posed from the “outside” 
(Weber 1998, 92-3). It is in this critical instance that the state reasserts its identity and 
thus reenacts its subjectivity, whereby the state is reinscribed into the world in which it 
lives. Foreign policy, in this sense, points to a moment of challenge and at the same time 
a moment of reenactment. Foreign policy is a site where the state’s identity-making 
“performance” takes place.  
 The present study has conducted an analysis of Japanese foreign policy from this 
perspective. In Japan, national identity has been an important issue since Japan was 
defeated by the United States and its imperial era was forced to end. As a country 
responsible for colonizing fellow Asian nations but also having to face the harsh realities 
of defeat, Japan has long struggled with the contradictory domestic image of its national 
self as a victim and the regional perception of Japan as an aggressor. Through a series of 
diplomatic issues with the United States and Asian states, in relation to which these 
conflicting identities emerge, Japan has tried to create a new self as an honorable and 
respectable identity, while also recreating the past selves as temporal others and thereby 
ejecting the “evil” and at times the “feminized” elements that inhabit these degraded past 
others.  
This dissertation has revealed this practice of constructing a “new Japan” by 
exploring two key sites of Japan’s identity formation: (1) the Okinawa problem, where 
the boundaries between Japan and the victorious United States are constantly negotiated; 
and (2) the comfort women issue, whereby Japan has struggled to overcome the lingering 
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dishonorable image of itself given by Asian victims. As I have discussed in this 
dissertation, both of these foreign policy issues have constituted critical sites where 
postwar Japan’s spatial, temporal, and ethical identity has been discursively produced. 
Each of these issues also represents the haunting legacy of World War II that Japan seeks 
to overcome in order to become a new self. In each case, though, Japan’s projected 
identity as a respectable, independent, and moral state has been challenged by the 
presence of the victorious United States or the victimized Asia. In the Okinawan case, 
and although Okinawa provides the foundation for the security alliance or “partnership” 
between Japan and the United States, the continued presence of the US military serves as 
a reminder of Japan’s miserable defeat in the Pacific War and its ongoing subjugation to 
a foreign power, something that was symbolized in repeated US military rapes of 
Okinawan girls. Rape victims whose internal space was brutally violated by American 
GIs became symbols of Japan’s victimhood, whereby the haunting ghost of Japan’s 
emasculated past was recreated as a shadow of Japan’s reconstructed masculine identity. 
In the comfort women case, Japan has been haunted by Asian female victims of wartime 
militarist Japan, who problematize postwar Japan’s proclaimed moral identity. These 
women indeed signify the brutal nature of wartime Japan that destroyed Asia.  
These issues suggest that Japan has continued to struggle with war memories as 
both a victim and a former assailant. Thus, honorable representations of postwar Japan 
are always challenged by the presence of the victorious United States or the victimized 
Asia. However, what is indeed haunting postwar Japan is past Japan itself. Okinawa’s 
continued victimhood constitutes a living ghost of Japan’s deplorable past as a defeated 
and occupied state, while former comfort women recreate the haunting ghost of Japan’s 
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past as an immoral aggressor. Thus, at stake in these foreign policy issues for Japan are 
the discursive construction of a new Japan and the re-inscription of the boundaries 
between past Japan and contemporary Japan. In other words, Japanese foreign policy 
toward these issues is a performance designed to reenact a new Japan and, thereby, to 
make the evil or defeated past self a temporal other. It is through the continuous 
construction of past selves as temporal others and the immediate negation of them that 
reborn Japan is constructed and the boundaries between the new Japan and the former 
Japan are maintained.    
Yet, I also argued, particularly in Chapter V, that, in order to become a new self, 
Japan actually needs this shadow, the shadow that represents what Japan “was” but also 
what Japan “is not.” The haunting legacies of the war are, in this respect, a condition of 
possibility for the “reborn Japan.” However, at the same time, the legacies also 
destabilize the very identity of the new Japan by remaking the past issue a contemporary 
problem and ultimately disrupting the temporal boundary of the new Japan. The past 
selves, accordingly, construct and simultaneously threaten Japan’s new masculine and 
pacifist identity.  
Japanese foreign policy is, thus, an ongoing struggle to reenact a new Japan. It is 
in this struggle that pacifist postwar Japan can be articulated and exist as a “social fact.” 
If we view Japanese foreign policy in this way, it then becomes possible to examine 
various Japanese foreign policy agendas from this new perspective and interpret them in 
the context of this performative construction of postwar Japan. As briefly mentioned in 
Chapter III, Japan has been making extensive efforts toward international peace and 
stability. Japan has recently shown a growing commitment to global issues by expanding 
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economic assistance to developing states, deepening its alliance with the United States, 
and joining United Nations’ activities. Notable is Japan’s decision to start to participate in 
UN peacekeeping operations in 1992, whereby Japan allowed its Self Defense Forces to 
be dispatched overseas such as Cambodia, East Timor, and the Golan Height. This 
decision marked a turning point in Japanese foreign policy in that the Japanese pacifist 
Constitution places strict limitations on the use of force as a means of resolving 
international disputes. Thus, the role of the Japanese Self Defense Forces had been 
traditionally restricted to “territorial defense,” which had made the overseas dispatch of 
the SDF a “taboo” in Japan. That is to say, as Masaru Tamamoto notes, “the inability to 
threaten other countries militarily came to be understood as Japan’s contribution to world 
peace” (1994, 92). In fact, and somewhat ironically, while the Japanese Constitution “is 
internationalist, proclaiming the construction of world peace as the national mission[,] 
[…] instead of participating in the international political realm to realize its constitutional 
ideal, Japan used the Constitution to shield itself from international politics” (Tamamoto 
1994, 92; also see Ito 2007, 78-9). As a consequence, Japan’s proclaimed UN-centered 
diplomacy did not lead to its active involvement in any UN peacekeeping operations 
outside Japan. Japan instead focused on economic assistance and used it as a way of 
contributing to international development and prosperity.  
However, in 1992, the Japanese Diet passed the so-called PKO Law (International 
Peace Cooperation Law) through which Japan paved the way for more active 
involvement in UN peacekeeping activities. Under conditions in which five basic 
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principles would be met,65 Japan sent its troops to Cambodia (UNCTAD), Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ), the Golan Heights (UNDOF), and some other parts of the world. These 
guidelines were set in order to put limitations on the SDF’s peacekeeping activities by 
allowing Japan’s participation in those missions authorized by, and conducted within, the 
framework of the United Nations only. Indeed, “for the assertive pacifist Japan that had 
desired to contribute substantially to world affairs through nonmilitary means, the UN 
provided an ideal forum in which to carry out its global responsibility and to enhance its 
status and prestige” (Ito 2007, 76). More recently, Japan has also passed “the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law” (in 2001) in order to dispatch the SDF to the Indian 
Ocean and thereby support US efforts in Afghanistan. This law made it possible for Japan 
to participate in activities outside the scope of narrowly defined UN peacekeeping 
operations. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was, however, a temporal law and 
abolished in 2010, while the PKO Law is a permanent one and still provides the basis for 
overseas dispatch of the SDF. Japan continues to show interest in acting within the 
framework of the United Nations, which establishes the legitimacy of SDF’s activities 
abroad.     
To note, Japan’s international contribution has been repeatedly discussed in 
official documents and statements for a long time (Kohno 2007; Murakami 2008). Japan 
has long positioned Official Development Assistance (ODA) at the core of its 
                                                          
65 The five PKO principles include: (1) “the parties to a conflict agree to, and maintain, a cease-fire”; (2) 
“the parties in the conflict must consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping unit and to Japan’s 
involvement”; (3) “any peacekeeping operations in which Japan is involved must maintain strict 
impartiality and neutrality”; (4) Japan can withdraw “from the contingent peacekeeping activities, if any of 
the prior three requirements […] fails or ceases to be satisfied; and (5) “corps personnel and SDF units 
participating in peacekeeping operations may use weapons at the minimum level [for self-defense]” (Ito 
2007, 85, 86, 87). These conditions were devised so that the PKO Law does not infringe on the 
Constitution. Further, the SDF can be dispatched only to participate in nonmilitary activities led by the UN.   
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international contributions, and thus “the idea of international contribution has been 
closely linked with Japan’s ODA program” (Kohno 2007, 25). But it was during and after 
the First Gulf War that the discussion was vigorously conducted in terms of “human 
contributions,” more specifically, SDF’s actual participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations. Many scholars explain Japan’s move toward bolder approaches to 
international security and stability in the context of “external pressures” (Ikudame 2004, 
267; Iokibe 1999, 236-7). In fact, since Japan became a member of the United Nations, 
political leaders had explored the possibility of SDF’s involvement in peacekeeping 
operations, which they nevertheless could not realize because of strong opposition from 
Japanese society (Kohno 2007; Murakami 2008; Sakaguchi 1999; Shoji 2010). Scholars 
assert that it was a great shock for Japan that its monetary contribution at the time of the 
Gulf War, although covering almost one-third of the coalition’s spending on military 
operations, was not only criticized for being “too little, too late,” but also was not even 
thanked by Kuwait. This was indeed a shock since the Kuwaiti government nonetheless 
appreciated other states for sending troops to the area. Many scholars argue that, 
awakened by this “Iraqi shock,” Japanese political leaders and bureaucrats “recognized 
that the traditional economic diplomacy could not be substituted for the maintenance of a 
security agenda” (Ito 2007, 76). Thus, in response to international pressure, US pressure 
in particular, Japan made a historic step toward authorizing the overseas dispatch of the 
SDF and actively participating in UN peacekeeping operations. 
In addition to this argument, various explanations about Japan’s recent policy 
toward UN peacekeeping operations have been offered. This new move can also be 
viewed, for example, as a result of change in domestic norms, from the dominance of 
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antimilitarism to a more nuanced balance between antimilitarism and liberal 
internationalism (Fujishige 2008), or as a sign of Japan’s realist turn (Ikudame 2004, 275).  
While these arguments are plausible, Japan’s move toward more active involvement in 
the United Nations can also be explained in terms of its performative construction as a 
reborn self, as discussed throughout this dissertation. In fact, we should remember that 
the politicization of the two issues discussed in this dissertation, the issues of the comfort 
women and of US military rapes of Okinawan girls, occurred in the 1990s, when the 
PKO Law was also enacted in Japan. While the rapes have become highly political since 
the 1995 incident, the rise of new discourses about the comfort women around 1990 
made it possible to transform this wartime issue into a contemporary problem of 
international significance. That is to say, almost 50 years after the war, Japan experienced 
a new wave of postwar issues both as a former aggressor and as a loser/victim. As 
suggested, these issues not only showed the resilience of war memories in Japan as well 
as in Asia, but they also indicated the conflicted and unsettled identity of Japan. As I have 
argued, as a fragmented subject, Japan has reasserted its new identity by dealing with a 
series of problems that emerged as the haunting legacy of World War II. Japan’s evolving 
policy toward UN peacekeeping operations can thus be understood in the context of 
Japan’s continuing struggles for identity, or of Japan’s performance to create the reality 
of a “new Japan.” 
Indeed, as a state rehabilitated and rebuilt as a pacifist nation after the war, what 
was at stake in the long debate over Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations 
was not only the limited scope of the Japanese Constitution, but also the question of how 
postwar Japan could play an international role in a way that is “appropriate” for reborn 
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Japan (Murakami 2008). As mentioned above, Japan’s international contribution has been 
one of the core agendas in Japanese foreign policy in the postwar era, especially after 
Japan achieved its economic miracle and regained a sense of pride. International 
contributions are a way for Japan to performatively (re)make itself as a truly international, 
pacifist state and, thus, to become a respected member of the international community. 
Therefore, the issue of Japan’s international contributions is also a question of identity for 
Japan. It is a way for Japan to differentiate itself from the past self once again and to 
overcome its haunting shadow that insists on bringing Japan back to a past reality that 
attaches Japan to the image of a barbarian aggressor in Asia. Pacifist Japan is, in this 
sense, not the foundation of Japan’s internationalist policy, but “is performatively 
constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its result” (Weber 1998, 90).  
This point is clearly shown in diplomatic bluebooks published in recent years. 
Japan’s diplomatic bluebook issued after the enactment of the PKO law (MOFA 1993), 
for example, states that the involvement in UN peacekeeping operations constitutes 
Japan’s “active contribution to world peace and security.” Further, as a result of the 
participation, Japan “contributed to the realization of peace” and “was highly appreciated 
by the international community.” The bluebook, thus, concludes that Japan’s 
peacekeeping activities are significant in that Japan can now “play a global role for world 
peace and security.”  
These expressions of Japan’s contribution to world peace and its growing 
international responsibility have repeatedly appeared in bluebooks since 1993. These 
bluebooks continue to construct Japan as a responsible, pacifist subject vis-à-vis the 
international community and, thereby, seek to reproduce “reborn pacifist Japan.” 
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Although wartime militarist Japan brought misery to Asia, based on the reflection on the 
past, Japan now actively tries to create peace in the world and to help others who are 
struggling to reconstruct their country. Also, through overcoming postwar devastation, 
occupation, and the 30-year separation of Okinawa, Japan learned the evil of war and 
now strives to make the world safer and more peaceful. In other words, both as a former 
assailant and as a defeated nation, UN peacekeeping operations provide a perfect place 
where Japan can articulate a new self while even sublimating these conflicted identities. 
Indeed, Japan’s past makes contemporary Japan’s international contribution important 
and meaningful, while, by making international contributions, Japan can reproduce the 
boundaries between an old Japan and a new Japan. Therefore, three different issues 
discussed in this dissertation, the issues of the comfort women, Okinawa, and Japan’s 
recent active international contributions, all can be understood as part of Japan’s ongoing 
struggle for identity and, thus, as Japan’s continuing performance to create or recreate 
“postwar Japan.” Pacifist Japan is, thus, a performative construction. A new Japan is 
constructed through performance that gives it a reality as a respectable, honorable state. 
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